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
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
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



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ROBERT MIDGLEY.

Aristoteles

Aristotle's RHETORIC;

Or the True
GROUNDS and PRINCIPLES
OF
O R A T O R Y;

SHEWING,
The *Right Art* of PLEADING
and SPEAKING in full Assemblies
and Courts of Judicature.

Made *English*
By the *Translators* of the *ART* of
THINKING.

In Four Books.

L O N D O N,
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The Epistle Dedicatory.

written in Obedience to his Commands. Which made him doubtless employ the choicest of his thoughts to gratifie so Excellent a Prince. Nor is it to be thought that *Aristotle* deem'd it a small Honour to be so Illustriously Patroniz'd.

The Emulation of the *English Version* to approach as near as might be to the *Greek Original*, and to follow the Authors Example, embolden'd this Address to your Honour. For they were not the Pedantic Rudiments of *Rhetoric*, which *Aristotle* offer'd to one that had been his *Royal Pupil*, but the most substantial Part, which he therefore fits and appropriates to the Practical Management of Human Life. As knowing the Potent Effects of Learned Eloquence in the Conduct of all Great Affairs, whether at the *Council Board*, or in the *Field*. What

The Epistle Dedicatory.

What then was once thought worthy the acceptance of a Prince, seeks now for Harbour in your Honours Favour. For where should Learning, when Important, seek for Patronage, but to a Person so well acquainted with Her, as your self? The Greatest Glory and the Greatest Justice she can do her self, is to lay her humble offering at the Feet of Honour and Vertue. Accomplishments, which you your self so conspicuously inherit by a long descent of Famous Ancestry. Story, that near will dye, admires *Ireland* once govern'd, with applause by Great and Prudent *Sidney*; no less Famous for the Overthrow of *Shane*, *Oneal* and all his Rebel Crew. Nor can Time deface the Memory of *Sr. Philip*, of whom *Thuanus*, *Juvenis Virtute, ingenii solertia & eruditione præstans*; nor of his Sister the Countess of *Pembrook*, once the Ornament

The Epistle Dedicatory.

ment of her Age. And if your Noble Father excell'd in Learning and Philosophy, well may we say, your self the Son of such a Parent have rais'd your self no less Conspicuous Monuments of your Wisdom and Prudence, both at home and abroad; while the Deep Affairs of late Negotiation and Treaty still Crown'd your Transactions with eminent succels,

No wonder then that *Alexander* and *Aristotle* dubious what entertainment they may find in *English* Dress, make their Applications to your Honour, for a new Pass-Port through the Common-wealth of Learning; since their Fate depends upon your Pleasure.

For my own part, I was glad of the Opportunity, not knowing (though under some Relation to the Noble Blood of the *SYDNEYS*) how I might approach
your

The Epistle Dedicatory.

your Presence in better Company,
or that could better excuse the Pre-
sumption of

(Honourable Sir)

Your Honours most

obliged and Devoted

Servant,

H. C.

THE
P R E F A C E
TO THE
R E A D E R

THE *Universality of Things is discern'd in Three places ; In this same living Fabrick of Heaven and Earth: then again it shews it self in the Mind as in a Looking Glass ; and lastly in Oration or Speech, which is a kind of Image representing the Minds of Men. For neither is there any thing in the World, nor in the Mind, which is the other World, or which can be conceiv'd by the Mind, about which Oration or Sense does not in some Measure or other exercise it self. Wonderful therefore is the Force and Prevalency of Oratory, to Transfer and delineate in the Lively Colours*

The Preface.

lours of Words, as in a Picture, the whole Spectacle of Nature into the Mind and Senses of him that hears thee, by which means the knowledge of things is as it were embody'd and transform'd into the Mind it self, and all things are made one and incorporated with it. A Faculty which is both one and the same, and lyes in a narrow compass, which way soever it may be made use of. And therefore they do ill that load it with an Infinite Croud of Precepts. Since the whole force of it consists in conceiving in the Mind, in expressing by Words, and in Conforming to the Auditory. The Knowledge of Human Customs, Civil Institutions, of all Histories, of the whole Series of Antiquity and of all things in Nature, flows from hence, as from a Copious Fountain. However there is no great difficulty in conceiving, provided we be watchful and attentively diligent to store up in our Minds the Force and Moments of Human Transactions, and to observe carefully the Nature of things: Which is the True Fountain

The Preface.

Fountain of Elocution. For all things imprint their forms and shapes in the Mind, and leave certain footsteps of themselves behind, which are imprinted by Nature. Which he that takes notice of while they are before him, shall recall 'em the more easily to mind being past, and from thence shall be able to form to himself the Forms and Images of things as often as necessity requires. In expression there is a great Proclivity or Proneness, if the Things be well conceiv'd, and imprinted, if the Mind of the Orator, which is the Spectator, Observer, Arbitrator and Judge of Things be furnished with good judgment. For the Tongue, the Lips and Countenance all move according to the Habit of the Mind. Therefore they mistake, who believe Elocution to be the Force of Words, which is the Strength and Efficacy of the Mind. For which Reason, this is a short Maxim, That He who will speak according to the Habit of the Mind, must take care in the first place rightly to adorn and perfect his mind.

In

The Preface.

In conforming to the Auditory there is more difficulty; and this is that which has produc'd such an infinite number of Precepts. For we see the vast Variety of Times, of Places, Persons, Causes and Moments of Things. Therefore seeing the Former require a kind of Civil and Boundless Exercitation; This is to be obtain'd from conversing with Men, and from the Customs of Nations, and to be learnt from our Infancy. Now whether Cicero has rightly comprehended these things, in those few words VVhat? VVherein? At what time? and how to be spoken? the Orator is to take care. Aristotle does the same here, discoursing of the First, in the first place, of Conformity in the next, and of Expression in his Third Book.

And now should we go about to speak in praise of the Author, as it is the Custom of most Interpreters, we might justly fear the same Reproof as was given to him that went about to applaud Hercules, among
the

The Preface.

the Lacedæmonians : For who, cry'd they, is there among us that has the least Evil Thought of Hercules; or that does not already reverence and adore him, as being ascrib'd into the Number of the Immortal Gods ? For such is the High Esteem of Aristotle in the World, and his Authority among Men, that it would be a vain thing to make any farther Encomiums upon his Wit and Learning, the Profoundness of his Knowledge, or his Diligence in explaining what he wrote; and whom therefore Tully also allows to be the Prince of all Philosophers.

Aristotle's

Aristotle's R H E T O R I C T O Theodectes.

B O O K I.

C H A P. I.

That Rhetoric and Logic treat of the same Subject. That they who treated of Rhetoric before, did not rightly understand it, and of the Benefit of Rhetoric.

RHETORIC and LOGIC are near of kin the one to the other. For both treat of the same things, which are in a manner known by all Men, and belong to no certain Science. And therefore one way or other all Men participate of both; seeing that all People by some means or other endeavour to find out and maintain an Argument, or to impeach and defend; which
B. many

many do rashly and without Experience, many through Exercise, and several naturally and habitually. Which being either way to be done, it is apparent that there is a way and method to be found out, to which the matter may be reduc'd when both attain their Ends, as well they who proceed according to the dictate of Nature, as they who search into the causes and reasons of what they do; which all will grant to be the Office of Art. Whoever therefore till this time have compos'd the Art of Eloquence, have found out but a small part of it; for when only Art prevails to gain Credit and Belief by Persuasion, other things are only additional; they make no mention of Enthymemes, which are the Sinews of Persuasion, but make a great pudder about those things which are little to the purpose. For Crimination, Compassion, Anger and those other affections of the Mind are nothing to the business, but only serve to move the Judges. And therefore as it is the custom in many Cities; especially such as are governed by good Laws, if the same were observ'd in Judgments, they would have nothing left for them to say. For so all People partly believe it should be ordain'd by the Law; partly they retain the same Constitution, to speak nothing from the purpose; as in the *Areopagus*, wherein they did well. For it is no way laudable to pervert a Judge by moving him to Anger, Envy or Pity. Which is no more then if a Man should pretend to make use of a Rule, and bend it crooked. Besides that whoever sets up a Controversy, has no more to do then to demonstrate whether the thing is, or is not? whether it were or were not done? Now
whether

whether the Act were great or of little Consequence, whether just or unjust, whatever the Legislator has not distinguish'd, that the Judge ought to know, and not to learn from him that propounds the Controversy. Therefore it is convenient that good and wholesome Laws should make a distinction of all those things themselves, and leave as few as possible to the opinion of the Judges. First, because it is more easy to find one, or but a few Prudent Persons that are able to make good Laws, and give true Judgment then many: In the next place, Laws are made by such as take long time to consider. Judgments are suddenly pronounc'd, and therefore it is a difficult thing rightly to dispence what is just and profitable: But this is the chiefest thing of all to be consider'd, that the judgment of the Legislator does not confine it self to Particulars and things Present, but dilates and extends to Universals, and things to come. But the Senator and the Judge determine of things definite and present. Whence it happens that their own affection, or hatred, or private advantage intervening, they make but a negligent enquiry into the Truth; while their Judgments are sway'd by their own gain or loss: So that as to other things, as already has been said, the least power of determining that may be is to be left to the Judge; but whether done or not done, whether it be or not be, will come to pass or not, all this of necessity must be submitted to his Determination; since it is impossible for a Law-giver to make sufficient Provision in such Cases. Which being so, it is apparent that they teach those things that are quite from the purpose, who treat of other things, as what the

Proeme, what the Narrative ought to contain, or any one of the other parts. For therein they teach us no more then how to dispose the Mind of the Judg this way or that way. But as to artificial Perswasion they inform us nothing, that is, how a Person may become a good Argumentator. Seeing therefore there is the same Method to be us'd in popular Orations, as in Pleadings at the Bar, and that it is much more noble and of greater use to be a popular Orator, then a litigious brangler about Contracts and private Bargains, they do ill in being so silent as to the former, so voluminous as to the latter, believing it is of less concernment to be extravagant in popular Arguments, and less wile and subtilty in that then in Bar-Pleading, as being more common. For in the former the Judg determines of what in part concerns himself; so that there is no more requir'd then to demonstrate the thing to be, as the Adviser says. But in causes of *Meum* and *Tuum* that will not suffice where it is necessary to take the Ears of the Hearer; for the Judgment is to be of other Mens concerns: So that while they consider their own profit, and hear with favour, they give themselves up to the Pleader, but make no determination. Therefore in many places the Law forbids digressions from the Matter, and there the Judges exactly observe that Law. But in regard it is manifest that the artificial way relates and consists in Perswasion, and that Perswasion is a kind of Demonstration, (for then we chiefly believe a thing when we suppose it to be demonstrated,) and for that Rhetorical Demonstration is Argument; which if I may so say, is the most powerful way
of

of Persuasion ; and for that Argument is a certain Syllogism, and seeing all Syllogisms are under the Consideration of Logic, either in whole, or in part ; it is manifest that he who can most readily find out of what, and how a Syllogism is Compos'd, will prove the sharpest Argumentator, especially Understanding in what things Enthymemes are of chiefest use, and how they differ from Logical Syllogisms. For the same Consideration will find out what is true, and what is like to Truth. For Men are sufficiently inclin'd to Truth, and for the most part attain to the Truth. Wherefore he who attains easily to Probability by conjecture, takes the same course to find out the Truth. Why therefore others have been so nice about things which are nothing to the purpose, and why they have made judicial Pleading, the Subject of their Labour is apparent.

Now Rhetoric is therefore useful, because that by Nature those things that are just and true, are much better then their Contraries ; and therefore if Judgments be not properly and conveniently made, there is a necessity of their failing, and being easily refuted ; the consequence of which is nothing but disgrace and reproof. Besides it is not an easy thing to persuade some Men with all our talking, tho' we have never so exquisite a Knowledge of the thing ; (for the Speech of Instruction is that which proceeds from Knowledge) which being so difficult, if not Impossible, there is a necessity of procuring the Impressions of Belief and Reason from common things, as we have already said in our Topicks concerning Haranguing to the unskillful Multitude. Nor is it amiss to

be able to persuade contraries, as in Syllogisms, not that we ought to persuade those things that are evil, but that we may not be Ignorant how they stand in Competition with Truth, and when such Arguments are unjustly made use of by others, that we may be able to refute 'em. Now of all the other Sciences none conclude contraries Syllogistically, except Rhetoric and Logic; for they both discourse of Contraries; tho' tis not so with their Subjects; but always those things which are naturally best and truest, are much more fit for Argument, and most proper to persuade. Moreover it would be very absurd that it should be a disgrace for the Body not to be able to help it self, yet no shame for a Mans reason to be defective, which is of more use to Man then the defect of his Body. If it should be objected that it might prove of very ill Consequence for a Man to make a bad use of an effectual power of Reason, that certainly is no more then what is common to all things that are accounted good, unless Vertue it self; but more especially the Fate that attends those things that are most beneficial to Mankind, as Strength, Health, Riches, and Command. For he that makes a just use of these things is commonly a great Benefactor; but he that abuses those advantages, oft-times becomes a public Pest. Now then that Rhetoric is not under any certain and Determinate kind, but as Logic is, and equally useful, is apparent by what we have said. For persuasion it self is not its Duty, but to see what may be appositely made use of for convincement upon every Subject, as in all other Arts and Sciences; For it is not the Office of Physic to create Health;

but

but as far as it is possible to reform an ill habit; for it is possible to Cure those, that it is impossible to restore to a sane Constitution. In like manner it is also the part of Rhetoric to consider what is Perswasive and what is probably convincing, as of Logic to discern what is a Syllogism, and what a seeming Syllogism. For a cavilling Disputant, is such not in force of Argument, but in pre-lection. On the other side, one Man shall be a Rhetorician by vertue of his Knowledge, another by Election. But no Man shall be a good Logician by Pre-election, but by the force of his Arguments. Now therefore as to this same Method it self, we shall endeavour to make out how and by what Principles we may attain to what we have propounded, beginning again with the definition of Rhetoric.

CHAP. II.

What Rhetoric is ? what its Subject ? how it relates to Logic ? and of what Things Oration chiefly consists ?

LET Rhetoric therefore be a Power or Faculty, to consider in every Subject what is therein contain'd proper to perswade. For this is the Duty of no other Science. For particular Arts are both Doctrinal and Perswasive, as to what is their Subject; as Physic in reference to Health or Sicknes; Geometry in reference to

Bodies and their Accidents, and Arithmetick in reference to Numbers, and so of the rest of the Arts and Sciences. But Rhetoric makes it her Business to consider the probability, or truth of the thing propounded whatever it be. And therefore we say it has not any proper and peculiar operation upon any peculiar *Genus*. Now of Proofs or Convincements, some are without Art, others Artificial. Those I call done without Art, which we never study for; Artificial, those that are invented by reason and Method; so that it behoves us of these two sorts, to make use of the one and invent the other. Now of those Proofs which Reason affords us there are three sorts. Some in the Manners of the Speaker; some in the disposition of the Hearer, some in the Oration it self, by vertue of its Demonstration or Probability of Demonstration. Convincement by manners is when the Oration is so pronounc'd that the Orator may be thought a person worthy to be credited. For we believe the Vertuous more easily and sooner, and barely in all things; but absolutely in these things where there is not that Certainty, but a suspence of Judgment, and difficulty of Determination, in regard of the various opinions of Men. However this ought to come to pass, out of some respect gain'd by the delivery of the Oration, not out of Partiality, advancing the undeserv'd Credit of any Person. For then like some Rhetoricians, they do not place the probity of the Speaker in his Skill, which they look upon as no way conducing to Convincement, but as if the chief Argument of perswasion lay in the vertue of an Orator.

Again the Auditors believe in respect of themselves,

selves, when they find the Impulse of some affection rais'd in their Minds. For we do not give the same Judgments, when we grieve as when we are glad; when we love as when we hate. Concerning which things the Writers now adays pretend to give Instructions; of which Particulars we shall say more, when we come to discourse of the affections.

Convincement by the Orations themselves is when we demonstrate what is true or what appears to be so, by what is most proper to persuade in every Particular. Seeing then that all Convincements arise from these things, it is apparent that all these three ought to be made use of, to the end we may obtain the faculty of Ratiocination, that we may be able to consider the conditions and vertues which ought to give perfection to Men, and as to the affections, that we may understand what they are, their several sorts, and whence and how they arise, and from all these to make Syllogistical conclusions. So that Rhetoric seems to be a kind of shute growing out of Logic, and the doctrine of Manners, and may therefore justly be said to be Political. Wherefore also Rhetoric seems to Personate Politics; and they who challenge the knowledg of it, claim that knowledge partly through Ignorance, partly through arrogance, and partly upon other human Reasons; for it is a kind of Particle and Similitude of Logic, as we have said in the beginning. For neither of both is the Science of any thing determinate, but a certain faculty and ability to invent Arguments. Now as to their effective Power, and how they relate one to another, enough has been said. But as to those things

things which are said, or appear to be demonstrated, there is one way to do this by Induction, another by Syllogism, or by that which seems to be a Syllogism. For Example is Induction, and an Enthymeme a Syllogism: Now I call an *Enthymeme* a Rhetorical Syllogism, and Example a Rhetorical Induction; since all Men prove by Demonstration, producing either Examples or *Enthymemes*, and little else beside. So that if it be absolutely necessary that he who makes use of a Syllogism or Induction, must demonstrate some thing, or some Person; which is manifest from our discourse of *Analytics*, by the same necessity must both those be like to both these. Now what is the difference between Example and an *Enthymeme* is manifest from the *Topics*. For there we have formerly spoken of Syllogism and Induction. Since if by many and like Arguments we shew the thing to be so, in the first there is Induction, in the latter Example. But where some things being granted, there are some things else that for their sakes happen to be not granted, in regard such things are either altogether or for the most part, the one is call'd a Syllogism, the other an *Enthymeme*, and it is apparent that both are to be commended in Rhetoric. For what has been said in the discourse of Method, holds good in these things; for as some sorts of Rhetoric are exemplary, others Enthymematical; so some Orators move by Examples, others by *Enthymemes*. Therefore Orations consisting of Examples are no less perswasive then others; but Enthymematical Orations more distract the judgment then the former. But we shall enquire afterwards into the causes of either, and how to make

make use of both; at present let us examine these very things a little more plainly and distinctly. Seeing then that Persuasion is persuasive to some Body; and this is immediately persuasive of it self, the other because it seems to be demonstrated by such Arguments; seeing also that no art inspects into Singulars; as Physick does not consider what is wholesome for *Socrates*, or *Callias*, but what is for every one, which is the true design of Art; seeing moreover that Singulars are infinite, and not to be comprehended by knowledg; so neither is Rhetoric to consider what will convince every particular person, as *Socrates*, or *Hippias*, but what will convince the Generality, as Logic also does. For Logic also makes use of Syllogism, not from whatever they see (for some things appear to Madmen;) but Logic raises her Syllogism from such things as stand in need of reason; Rhetoric argues upon those things that fall under Consultation. For it is the duty of Rhetoric to discourse of such things about which we consult, and have no Art to direct us, and among such Auditors that cannot see through multitude of things, nor discourse of things remote; but we discourse of things that seem possible to be brought about one way or another. For as to such things which it is impossible they should be otherwise, either at present or for the Future, no Man consults, at least upon such a Supposition, in regard there can be no consultation concerning things that can not be otherwise. But we reason and draw our Collections either from what has been Collected by Syllogisms before, or from things confus'd that want

want the contraction of Syllogism, because they do not seem to be probable. Of which some are of that sort as not easily to be understood by reason of their Prolixity, let the Judge be never so candid; and other things not convincing, as neither being taken for granted, nor look'd upon as probable. Wherefore there is a necessity to make use as well of *Enthymeme*, as Example, to prove things to be so, which may be otherwise; Example requiring Induction, and Enthymeme Syllogism, and that from but a few or fewer things, then the first Syllogism consists of. For if there be any thing there which is perspicuous, it is not to be mention'd; for the Auditor supplies that himself. As when a *Lacedæmonian* has been victor in such a game wherein he won the garland, it suffices to say, he was a Victor at the Olympic Games; but to say that he was crown'd because he won the Prize at the Olympic Games is superfluous, there being no Man who is ignorant of the Victors being Crown'd. But because there are few necessary things from whence Rhetorical Syllogisms are drawn, in regard that many things which fall under judgment and deliberation happen to be otherwise, since Men consult and deliberate about what they have to do, not of necessity, but by choice; therefore common Accidents are collected from common Examples; necessary things are prov'd and perswaded by necessary Consequences. Whence it is apparent, that of those things from whence Enthymemes are drawn, some are necessary, others such as are so for the most part: For Enthymemes are deduc'd from Probables and Signs. So that of necessity, both of these must be the same to the other.

That

That being probable that for the most part and most usually happensto be ; not simply, as some would have it to be ; but as being that, which in those things that may be otherwise, has the same relation to Probable, as universal to particular. Of Signs there are some that have the same Relation one to another, as singular to Universal ; others, as something Universal to Particular. Of these some are necessary, which are call'd τεκμήριον ; but such as not necessary, have no name according to this Distinction. I call those necessary, out of which a Syllogism is Compos'd ; which is therefore call'd an Argument. For when they believe there can be no contradiction of the thing Propounded, then they think they have brought a τεκμήριον, or Sign that the thing is Demonstrated, Limited, and Determin'd. For Τεκμαρ, and Term or Limit signify both the same thing in the antient Language. Now because of these same Signs, some hold one to another as the singular to the Universal, as if we should say 'tis a sign that wise Men are just, because that *Socrates* being a wise Man was just. This is a Sign ; but such a one as does not always hold good, tho' what was said were Truth, for it cannot be Syllogistically concluded without a Contradiction. But this necessarily follows, such a one is Sick because he has a Fever. Such a one has had a Child, because she has Milk. Which is the only Argument by Signs, when the Sign alone is so true that it cannot be contradicted. The other sort of Signs have the same relation one to another as the whole to the part. As if a Man should say, 'tis a sign he has a Fever ; for he breathes short, and yet this may be contradicted.

contradicted, tho' it were true when so said. For it happens that many who are not troubled with Feavers, breath short. And thus far what is probable, what a sign, what an argumentative or conclusive sign, and how they differ one from another. We have also shewn that Example is Induction, and wherein Induction consists. But Induction is neither as the whole to the part, nor the part to the whole, nor as the whole to the whole, but as the Part to the Part, and as the like to its like, as being both subject to the same Genus, tho' the one is more perspicuous then the other. As for example, *Dionysius* affected a Tyrannical Government, because he requir'd a Guard. For *Pisistratus*, who affected the same before him, demanded a Guard, and when it was granted him he became a Tyrant. In like manner *Timagenes* of *Megara*; and whoever were known to have acted in that manner are examples to prove the Intention of *Dionysius*, while the thing was in Consultation whether to allow him a guard or no, and before they knew the reason why he demanded it. All which Examples fall under the same general *Whole*, that he who affects Tyrannical Government, first demands a Guard. And thus much to shew from whence seeming Demonstrative Proofs may be drawn.

But there is a great difference between Enthymemes, and besides there are very few that understand the method of Syllogisms in Logic. For some are appropriated to the method of Rhetoric, as others to that of Logic; some appear in other Arts which are extant, others reserv'd for other Arts not invented. Wherefore they lye hid from the Auditors, and they that meddle

meddle with 'em more then is fitting, wander from themselves. All which a further explanation will make more manifest. I say therefore that Logical and Rhetorical Syllogisms are such, to which we ascribe their common places. These are such as are commonly reduc'd under the Heads of Justice, Philosophy, Politics, and many other things specifically different, as the Topics greater and lesser; nor is there any restriction from arguing more upon one then another Subject or Topic, be it what it will, or never so specifically different, and these are general Topics.

Particular Topics are such as belong to every Genus and Species of Proposition: as for Example, those are Topics or Propositions belonging to natural Philosophy, from whence no Enthymeme or Syllogism can be drawn that has any relation to Ethics, and others are Propositions proper to Ethics, that have no relation to natural Philosophy; and so in all other arts and Sciences whatever. But these things will not give a Man to understand any one Genus, as not being fixt to any Subject. But he that can with most Judgment select these Propositions, e're he is aware shall frame a Science distinct from Logic and Rhetoric. For if he happen upon Principles, it is neither Logic nor Rhetoric; but that Science whose Principles it contains. But most Enthymemes are drawn from those Forms, which are particular and proper; fewer from those which are common. And therefore the Genus's of Enthymemes are to be distinguish'd, as are also the places from whence they are taken. I call Forms the Propositions proper to every Genus. *Places*, such as are alike com-
mon

mon to all. Now then concerning Forms. But first let us take along with us the Genus's of Rhetoric, that when we have distinguish'd how many they are, we may discourse apart of their Principles and Propositions.

CHAP. III.

Of the three kinds of Causes, and their Ends.

THE forms of Rhetoric are in number three, for so many sorts of Auditors there are that hear Orations. The Oration it self also consists of three things, the person that speaks, the matter discoursed of, and the Person to whom the address is made, in whom, that is to say the Auditor, the end is included; for the Auditor is either a Spectator or a Judge, the Judge is either a Judge of things past or to come. The Judge of future things is the Senator; the Judge of things past, is the determiner of Causes, the Judge of the force of the Oration is the Spectator. So that of necessity there must be three kinds of Rhetorical Ratiocinations or Discourses, Deliberative, or appertaining to the Council-Board, to the Bar, or Judicial, and Demonstrative. As to that which concerns the Council-Board, the one part of it is perswasive, the other diswasive. For always they who privately debate, or publicly harangue, intend one of these two things. Of the Judicial one part is the accusation, the other is the Defence. For they that are in Con-
troversy

troverſy muſt do one of theſe two things, either complain or defend. Of the Demonstrative, the one part is Praise, the other Diſgrace. Seaſons alſo are accommodated to every one of theſe. To the Privy-Counſellor the future, for he conſults about what is to come, either to procure or prevent. To the Judge of Controverſies the time paſt; for all ſuits relate to what has been done. To the Demonstrative, the preſent time is moſt properly allow'd; for they approve or diſlike, as the Inſtant of Delivery. But they make uſe of things paſt and future to the ſame purpoſe, calling to mind things paſt, well or ill alledg'd, and conjecturing of future things whether well or ill judg'd by the Orator.

But in every one of theſe there is a different End. The end of the Counſellor is either good or bad; for he that perſwades, perſwades for the beſt; he that diſwades, diſwades from the worſt: to which he adds juſt and unjuſt, bravery, and ignominy.

The Judges of Controverſies propoſe alſo Juſtice or Injuſtice; but they that praise or diſlike, chiefly look upon honour or diſgrace; including alſo thoſe other Ends of *Good and Bad, Juſt and unjuſt.*

And the ſign that theſe are the Ends that every one of the three propoſe, is this; for that they never call the reſt in queſtion. As for Example, he that is ſued at Law, will alledge that he never did the thing, or that he did no harm in doing it; but will never confeſs that he did unjuſtly; otherwiſe there would be no need of Determination. In like manner they who conſult for the public, grant all the reſt; but that they adviſe what is
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hurtful, and dehort from what is for the common good, they will never admit. But whether it is just to enslave their Neighbours, and such as do them no Injury, they never consider. In the same manner they who praise or disprove, never mind whether the Person has acted for the public good or not; but more often applaud him, because he never minded his own Interest, that he might act like a good Common-wealths Man. For they commend *Achilles*, because he undertook to assist his Friend *Patroclus*, tho' he were certain to dye himself, and that his friend should live. For to him such a death was more honourable; Life only beneficial.

From what has been said, it appears therefore necessary to be furnish'd with Propositions in the first place concerning these things. For argumentative Marks, and Probabilities, and Signs are Rhetorical Propositions; Seeing that every Syllogism consists of Propositions, and every Enthymeme is a Syllogism consisting of the foresaid Propositions. But because it is impossible for Impossibilities to be acted, or that they will be acted hereafter, but only things that are possible, or that those things that never were, nor ever will be, should now be done, or ever can be done, it is necessary as well for the Consulter and the Judge, as for him that goes about to demonstrate, to be furnish'd with Propositions of Possibility and Impossibility, whether it were or were not, whether it will be or no. Moreover, seeing that all People who either approve or dislike, persuade or dissuade, sue or defend, endeavour to shew not only what has been already said, as what is useful, what is hurtful, what is honest, what

what disgraceful, what just ; what unjust ; but whether the thing be of great or small moment, either considering useful and hurtful, honest and dishonest, just and unjust in themselves, or by comparing one with another ; it is manifest, that they must be furnish'd with Propositions of great and little, more and less, with respect to Particulars as well as Universals ; as what is more, what less profitable, which the greater, which the lesser Injury or Injustice, and so of other things. And thus much as to those things of which Propositions must be made. Now we must distinguish every one of them apart ; and first to which Deliberation, next to which Demonstration, lastly to which Judgments belong.

CHAP. IV.

Of what things Men usually Deliberate?

FIRST then we are to consider about what things good or hurtful the Politician consults for that he does not deliberate upon all things, but upon what may be, or may not be done, in regard it is in vain to deliberate upon things that are or will be of necessity, or such as it is impossible that they ever will be. Nor yet upon all Accidents neither. For there are some good things which proceeding from Nature and Fortune, happen sometimes to be, sometimes not to be ; upon which it's not worth while to Deliberate. But we are to consult of those things that may be re-

ferr'd to us, whose Original and Cause is within our-selves. For we deliberate till we have found whether the things may or may not be done by us. Nevertheless it is not our present Business to enumerate every particular, nor to digest the several subjects of Deliberation into their several Species's and Forms, nor to enquire what may be determin'd concerning 'em according to Truth. For that belongs not to Rhetoric, but to a more prudent and certain Art; tho' much more then what falls properly under her Consideration, is now adays allow'd her. For what we have already affirm'd is true; that *Rhetoric* is compos'd of the Analytic Science, and that part of *Politic's* which relates to manners, and partly resembles Logic, partly sophistical Oration.

However if any one go about to teach either *This* or *Logic*, not as Faculties, but as Sciences, he secretly subverts their Nature, while he dilates them into Sciences of certain Subject Matters, and does not confine them to Oration alone.

But now let us therefore shew what things more properly fall under Political Consideration, and are more proper to be explain'd.

The chiefeſt things then of which all Men conſult, and argue upon in Deliberation are five in number; of Wealth, of War, of Peace, of the Preſervation of the Country, and of what things are exported and imported, and of the making and obſervance of Laws.

He that conſults about the raiſing of Treafure, ought to underſtand the Revenues of the Country, and whence they ariſe, that if there be any deficiency, it may be ſupplied; and if it be too
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small, that it may be augmented; also that all unnecessary Expences of the City may be cut off; and all profuseness moderated. For not only addition of Treasure, but frugality in Expences, increase Wealth. And this not only appears from our experience of private affairs; but there is a necessity for him that would speak to the purpose concerning these things, to know the Observations of others.

He that consults concerning War and Peace, must understand the Forces of the City, what they are at present, and how powerful they may be; what sort of Strength there is at present, and what sort of additional Force is to be provided: also what Wars, and in what manner the People have carried on their Wars before. Nor is he only to understand the Concerns of his own Country, as to these Particulars, but to be well inform'd of the State and Condition of his Neighbours, especially of those with whom his Country may have an occasion to enter into a War: and what is the equality, or inequality of Force on both sides, that he may make a Peace with the stronger; and be at his own Liberty, whether or no to make a War with the weaker: and then again which is the most wealthy Common-weal of the two; for in that also we may be either Superiour or Inferiour.

Moreover he ought not to be ignorant how the Country may be best preserv'd and defended, nor of the number or quality of the Soldiers, fit to be kept on Foot; nor of places proper for Garrisons; which it is impossible to do, without an exact knowledge of the Country; that if the Garrisons are too weak, they may re-inforc'd; if superfluous, they may be dismantled, and

Garrisons plac'd in more proper places. Also what Expende is necessary to supply the City with Provision, what the Country will afford, and what must be supplied from abroad. What commodities are fit to be imported, what exported, that Leagues may be consider'd accordingly. There being a necessity for a Common-weal to keep fair with two sorts of People, with those that are superiour in Strength, and beneficial to it in Commerce.

But as the knowledg of these things very much conduces to the Preservation of a Common-weal, there is one thing no less beneficial, which is the skill of making Laws. Wherefore it is necessary to understand how many sorts of Governments there are, what Constitutions are most profitable, and by what Adversities or Prosperities they may be upheld or destroyed; for the safety of a City consists in the observance of the Laws. I say, destroy'd by Prosperity; for that unless it be an absolute constitution of Government indeed, all others are dissolv'd or deprav'd by rigorous Severity or Remissness.

As *Democracy* is not only weakned by Remissness; but also when it is too rigorously severe, so that at last it falls under the Power of a few. Like Noses that being moderately flat, or Hawk-Beak'd, look well enough; but when too much bent or Arch'd, or flatted to the Face, can hardly be discern'd to be Noses. Therefore it mainly conduces to the making of good Laws, as well to gather from the benefit of former Constitutions, how the Common-weal thriv'd at that time, as to understand the condition of other Common-weals, and what is most agreeable to

to the conditions of the People : whence it is apparent that a good Law-maker ought to be a great Traveller, there being nothing so necessary for him as to understand the Constitutions of other Nations: and to enable him for public Council, to be exact in the knowledg of History. But these things belong to Politics, and not to Rhetoric. Thus much therefore concerning those things which a good Counsellor ought chiefly to deliberate upon. Now let us see upon what he ought to employ his gifts of Perswasion or Diswasion.

CHAP. V.

Of the Felicity and End of Deliberations.

FOR the most part there is a certain end which every Man in particular, and all Men in General aiming at, either choose or reject. And that end in a word is Happiness, and those things that belong to it. Wherefore for examples sake, let us explain what this Felicity is, and what are the parts of it. For all perswasions and diversions have an Eye upon this, and those things that attend it, and their contraries. For those things that procure this, or any of its parts, or being less, render it greater, are to be observ'd and done; but whatever deprave or hinder it, or procure its Contraries, is utterly to be rejected.

Therefore let *Felicity* be a prosperous acting with Vertue ; or contentedness of Life ; or a most pleasant Living in security, or a sound constitution of Estate and Body, with a powerful faculty to preserve and cause these things. For of these Enjoyments, either one or more, all Men confess to be felicity. If this then be Felicity ; the parts of it must be Nobility of Extraction, Multiplicity of Friends, and those good Men ; Wealth, numerous and hopeful Off-spring, and long Life. And then for Bodily perfections ; Health, Beauty, Strength, Lustre, Proportion, Glory, Honour, Success, Agility in Combat, Success and Victory, Vertue, and its parts ; as Prudence, Fortitude, Temperance, Justice ; for surely he must be contented with his Lot, who is the person possess'd of all these Enjoyments, both External and Internal ; for besides these, there are no other of Moment. Internal are the Blessings belonging to the Mind ; and those within the Body. External, Nobility, Friends, Wealth, and Honour ; we also think it convenient to add Strength and Success : for thereby our Life is secured. Let us then consider what every one of these is. Nobility therefore is to be a Native of the same City or Country, of most ancient descent, numbring a long Progeny of famous Captains, and Persons Illustrious, for such worthy actions as all Men emulate. In private persons. Private Nobility is either by the Man or Woman's side, and a Legitimacy from both ; as in Cities and Kingdoms there is a Superiority in Vertue, Wealth, or any other Ornaments honour'd among Men, together with a race of Men, and Women, old and young, conspicuous for their
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their Vertue, so in private Nobility. As for a vertuous and numerous Off-spring it is plain what it is. Commonly it is taken for a numerous company of young Children, and vertuously inclin'd. The vertues of the Body are Proportion, Beauty, Strength and activity. The Beauties of the Mind in Youth are Temperance and Fortitude. In private Families that is said to be a numerous and vertuous Issue, where the Children are many, and lawfully begotten both Male and Female. The vertue of Wives as to the Body, is Beauty and goodly shape; as to the Mind, Sobriety, and Sedulity, without avarice. And as well in private as public Families both in Men and Women, every one of these Vertues are requir'd to be; for whereever these Vertues are wanting, as among the *Lacedæmonians*, the men hardly enjoy the half of Happiness.

The parts of Wealth are many, Lands, Mannors, rich Furniture, store of Cattel, and a numerous retinue of strong, healthy, and handsome Slaves. All which things ought to be secure, free, and useful. Useful implies Profitable, Free implies Pleasure and Enjoyment. Profitable I call those things that yield a Revenue. The Definition of *Secure* is to possess in such a place, and such a manner, that the use of what he enjoys, or the Power to alienate or keep, the Properties are still in himself. I call Alienation giving or selling; so that to be rich, consists rather in Enjoyment and use then Possession. For the use and performance of such things are properly to be call'd Wealth.

• Reputation is when a person is by all Men esteem'd a person of Vertue; or is accompted to be

be endow'd with that which all or most Men of Integrity and Wisdom value.

Honour is the Sign of a high Opinion of a man's Liberality, and therefore they are justly and most deservedly honour'd, who are most liberal and bountiful. He is also honour'd who is able to do kindnesses. Now Beneficence is that, whatever it be, which is the cause of either our safety, and that we are, or of our attaining Riches, or some other Benefit, which we cannot either altogether, or in such a place, or at such a time readily and easily attain to. For several attain to honour, which they never merited, but the manner and the opportunities are the Cause. Now the parts of Honour are Sacrifices, Eulogies in Prose and Verse, Crowns, Temples, Possessions, Monuments, Statues, and public Salaries. Among the *Barbarians*, Cringing Adoration, giving place, and Presents which are universally valu'd. For a gift is the giving of Possession, and a mark of honour. And therefore while they who are covetous of Money, and ambitious of Honour, eagerly desire the one and the other, they both by that means attain their desires. For the Covetous gain the Possession of what they desire, and the ambitious attain to Honour.

The vertue of the Body is health, whereby we have the use of our Limbs free from all Diseases and Distempers. For no man will believe them to be happy that only enjoy the Health of *Herodicus*. For he, for the Preservation of his Health, was forc'd to abstain from all or most of those things, which other Men make use of.

Beauty

Beauty varies according to Age. For he is a beautiful young Man, who has a Body able to endure racing and violent Labour, having a pleasant aspect with all. Therefore they that exercis'd the five Games were most beautiful, as being born to Strength and Swiftness. A handsome Man is he, who being able to endure the toils of War, appears with an Aspect pleasing, but yet stern and awful. A comely old Man is such a one as having a Body strong enough to undergo necessary Labour, lives altogether free from the Pains and Diseases of old Age.

Strength is that whereby a Man is able to move what he desires to move as he lists himself. Now we move a Body either by drawing to us, or thrusting from us, by lifting up, or casting down, or by crushing and squeezing together: So that a strong Man has Strength to do all these things, or many of 'em.

The virtue of Magnitude is to excel in length, depth and breadth, so that the motion of the Body be no way hindered by its Bulk.

The wrestling or contending virtue of the Body consists in Bulk, Strength, and Agility, or Swiftness: for a swift Man is a strong Man; for he that can move his Legs swiftest and farthest is a Runner. Who can grapple and hold fastest, a Wrestler. Who can keep off from his Person by striking, a Boxer. Who can do both, a *Pancratiast* or general Wrestler; who excels in all, a *Pentathlian*, or a Man for all the five Exercises of Cussing, Leaping, Running, Hurling the Bowl, and Wrestling.

A happy old Age is that which comes late, and brings no Pains or distempers with it. For he who sooner or later grows old, if he be tormented with Aches and Distempers, leads an uneasy Life.

Now there are some which are virtues both of the Body, and of Fortune ; for he that is of a sickly Constitution, and not Strong, shall not be free from Pain ; or tho' he be, he shall not be long liv'd ; nor can he last without Fortune ; for there is another way to live long without Strength and Health, seeing that many live long without the Virtues of the Body.

But a farther Examination of these things is needless at present. Now what is multiplicity of honest and virtuous Friends, shall be shewn in the definition of a Friend. A Friend is therefore he, who does for his friends sake whatever he thinks will be for the advantage and profit of his Friend. He then who has many such friends is the Friend of many, and if they be persons of Integrity, he has many good and virtuous Friends.

Prosperity is that, when all, or most or the chiefest part of these Blessings, of which Fortune it self is the cause, flow into a Man, and make him happy. Now Fortune is the cause of many things artificial, and of many things without Art, which tho' they proceed from Nature are Preternatural ; as the air is the cause of Health ; nature the cause of Beauty and Stature. And those Benefits that altogether proceed from Fortune, which are still the Subject of other Mens Envy.

Fortune is also the cause of those Benefits, for which no reason can be given; as when all the rest of the Brothers are deform'd, and one alone proves to be Beautiful; or when all the rest of the Brothers oversaw the Treasure, and one had the luck to find it out. Or when the next Person happens to be struck through with an Arrow, and the other escapes. Or when only one Person came not to a place, who was never wont to fail, and all the rest that came who never us'd to come, came only that time, and happen'd to be all kill'd: For all these things seem to be the act of Fortune. As for the Vertue of the Mind, because it is a Topic most proper for the discourse of Applause and Commendation, we shall refer it to Demonstration.

CHAP. VI.

Of Profitable and Good.

WHAT we ought to aim at in perswading, whether in reference to things present or to come, or in dissuading, we have already made manifest. For they that dissuade, dissuade the contrary. Now in regard that Profitable is the scope of him that advises, and they that advise, consult not about the End, but those things which relate to the End; and for that these things are profitable in the Effects, if rightly acted, and profitable is good, we are to consider the Element of good and profitable simply. Good is therefore

therefore that which is to be desir'd for its own sake, and that for whose sake we desire something else; and which all things or Creatures desire, if they have Sense and Understanding, or would desire if they had; and whatever the Understanding dictates to every one, and what the understanding Dictates concerning each Particular, good to every Man, that is good to all in general. Which being present, the Mind is at rest, and contented in it self. Which is sufficient for it self; and which is the cause and Preserver of these things, and upon which those things attend that prevent and destroy the Contraries to it. Now those things attend upon it two ways, either at the same time or afterwards; as Knowledge attends Instruction, but afterwards; but Life and Health go both together. The Efficient causes attend three manner of ways, sometimes as soundness of Body attends upon Health; sometimes as Diet, attends Health; sometimes as Exercise attends it, for it generally procures Health. These things thus laid down, there is a necessity that the Election of things good, and the rejecting of what is hurtful, should be good. On the one side it follows that we are not pester'd with what is hurtful at the same time, on the other, that we obtain the good afterwards, and instead of the lesser good we choose the greater, and in lieu of the greater Evil, we chuse the less. For the same reason that the greater exceeds the less, therefore we chuse the one, and avoid the other.

And of necessity all Vertues must be good, it being always well with those that are endu'd with 'em. Besides that they are the efficient and
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active causes of Good ; but to say what and of what nature they are, requires a distinct discourse of each.

Pleasure also is most certainly a Good ; since all Creatures naturally covet it : wherefore it is necessary also that delectable and honest should be good. For Honest is the effective cause of Pleasure. And honest things are partly delightful, and partly chosen for their own Sakes.

But that we may discourse of each particularly ; of necessity these must be good things.

First Felicity, because it is desired for its own sake, sufficient, and that for whose sake we desire many other things ; as Justice, Fortitude, Modesty, Magnanimity, Magnificence, and all the rest of the Vertues of the Mind, together with Health, Beauty, and the like. For these are the Vertues of the Body, and the effective causes of many things ; as Health is the cause of Life and Pleasure. And therefore some account it the best of good things, as being the cause of those two things which are the chiefest of good things, Life and Pleasure.

Then Riches, wherein consists the vertue of Possessing ; which is the effective cause of many other Benefits. Next, Friends and Friendship ; for Friendship is desirable for its own sake, and is the effective cause of many good things. Honour also and Fame. For they are delightful and produce many good things, and generally shew that they contain those things within themselves, for which they are admir'd. Next the faculty of speaking and acting. For they are also the effective causes of good things. Likewise Wit, Memory, aptness to learn, excellency of Mind
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and Thought with all other things of the same Nature. For all these are faculties productive of good things. In the same List we may number the Arts and Sciences, and Life it self. From whence though no other good should flow, yet it is desirable for its own sake. *Just* is also in the same Roll, because it conduces to the public advantage, These are the chiefeſt part of thoſe things which all Men account good things.

As to thoſe things that are call'd in queſtion, Arguments are thus fram'd to prove them good. That to which evil is contrary, is good, and the contrary of that which is ſerviceable to our Enemies; as if to be Cowards is a kindneſs to our Enemies, it is manifeſt that Fortitude is a great good to our ſelves and our Country. And in a word, what our Enemies deſire and rejoice at, the contrary to that muſt be advantageous to us: Therefore it was well ſaid of the Poet,

Sure Priam will rejoice.

However theſe are not always, but for the moſt part good things, ſince it may happen that ſometimes the ſame things may be of advantage as well to our Adverſaries as to us. Whence it is ſaid that Miſery reconciles Men, when the ſame thing is pernicious to both. Alſo the *Mean* between both is good. For that which is greater then it ought to be is bad, and that for whole ſake Men have endur'd many hard labours, and waſted much Treafure; for now it is a ſeeming Good, and as ſuch, is look'd upon as the end, and the end of many things; but the end is good. Whence that of *Homer*.

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But Fame.

Indeed was only Priam's aim.

And that other of the same Poet.

But Delay.

Will shame us, if we longer stay.

With which the Proverb agrees, There lies a Snake at the door. Moreover what many Men cover and contend for is good; for many are look'd upon as the generality, and what they commend is fit to be commended. For there is no Man will applaud that which is not good. As also what our Enemies and wicked Men approve; for indeed we may say that all men confess, if the bad confess the same. For because it is undeniable, therefore it is confessed on all hands; as that they are bad whom our Friends discommend, and that they are good of whom our Enemies speak no ill. And therefore the *Corinthians* thought themselves affronted by *Simonides* for saying,

However Ilium does not Corinth blame.

Also the good opinion of wise and good Men or Women. Thus *Minerva* prefer'd *Ulysses*; *Theseus*, *Helena*; *Alexander* was prefer'd by the Goddesses, and *Achilles* by *Homer*. And in general, whatever things are desirable before others. Now Men chuse to act not only those things which have been already spoken of, but to serve their Friends, and mischief their Enemies, and by such means as are possible. Now Possibilities are two-fold, such as may be done, and such as may be easily done. Facil things are such as may

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be done either without Pain, or in a short time. For facility is terminated either by Pain, or length of time, or if they be done according to their Wish; but Men wish either for no Evil at all, or for much less than the Good, which may come to pass, if either they can hide themselves from the Punishment, or procure it to be small. Also what a Man wishes of his own Election, not made choice of by any Man else, but beyond the common road: Hence the more honour. And what are agreeable to their Genius; such are those things which are most suitable to their Fortunes, or their Strength; and what Men believe they are defective in, tho' little things, for they chuse to act in those things to gain or recover Credit. And what may be perform'd by any one. All these things may be done, as being easy. And another may do those things, which all or many, like, or lesser have well done before. And what will make us acceptable to our Friends, and odious to our Enemies. And what every one admires, they chuse to act. And those things wherein Men are ingenious and expert; for such things they believe they shall more easily accomplish: and such things as they desire; for then the Pains is a Pleasure. And which the wicked refuse to undertake; for such acts are so much the more Praise-worthy. And such things upon which Men have most singularly plac'd their affections: As the Warrior upon Victory, the Ambitious upon Honour, the covetous Person upon Money, and so of the rest. And thus much concerning good and profitable.

CHAP. VII.

Of the greater and lesser.

NOW because they who grant both to be profitable, cannot agree upon which is most profitable, therefore we must say something of the greater good, and of that which is most Profitable. That which exceeds is therefore that which is so much and more. The excess, that which is within it, and always greater, and more in respect of the less; but great or less, many or fewer, in the respect of the Magnitude of many. And the excess is call'd great, the defect little, and so of many and few. Since therefore we call Good that which is desirable for its own, and not for the sake of another; of which all the parts are coveted; and which every Creature that has Sense and Understanding would covet, and that which is the efficient and Preservative cause of all; and upon which all things of that nature depend, of which the why and the wherefore is the end, and the end is for whose sake all the rest; and this is good for this or that, which is most appropriated to it; of necessity the more must be the greater good than one, or the lesser, according to the number of the one and the lesser: because it exceeds, and what is contain'd within is exceeded. For if the greatest be exceeded by the greatest, those also must be exceeded by themselves; and if the Kinds are thus exceeded by the Kinds, the biggest by the biggest; as if the biggest Men are bigger than

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the biggest Women, Men are absolutely bigger then Women; and if Men are absolutely bigger then Women, the biggest Man is bigger then the biggest Woman. For the excess of the Kinds, and of those things that are contain'd in the Kinds, hold the same proportion one with another. The same may be said when this follows from that, but that does not follow from this. Now that which follows, follows either together or afterwards, or potentially. For the use of that which follows is in the other. Now it follows together, if a Man be in health, that he lives; but it does not follow that he is in health because he lives. But Knowledge follows the being taught afterwards. Potentially it follows, that if a Man be a Sacrilegious Person, that he may rob a Temple, seeing a Sacrilegious Person will rob. And they are greater that exceed the same thing in greatness; for of necessity the greater must be exceeded. The Effective causes also of the greater good are greater; for by that means the Efficient cause became greater, and in the same manner the effects of the greater cause must be greater. For if wholesome be more to be desired, and a greater Good then Pleasant, Health is greater then Pleasure, and that which is more desirable in its self then that which is not more to be desired in its self; as Strength, then Health. For that is desirable for its own, this not for its own sake; which is the true condition of good. Also if this be the End, that not the End; this is more to be desired than that; for this is desired for that, and that for its own sake; as that the Body may be kept in Exercise, and by Exercise in Health: And the less defective then the other,
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or the others is most desirable, as being more sufficient. Now the lesser is defective in wanting fewer or more easy; or when this cannot be accomplish'd, or be without that; but that may be accomplish'd without this. For that which is not defective is most sufficient in it self, and therefore it is apparently the greater good. Also if one be a Principle, the other not; if one thing be the cause, the other not. For, without the Cause or the Principle nothing can be, or be done. Now where there are two Principles, that which proceeds from the greater Principle is the greater. Where there are two causes, the Product of the greater cause is the greater. So that either way the thing must be greater whether one be a Principle, the other not; or whether proceeding from the greater of two Principles. For the end is greater and not the Principle. As *Leodamus* said, when he accus'd *Callistratus*. He who advis'd was more in fault then he who acted. For had not the thing been advis'd, it had ne'r been put in Execution. But *Chabrias* argu'd that he who acted was more to blame then he who advis'd; because the thing had not been put in Execution, had it not been advis'd; for Action is the end of Consultation. Moreover that which is more scarce is more desirable then that which more Plentiful, as Gold then Iron. For Iron is less profitable. Therefore the possession of Gold is greater, because it is more scarce to be found. But in another Sense, that which most abounds is the greater, because we make more use of it. At other times that which is scarce, is exceeded by that which is Plentiful, and therefore we say the best Water. Briefly, difficult things are ex-

Plaintiffs, Judges, and Defendants. Here that prevails which all affirm; there what the Judges Pronounce, as excelling in Power and Knowledge. Sometimes that is greatest of which all participate; for it is a disgrace not to participate. Sometimes those things which are most Praise-worthy, as being most Honest. Sometimes degrees of Honour make the Honours greater; for Honour is a kind of price or value set upon a thing. The greater Punishments also are the greater, and such things as are greater than the things which are apparent and granted; especially when divided into parts; for then exuberancy of many is apparent, which was the reason that the Poet to excite *Meleager* uses these words.

*What Mischiefs must thy Subjects then bewail,
If into hostile Hands the City fall?
Slaughter and Fire their Masons will invade;
And helpless Children will be Captive led.*

And then addition and aggravation, as in *Epicharmus*; which is apparent, partly by the same reason, that dividing the parts makes the thing greater; for Aggravation plainly shews the Excess. Partly because the Original and cause of things seems greater: and then because that is greater which is less frequent, and more difficult. Opportunity, Age, Time, Place, and Force, make things greater; for beyond the Strength, the Age of such an one, beyond others here, there and then, denote excess of Beauty, Goodness, Justice, or their Opposites. Whence the Epigram upon the *Olympian Victor*,

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*Though formerly 'tis true, so mean my Trade,
With heavy Doffers on my Shoulders laid,
From Argos to Tegea still I trudg'd,
To sell my Fish, till Victor here adjudg'd.*

And Iphicrates gave himself this *Encomium*,
from whence all these. Moreover, Genuine than ac-
quir'd : wherefore said the Poet,

School'd only by my self, these Songs I sing.

Also the greater part of a great thing. As *Pericles* speaks in an Epitaph, that Youth being taken from a City, render'd it equally deformed with a year that had no Spring. Also such things as are desired as most useful in greater necessity, as in old Age or Sickness, and of two things, that which approaches nearest to the end : also that which is in it self, and simply of value. Also possible is better then impossible ; for the one is in it self, the other not ; also what is at the end of Life ; for that is more the end then what is farther off. Also what come nearer to Truth then Opinion, or Vain-glory. Now the Definition of what belongs to Opinion or Vain-glory, is this, what a Man would not chuse if he thought it would be conceal'd. Therefore 'tis better that a Man should receive a kindness then give it ; for a Man would receive a kindness not caring whether any Body knew of it or no ; but the giver would not chuse to give, if he thought it should not be known : and what would be greater then they seem to be ; for they approach nearer to Truth. Therefore they say Justice is but a small thing

thing, because it is better it should seem to be than be ; but it is not so with Health. Also what is Serviceable for many things, as for Living, for well Living, to enable a Man to act honest things, and for delight. And therefore Riches and Health seem to be the greatest things ; for they are serviceable to all these things. Also that which is less painful, and that which brings Pleasure, for they are more than one ; so, that Pleasure is a good, and absence of Pain. And of two things that which being added to the one, makes the whole greater, and those things which being present, appear, then those things which lye hid, for they approach nearer to Truth. And therefore to be Rich, is a greater good than to seem Rich. And what is to be beloved by some singly, by others with intermixture or addition of other things. And therefore the Punishment is not equal to condemn him that has but one, and him that has two to the loss of one Eye ; for the only thing beloved is thereby taken away. As thus much for Instruction from whence to fetch our Arguments in dissuading or persuading.

CHAP. VIII.

Of the Number and Forms of Common-meals.

BUT there is nothing that furnishes a man with a more sublime and powerful ability, to persuade and advise with prudence and discretion,

tion, then to know all sorts of Common-weals, the manners and constitutions of each, and to distinguish which is most profitable. For they convince all men by uttering what is for advantage; and it is therefore advantageous, because it preserves the Common-weal. Moreover the sentence of the Sovereign firm and undeniable, is Dominion. But Dominion is distinguished according to the forms of Common-weals; for as many Common-weals as there are, so many sorts of Dominion there are. Now there are four sorts of public-weals; Democracy, Oligarchy, Aristocracy and Monarchy. So that the supreme and determining authority, is either a part of, or else the whole of these. Democracy is a Common-weal wherein the Magistrates are chosen by Lots. Oligarchy, when they are chosen by their Estates; Aristocracy when they are elected that excel in Discipline: And I call that Discipline or Education, which is regulated by the Law. For they who are most obedient to the Law, are the best, and govern in Aristocracy. From whence the name. Monarchy, according to the signification of the word, is where all are subject to one Supreme and Sovereign. And this being limited to certain constitutions, is called a Kingdom; being unlimited, it is called Tyranny. Now we are to understand the end of every Public-weal; for Men make choice of those forms that relate to the end. Now the end of Democracy is Popular Liberty, of Oligarchy, Riches; of Aristocracy and Monarchy, wholesome Laws and good Government; of Tyranny, single Preservation. Therefore the manners, constitutions and advantages of every one are to be distinguished;

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for men make their choice with reference to these things. And because convincement is not only that which demonstrates by oration, but by Ethical discourse, for we believe the speaker because we take him to be an honest Man; or a man of understanding, or both; therefore it behoves us to understand the customs of every sort of Public-weal. For of necessity nothing can be more prevalent with every one, then the approved constitutions of every public-weal, which are only to be found in the Governments themselves. For manners appear by pre-election, and pre-election is referred to the end. And thus much as to what they ought to understand, who desire to convince by Elocution, what arguments they ought to fetch from profit and advantage; as also from manners and customs, and with what, and by what means we ought to abound, enough has been said for the present, for the more exquisite discourse of these things, we refer to our Politicks.

CHAP IX.

Of Honest and Laudable, which belong to the Demonstrative kind.

NOW let us say something concerning Vertue and Vice, Honest and Dishonest. For these are the Aims of those that praise or dispraise. But it will happen while we discourse of these things, that we shall also explain those other Things, which will give us the repute of being
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in some measure a Person of good Manners, which is the second step to Convincement: Seeing that from thence we may gain credit, as well to our selves and others, for being vertuous. But because we happen to praise sometimes in jest, sometimes in earnest, not only Man or God, but things inanimate, we are also in like manner to consider these things.

Honest therefore is that which is desirable for its own sake.

Praise worthy, is that, which being good, is therefore delightful, because good. Now if this be honest, of necessary Vertue is honest. For being good, it is also Praise worthy.

Vertue is a faculty which produces and preserves good things, also a Benefic Faculty affording many and great things, and all in all things.

The parts of it are Justice, Fortitude, Modesty, Magnificence, Magnanimity, Liberality, Mildness, Prudence, Wisdom. Now in regard that Vertue is a faculty to do good, of necessity they are the greatest Vertues that are most profitable to others; therefore we chiefly admire the just and courageous. For the one is most useful in War, the other in Peace: Next the Liberal, for they never contend about Money which others are so covetous of, but freely bestow it abroad for the public good.

Justice is a Vertue which distributes to every one their own as the Law commands. Injustice is that by which men seize upon that which is not their own, contrary to what the Law ordains.

Fortitude is that by which men perform great actions in the midst of danger, and as the Law commands, being also Assistants and Supporters
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of the Law. Cowardice the contrary.

Temperance is a Vertue, by which we make such a use of corporeal pleasure as the Law ordains; Intemperance the contrary.

Liberality is the bountiful use of Money, to the benefit of others, Illiberality the contrary.

Magnanimity is a Vertue that excites us to do great actions, Pusillanimity the contrary.

Magnificence is a Vertue that consists in the sumptuousness of expence, of which pinching and narrow-sould Parsimony are the contrary.

Prudence is a Vertue of Reason, enabling us rightly to deliberate of evil, and those blessings that pertain to happiness.

And let this suffice in general at present concerning Vertue and Vice, and the parts of both; and for the rest, they fall under an easie consideration. For of necessity, those things that are the causes of Vertue must be honest, as relating to Vertue, and being produced by Vertue. Of which sort are the marks and works of Vertue. Now because the marks, and such like, whatever they be, which are the Acts and Sufferings of a good man; of necessity, whatever are the Acts or Signs of Fortitude, or whatever are acted couragiously, are noble and honest. And so it is with the signs and acts of Justice; but not in the sufferings. For in this one vertue alone, not always that which is just is honest and laudable. For it is rather an ignominy to be condemn'd, if justly, then unjustly. And so of the rest of the Vertues. And where honour is the reward, those things are vertuous and laudable; as also where honour rather then money. And whatsoever among those things that are desirable, which a man acts
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not for his own sake. And whatsoever are simply good, and whatsoever a man acts for his Countries sake, contemning his own Interest: And which are naturally good, and which are good, but not to himself. For what is good to himself he acts for his own sake. And which attend the memories of the dead rather than the living. For where fame and honour attends the living, they seem to act rather for their own sakes. Also whatever acts are done for the sake of praise. For these are done less for a man's own sake. Also those things that are serviceable and profitable, not to himself, but to others, and chiefly to Benefactors.

Thus Justice and Munificence are profitable to others. Also the contraries to those things, of which we are ashamed, either speaking or acting, or about to speak, or do. For Men that say, or do, or are about to commit ignominious actions, are ashamed, as when *Alcaeus* said,

*There's something I would tell thee, but for shame,
That will not let me the occasion name.*

To which *Sappho* made answer;

*Speak freely on, for if a true desire
Of good and vertuous does thy thoughts inspire.
And that thy Tongue be not design'd to frame
Report and calumny, beseeming shame
Will bro'er o're thy Brows, and arm thy Pen;
To speak the truth; and I desire thee then.*

Also those things about which Men fearlessly contend. For men are most affected with those thing

things which most conduce to glory. Also the virtues and deeds of those who excel by nature, are most praise worthy, and the virtues of Men rather than Women; and such as with which others are more endowed than themselves. Wherefore just and justice are applauded; also revenge rather than reconciliation. For it is but just to return evil for evil, and justice is honest. For a stout man also to be invincible for victory and honour, are desirable: For though they bring no advantage, yet they are to be desired, and shew a conspicuous Virtue. Also Commemorations and Monuments: And the more famous they are, the more noble. However those are more noble that attend upon the dead, and to whom the greatest honours are attributed: Also such as are extraordinary and belong to the Person alone; for as they are more memorable yet unfruitful possessions, they seem more liberal. All, what things are proper to particular persons; and the marks of such things that are praise worthy, among those with whom we inhabit, as among the *Lacedaemonians* to wear long hair. For it is a mark of Liberty, for it is not for him that wears long hair, to do any servile drudgery, it being the mark of a Freeman not to live under another.

We are also here to take in those things that approach to Virtue, as being the same both in respect of praise and dispraise. As wary timid and decentful: A fool and one good natur'd; a person not sensible of pain, and one mild and gentle: And thus from the consequences according to that which is best; as to call an hasty furious man, silly; an arrogant man

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magnificent and great; and such as take the excesses of Virtue for the Virtues themselves; as if we should call a rash man stout, or a prodigal person liberal; seeing that many so fallaciously conclude from the causes outwardly appearing. For he that is so ready to run into danger, when there is no occasion, will be much more, when he finds it necessary: And if he be liberal to every body, much more to his friends: For it is the excellency of that Virtue, for a man to be bountiful to all men. We are also to consider from whom praise is proper. For, as *Socrates* said, 'tis no difficult thing to praise the *Athenians* among the *Athenians*. But we must call that honourable which is honourable every where; as among the *Scythians*, the *Lacedæmonians*, among the Philosophers; and in a word, whatever is honourable we may affirm to be honest. For they seem to approach near to virtue. And whatever looks like praise-worthy, as for a man to do those things that are worthy his Ancestors. For it is an addition to his felicity and to his honesty, to advance his Reputation. Or if besides that which is becoming, he act that which is best and most honest: As if a Man make a moderate use of his Prosperity; and shew himself magnanimous in adversity: Or the higher he ascends, the more generous and affable. And such was that of *Iphicrates*, from which to what; or that of the *Olympic Victor*,

Tho formerly, 'tis true, so mean my trade, &c.

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And that of *Simonides*,

*Whose Father, Husband, Brothers, rare to see
All Sovereign Kings, yet nere the prouder she.*

Now because praise arises from Actions, and for that it is the property of a good man to act by Election; we must endeavour to shew how he acts by Election; which he may be said to have done, if he have so frequently done. Wherefore those things which are done by chance, or fortune, are to be attributed to counsel and judgement. For when many things and similar are joyn'd together, they will seem to be a mark of virtue and judgement. Now seeing that praise is a speech that sets forth the greatness of virtue, of necessity we must demonstrate those actions to be of the same nature. For *Encomiums* are upon actions: But the circulating arguments that make for convincement, are Nobility of Birth and Education. For it is most likely that good men beget good men, and that a person so educated will act according to his education. There we celebrate in *Encomiums* those that act; which actions are the marks of the habit. So that we should praise him that never acted, if we thought him to be like the other. And the means whereby men become happy and fortunate, are the same in themselves; but not the same in reference to these. But as Felicity contains Virtue, so the making of a man happy contains Felicity. For praise and deliberation have something common one with another, seeing, that what we propound in advising the same things, by the alteration of the speech, beget praise. Therefore when we
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know what we have to act, and what the person ought to be: These things being said, as it were by way of advice, are to be chang'd and transpos'd in words; as when we say, a man is not to boast in the successes of Fortune, but in what he wins through his own Virtue, which being so said, has the force of a precept; but thus becomes an *Encomium*, glorying not in the successes of Fortune, but in the acts of his own Virtue. Therefore consider what to praise when you advise, and what to advise when you praise. For the speech will of necessity be opposite, when that which prohibits and that which allows are transpos'd. We may also make use of many of those things, which avail to amplify: As whether he acted alone, or the first, or with many, or whether he were chiefest in the action; or whether he observ'd time and season, or whether he did the same thing often: For that is great and shews him not beholdling to Fortune, but his own Virtue. And whether those things which encourage us to virtue and raise us to honour, were thought on and prepar'd by him; and upon whom the first *Encomium* was made: As it happen'd to *Hippolychus*, *Harmodius* and *Aristogeiton*, to have their Statues set up in the Market-place. And the same thing is to be observ'd in the contraries. Of which, if there be not a sufficient quantity to be found singly, compare them with others, as *Isoocrates* was wont to do, as being accusom'd to pleading at the Bar. Which comparisons ought to be made between the most remarkable things, as having a power to amplify, and is most commendable, when a man appears to excel in sincerity. Which enlargement falls deservedly upon

praise. For it consists in excellency, and excellency consists in goodness. Therefore altho the comparison be not made between things most remarkable, at least it ought to be made between other things perhaps of lesser note, in regard the excellency denotes the virtue: And indeed of all those forms which are common to all Orations, Amplification is most apt to demonstrate. For they take the actions for granted, that they may have no more to do, then to add to them, Grandeur and Beauty. But Examples are more fit for Deliberation; for conjecturing of future things, from things formerly transacted, we make our judgment. *Enthymemes* are more fit for judicial pleadings: For the fact admits of the cause and the demonstration, because it is obscure. And thus from whence all praises and dispraises are produc'd; what we ought to look upon, when we commend or discommend, and of what things *Encomiums* and dispraises consist, is apparent by what has been said. For these things being known, their contraries as may readily be discover'd.

CHAP. X.

Of Accusation, and Defence.

IN the next place we are to speak of Accusation and Defence, of what, and of what nature they ought to prepare their Arguments, to which purpose we are to consider three things. Wherein, and to what end, Men do Injuries. Next how they are affected, and thirdly what sort of People

ple they are, and in what Condition. When we have therefore defin'd what it is to do an Injury, we shall proceed with the rest. To do an Injury then, is to offer harm and violence to another, contrary to the Law. Now the Law is either peculiar or common. I call that peculiar, according to which being set down in Writing, Men act politically: Common, that which tho' not set down in Writing, prevails among all Men. We act spontaneously, whatever we act knowingly, and not by constraint. Yet where we act willingly, we do not all things of choice: but where we act by choice, we do all things willingly and knowingly; for no Man can be Ignorant of what he makes a choice before-hand. Now the choosing to do harm, and commit evil acts, contrary to the Law, is a Vice and Intemperance. For whoever are addicted to one or more Vices that render 'em wicked, are also Injurious. As the Miser in Money, the Intemperate in Pleasures of the Body, the effeminate in Sloth; the Timorous in danger. For through Cowardice, they desert those that are in the same Jeopardy. The Ambitious in Honour; the Hasty in Anger; the desirous of Conquest for Victories sake; the Violent for Revenge sake; the Imprudent, because he is deceiv'd in what is just and good; the Impudent, through contempt of Reputation; and so of the rest, every one according to the subject of his Passion. But these things are and will be manifest partly from those things that have been spoken concerning the Vertues; Partly from those things that shall be explain'd concerning the Affections. It remains to declare for what reason, and in what condition Men do Injuries, and whom they injure.

First therefore let us explain what we desire, and what we avoid; while we endeavour to do an Injury. For the Accuser must consider how many, and which of those things, which all Men coveting, injure their Neighbors, make up the Composition of his Adversary: and he that defends must consider which and how many of those things the Adversary misses; for all Men act all things partly of themselves, partly not of themselves. What they do not act of themselves, they act partly by Fortune, partly by Necessity. And of those that act by Necessity, some act by Force, some by Nature. So that all things whatsoever they do not act of themselves, some proceed from Fortune, some from Nature, and some from Force. But of those things which they act of themselves, and of which they themselves are the causes, some are through Custom, others out of a desire: and of those, some out of a rational Appetite, others out of an Irrational; but the Will is a rational desire of Good; for no Man covets but what he believes to be good.

The Irrational Appetites are Anger and Lust. Wherefore of necessity all things that they act, they act for seven Causes. Fortune, Force, Nature, Custom, Reason, Anger, Lust. Nor must we distinguish those things that are acted, according to Ages or Habits, or any thing of that nature; for if it happen that young Men prove Cholerick and Lustful, it is not because of their Age, but because of the Passions that reign within 'em, that they act so. Nor are Riches or Poverty the cause that rich or poor Men covet or desire. But it happens that the Poor for want, covet Money; and that the Rich through Licentiousness

tiouſneſs covet unneceſſary Pleaſures. However they are not actuated by their Riches, or their Poverty, but by their deſires. In like manner the juſt and unjuſt, and all thoſe that act habitually, are actuated by all theſe things, either by Reason or Paſſion; ſome by honeſt Inclinations and Affections, ſome by their contraries. However it happens, that ſuch Conſequences attend ſuch Habits, ſuch and ſuch others. For a temperate perſon, by reaſon of his Temperance, has always good and lawful opinions and deſires of Pleaſure. But an intemperate Perſon quite the contrary. Therefore theſe diviſions are to be omitted, and we are to conſider, which moſt uſually follows which. For whether a Man be black or white, or great or little, nothing to our purpoſe follows from thence. But if a young or an old Man be juſt or unjuſt, there is then a difference: and in a word whatever things cauſe a difference in the conditions of Men: as it will make a diſtinction whether a Man be Rich or Poor; whether in Proſperity or Adverſity. But of theſe things more hereafter, now of the reſt.

Thoſe things proceed from Fortune, of which there is no determinate cauſe; which are not done for ſuch an end, nor always, nor for the moſt part, nor uſually. Which is manifeſt from the definition of Fortune. Naturally thoſe things are done, whoſe cauſe is in themſelves, and orderly; for they happen either always, or for the moſt part. For as for thoſe things which are preternatural, whether they proceed from ſome ſort of Nature, or from any other cauſe, it will be needleſs here to enquire, though Fortune ſhould ſeem to be the cauſe of ſuch things. By force

those things are acted which are done by the Agents themselves, through cogitation, or desire.

Men act by custom when they do those things which they have often done before. Those things are acted by Reason, which are done for advantage, as being of the number of those good things already mentioned, or as the end, or conducing to the end. For the Intemperate sometimes act many things that are useful, not for the sake of being profitable; but to gratify their Pleasure. Anger and Choler is the cause that many act to satisfy revenge; but there is a difference between Punishment and Revenge; for Punishment is inflicted for the sake of him that suffers. But he that acts a piece of Revenge, does it to gratify himself. But as to those things that are done through Anger, we shall say more when we come to speak of the Affections.

For the sake of Lust all those things are acted which appear to be pleasant, in regard that those things which are familiar to us by use and custom, are delightful; and many things also that are not naturally delightful, being made familiar by Custom, are acted with delight. So that in short, all those things which Men act of themselves, are either good or seemingly good, either pleasing or seemingly pleasing. For I place the eschewing of Evils, or of seeming Evils, or the choice of the greater for the less, in the number of good things, as being in some measure desirable; and the eschewing of things painful, or seemingly painful, or the choice of the less for the greater, among those things which are delightful. Wherefore we are to understand how many and what things are profitable or pleasant. But
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of those things that are profitable in deliberation, already has been spoken : We are now to discourse of what is delightful ; of which the definitions will be sufficient, though they be not altogether so exact , if they be not obscure.

CHAP. XI.

Of things delightful.

LET us therefore suppose pleasure to be a certain motion, and entirely sensible disposition of the mind, according to the present condition of nature : Grief the contrary. Which if it be pleasing and delightful , must be the cause of the said affection ; but whatsoever depraves or causes a contrary disposition of the mind is painful. Therefore of necessity those things must be delightful that proceed according to nature, especially when being acted according to nature, they have assum'd their own nature : In regard that custom is a second nature. For *most frequently* approaches near to *always* : Nature being *always*, Custom *most frequently*; provided it be not violent ; for violence is preternatural. Wherefore necessity is painful ; for which reason it was rightly said,

*What's re must of necessity be done,
As harsh and irksome all men look upon.*

Therefore

Therefore cares, distraction of thoughts, and intencness of mind, are painful. For they are of necessity, and by constraint, unless men be accustomed to 'em. For custom begets pleasure; but the contraries of these are delightful: And therefore Sloth, Ease, Rest, Mirth, Recreation and Sleep, are in the number of pleasant Things, in regard they are not done by compulsion. Whatever also allures our desires is pleasant and delightful. For Desire is an eager reaching of the appetite after pleasure. But of these desires, some are rational, some irrational. Irrational are those which are without any consideration; such as are natural and the appetites of the body, as hunger and thirst after nourishment: There is also an appetite after all sorts of nourishment, as also in tastes and venereal sports, and generally in the smell, the touch, the hearing and sight. Rational are such, as when we desire by persuasion. For we are eager to desire and enjoy many things upon report and persuasion. But because we then are said to enjoy pleasure, when we are affected with some sort of sence, and for that the imagination is a sort of weak sence, and consequently a certain imagination of the thing remember'd and hop'd for, attends upon him that remembers and hopes, it is apparent that they who have strong memories and hopes are affected with great pleasure, because they have a deep sence of what they remember and hope for. Therefore all pleasant things of necessity consist in the sence of things present, the remembrance of things past, or the hope of things to come. For we are sensible of the present, remember what is past, and hope for what is to come. Therefore those things which

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we preserve in our memory are pleasant, not only those things, which at the time of enjoyment were delightful; but also some things that were painful; if afterwards they produce any thing of profit or pleasure. According to that of the Poet,

*Pleasing it is, when once from dangers free
To tell the Tales of former misery.*

And that other :

*For Dangers scap'd, and Labours undergone
To those are pleasing that renown have won.*

For which reason it is, that it is a pleasing thing to be free from pain. And then again, of those things which consist in hope, whatever seem to delight at present, or to be very helpful, or to be helpful without trouble. Generally tho, whatever delights at present, delights both those that remember, and those that hope for the most part. Wherefore it is sometimes a pleasing thing to be angry : According to that of *Homer*, concerning furious anger.

Sweeter than Honey from the fragrant Comb ———

For no man is angry with those upon whom it is impossible to act his revenge; and with those that are far their superiors in power, either they are but very little angry, or not at all.

Also there is a certain pleasure that attends most desires : For either in remembering what they were, or in hoping what they will be, we enjoy a certain pleasure : As it fares with them
who

who are thirsty in Fevers, while they remember how they did drink, and hope to drink presently again. In like manner Lovers, when they discourse, write, and sing, are always tickl'd with some pleasant fancy concerning the thing which they love. For in all these things they believe themselves sensibly present with the person they love, when they remember him. And this is the beginning of love in all people, when they are not only pleas'd with the presence of the person, but remember him when he is absent. And therefore they are sad and melancholy in the absence of the thing belov'd : Inasmuch that there is a kind of pleasure in weeping and mourning. The sadness proceeds from the absence of the person belov'd, but the pleasure consists in the remembrance of the person whom they behold in imagination. Whence that of the Poet.

*Thus having said, he rais'd in every one
A pleasing strife his sorrows to bewman.*

It is also a pleasure to be reveng'd of another. Of which, if a man happen to fail, he is troubled; if his design hit, he is overjoy'd. And for Cholerick men, they are in a rage if they miss their revenge; but they are pleas'd with the hopes of revenge. It is also delightful to get the better, not only to those who are eager after victory, but to all mankind. For there is an imagination of excellency, which all men seek after, either more or less ardently. Seeing then it is a pleasing thing to vanquish, therefore of necessity, all sports and exercises relating to War, Music or Disputation, of necessity must be delightful, in regard

In regard it was a frequent thing to be victorious in those things: as also all manner of Games, as Cards, Dice, Tennis, Tables, &c. where there is an Emulation or desire to win: and so of Games and Exercises accounted more serious: of which some are delightful through use and practice; others naturally so; as all manner of Hunting. Wherefore pleading of causes and contentious disputes, are pleasant to those that are accustomed thereto, and know themselves to be nimble at disputation. Honour and Reputation are also in the number of those things which are most delightful, in regard every one is willing to fancy himself such an one. So much the more when affirmed by them who believe they speak truth. Such are Neighbours rather than those that live at a distance; Friends, Acquaintance and Citizens, rather than Forreigners; and such as are in Being, rather than such as yet to be born; prudent rather than imprudent, and many rather than a few. For it is most probable, that all already mentioned, speak truth, rather than their opposites. For as to those things which a man despises, as Children and Beasts, no man regards their honour or esteem, for the sake of Reputation it self; unless he have any other reason. Friends are also in the number of things delightful; also to love is delightful: For there is no man, a lover of Wine, who is not pleased with Wine: And it is also delightful to be beloved. For then men imagine there is something in 'em, which all men desire that are endued with sense. But to be beloved, is to be carressed by another for his own sake. Also to be admired is pleasant, because it admits a man to be honoured. As also

so

so to be flatter'd, and a Flatterer, are both things that please: For a Flatterer seems to be both an Admirer and a Friend. Also frequently to do the same thing is pleasing; for what is customary is pleasing: Exchange is also pleasing, for exchange is proper to nature, in regard that always the same, begets a satiety of the constituted and fix'd habit. When it is said, that there is a pleasure in the vicissitude of all things: Wherefore the alterations of process of time, whether in men or fashions, is pleasing: As being an alteration from what is at present; as also for that what space of time produces is less frequent. Also to learn and to admire, is for the most part delectable. For there is desire in admiration. Wherefore what is admirable excites desires. For learning is the perfection of Nature. Also to do and receive kindneses are in the number of delectable things; and because that whatever avails to do good is pleasing, therefore men are delighted in correcting the miscarriages of their Neighbors; and to amend what is defective. And because it is a pleasing thing to learn and admire such things, of necessity those things must be pleasant which are expressed by imitation, as Painting, Sculpture and Poesie: And whatever else is done by imitation, though the imitation it self be not pleasing. For they are not delighted with the imitation, but they argue from thence, that this is that, and so they come to learn something. Also variety of unexpected accidents, and the narrow escapes from danger; for all these things are to be admired. Also because all things that are natural are delightful, and for that these things which mutually agree one with another,
are

are natural; there all things that are alike in agreement are natural. As Men with Men, young Men with young Men, Horses with Horses. Hence those celebrated Proverbs; *like to like, the Whale to the Whale, the Blackbird to the Blackbird*, and so of the rest. And because like and homogeneous, are always delightful to themselves, and every thing is thus or thus affected toward it self, of necessity all men must be lovers of themselves, either more or less. For all such things chiefly have a regard to themselves. And because all Men are lovers of themselves, those things which are their own, must of necessity be equally delightful, as their Works, their Orations, their Poems, &c. Wherefore for the most part they love their Adorers and Friends, their Ambition, their Possessions and Children; for Children are their own works. Also to finish what they have begun is delightful, for it was their own work before, and because it is most pleasing to be the chiefest, therefore to be thought wise is most delightful. For it is Prince-like to be wise. For Wisdom is the knowledge of many and admirable things. And because they are generally ambitious, they delight in reproving their neighbors. And to abide by that, wherein every man thinks he has a particular excellency. According to that of Euripides,

*To this doth He, with eager thought
The chiefest part of every day devote,
Himself to make the best, and better too,
Nay, better then himself, if soyl would do.*

In like manner, because all Recreation is pleasant, together with relaxation of Mind, therefore Mirth and Laughter are delightful, and also most ridiculous things are pleasant; as well ridiculous Men, as Speeches and Performances; but as for things ridiculous, we have discours'd in our Art of Poetry. And so let this suffice to shew what things are delightful, what things are irksome will appear by their Contraries. And thus much for those things which are the causes of Injustice and Injury.

CHAP. XII.

How Men believe themselves capacitated to do Injustice, and by what means they do it.

NOW let us see how Men are capacitated to do an Injury, and by what means they do it. These People therefore when they think the thing possible to be done, and to be done by themselves, they consider likewise whether they can conceal themselves when they have done it; or if they cannot, whether they shall be question'd, or if they come to suffer, whether the Punishment will be greater then what they have got by the Act. But as to what may be done, and what not, we shall afterwards declare, for these things are common to all the parts of Rhetoric. Now they believe themselves most able to do an Injury, who think themselves of greatest ability both to speak and act; whether out of their Experience in
contention

tention and controversy; or confiding in their Friends and their Riches: for if they find themselves thus supported, they believe themselves able. Or otherwise whether they have such or such for their Friends, Assistants, or Accomplices; for perhaps by the help of such Aids, they may accomplish their ends without fear of Punishment, or else conceal themselves from it. Or if they be in Friendship with those that suffer the Injury, or with the Judges; for Friends are careless of Injuries, and easily reconcil'd before Prosecution. The Judges also are willing to gratify their Friends, either by acquitting 'em, or by inflicting but a small Punishment. Moreover it is easy for them to conceal themselves, who are adjudg'd unable to commit the offence, as if a lame Person should be accus'd for beating a Man, or a poor, or a deform'd person be accus'd of Adultery. Or if the Crime be said to be committed publickly, and in the face of the World, for People are not apt to believe such things; or if the Crimes be so great or so many that never were committed before. For Men are not aware of such Injuries: in regard all Men shun common actors of mischief, like so many Pests or Diseases. But as for him that never was sick, no Man avoids him, and such as have no Enemies or many. For these believe they may conceal themselves, because they are not suspected. Others believe they may conceal themselves, because it cannot be thought they would set upon those who are aware of 'em; or that it would be an Argument that they did never make the attempt, because they were sure to find resistance. The same may be said of such as are provided of a means to escape, or of some place

at hand to secure themselves, and of such who if they cannot conceal themselves, can put off the cause by delay of Justice, and corruption of the Judges. Or if he be amerc'd, is sure to delay or buy off the Payment, or if he be such a one who through Poverty has nothing to lose, or such whose gains are apparent, great, and at hand, their Fines but small, hard to be found, and at a distance. And where the Punishment cannot be equal to the Profit. And such as gain by the Injury, but are only sham'd by the Punishment. Or where the Injury may seem commendable, as if a Man revenge an Injury done to his Father or Mother, as it was *Zeno's Case*; where the Punishment is only a Fine or Banishment, or some such thing; for both do an Injury, whether this way or that way done: tho' both are not the same Persons, but contrary in their Manners and Dispositions. Also they who have often had the good Fortune to conceal themselves, and never more to be call'd in question, also such as frequently fail in their Attempts. For there are some in such things, as well as in warfare, who are still prepared to renew the Fight. Or such as obtain a present Pleasure, but the loss follows afterwards, as it fares with the Intemperate; for there is Intemperance in all things which are desired. On the contrary, such as presently suffer pain or loss, but attain to Pleasure or Profit afterwards, tho' later. And such are the things which the abstemious and prudent seek after. And such as may seem to have acted by Fortune or Necessity, or by Nature or Custom, and to have been mistaken altogether, and not to have done any Injury. Partly such as could not otherwise obtain their right,

right, partly such as were in want. Now Men happen to be in want two ways: either they want Necessaries, as the Needy, or Superfluities, as the Rich. Partly, they who are Men of Repute, or Infamous: Those because they shall not be the less esteem'd, these because they shall not be the more esteem'd: and under these Circumstances they both attempt. And they injure those who are furnish'd with such things, of which they stand in need, either necessities, or for superfluity, or pleasure, and as well those that live at a distance, as those that live near at hand. The one are soon apprehended, the other more slowly punish'd; as they who rob'd the *Carthaginians*. Also the unwary, and such as are not watchful, but credulous; for it is easy to deceive all these, also the negligent. For he that seeks revenge must be diligent. The bashful also, for they seldom contend for gain. Also those who being injur'd by many, never care to take revenge. For to use the common Proverb, these are the *Mysians Prey*. Also those who never, or they who were frequently injur'd, for both are neglectful: These because never, those because they think they shall be no more. Also those that are or may be easily oppress'd with scandalous Reports. For such never chuse to defend themselves, fearing the Judges; nor can perswade the contrary; of which sort are they whom many hate, on many envy. And against whom they have any Pretences, either of their Parents, or of their own, or of their Friends, either that they have or would do wrong, either to their Parents themselves, or such as are their dearest Relations, who are under their Protection. For as the Proverb

says, Improbity only wants a pretence. We also injure our Friends and our Enemies; for it is easily to do the one, pleasing to do the other. Also those who have no Friends, who are not in a condition to say or do. Also such as are neglectful of Revenge, or apt to be reconcil'd, or never prosecute to the end. Or such as to whom it is not worth their while to spend time to stay for Judgment and recompence, as Forraigners, and Handicraft Tradersmen, who are contented with small satisfaction for an Injury committed. Or such as have done many Injuries to others, or themselves have suffered several like to what they have done. For that does not seem an Injury, when a Man has suffered no more then what he has often done himself, as if a Man should be a person that used to give ill Language to others; or such as have done an Injury, or intended it, or were about to do it: For in so doing there is both satisfaction, and applause; nor does it seem for the most part to be an Injury. Or such who do an Injury, that may be grateful to their Friends or their Masters, or those with whom they live. Also such as from whom they easily hope for Forgiveness. Also when they have accused a Man and are at odds with him; as it was the case between *Calippus* and *Did*. For such Acts do altogether seem to be Injuries. Also those not doing harm themselves, are oppress'd by others, as if it were then too late to consult a Remedy, as *Aenesidemus* is reported to have written to *Gelo*, when *Catabia* was by him dispeopled; that he wanted but a little of preventing him, as if he intended to have done it himself. And such to whom if we once do an Injury, we may do many things justly by way of Satisfaction.

As

As *Jason of Thessaly* said, we must do Injury in some things, that we may do Justice in many. Also they more easily commit those things which all or many do : hoping easily to obtain Pardon for such things. Also Men are ready to commit Injuries which may easily be conceal'd. As when a Man takes unjustly from another such things as are easily consum'd, as things that are eatable ; or which are not easily detested, because of their changing Colour and Complexion, or such things as are Portable, and hid in a small Room, or things that are like to many things, which he that did the Injury possess'd before ; or which a Man is unwilling to disclose, as the Adulteries of his Wife, or his own, or his Childrens miscarriages ; and such things that shew the Prosecutor to be a contentious person, and given to Strife : things of little Consequence, and for which Pardon is frequently allow'd. And thus, how Men are capacitated to do an Injury, by what means, who they are that act and suffer, and wherefore Men seek to injure others let this suffice.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Injury, and things done justly.

NOW let us distinguish between all Injuries and Lawful Actions, beginning first from hence. Just things and unjust are therefore distinguished according to the Laws, and the Persons to which they relate, two ways. Now I

say the Law is either Proper or Common. Proper, that which concerns all Persons in particular one among another; and this is either written or not written. Common is that which is according to Nature; for there are some things that are just or unjust by nature, and would be so if there were no Society or Agreement among Men. As *Antigone* in *Sophocles* seems to intimate; when she avers it to be a thing naturally just to bury *Polynices*.

*For neither now, nor yet of Yesterday,
But always this has born perpetual sway.
In all Mens Minds; nor is there one that knows
From whence this secret Law of Nature flows.*

And as we find in *Empedocles* against Murder; for Murder is not just among some; unjust among others.

*But a fix'd Law in all Mens Breasts, where'er,
(cicero's Arr.)
Heaven's Immense Light shines through the spa-*

Which also *Alcidamas* confirms in his *Messe-miac*. Now where they are determin'd, they are two ways determin'd; for what we ought to do or not to do relates either to common Society, or to one supream thing in that common Society. Therefore we may do right and injustice two ways; for either we hurt one single person, or a common Society. For he that commits Adultery or beats a Man, harms a certain person; but he that deferts his colours, injures the public. To suffer an Injury is to be injur'd by him that does it

it willingly, and with an Intention so to do. For we have already defin'd doing an Injury to be a voluntary act. And because he that suffers an Injury receives a mischief unwillingly, and all Injuries consist of those things already repeated (for we have already distinguish'd between things good and evil of themselves, and what Men do spontaneously, that they do willingly) of necessity all offences relate either to the public, or to private Persons; and that they are committed either unknowingly or unwillingly, or else willingly and knowingly: and of these, some are committed out of Pre-election, or out of Affection. Now what things Men make choice of, and in what Capacities, has been already said. But because some Men who confess they have done such a thing, either will not acknowledg the declaration of matter of Fact in the complaint, as if it should be said, that he stole the thing where he took it. Or if he confess that he struck first; but did not give the first Provocation; that he was in the Womans Company, but did not lye with her: or that he did commit the Theft; but it was not Sacrileg; as it was also laid in the Declaration; or that he brake up Land, but not belonging to the public; or that he discours'd the Enemy, but not as a Traytor; Therefore when we treat of these things, we define, what is Theft; what Contumely, what Adultery, that whether we would demonstrate it to be or not to be, we may declare what is just; for in all these things, the question is, whether the thing be unjust, or wicked, or not: For Improbability or Injury consists in Election. And words indeed of this nature demonstrate the Election; as Contumely and Theft.

Theft. Yet he that strikes a person, does not presently offer an indignity to the same person, but if he do it to some other purpose and intention, as either to disgrace the same person, or else for to please himself. Nor can he that takes a thing privily be said to steal, but if he do it to the damage of another, and to his own proper benefit. And the same rule is to be observ'd in other things of this nature.

And because there are two sorts of just and unjust things; for some are set down in writing, others not; of what are delivered in the Law we have already spoken; but of those things which are not set down in writing, there are two sorts besides. And these are partly according to the exuberancy of Virtue and Vice, wherein are ignominy and praise, dishonour and honour, and gifts and gratitude to a Benefactor, and returning kindness for kindness, (to be assisting to a mans friends and the like: Partly a supplement to the written and proper law. For equity seems to be just, and equity is that which is just, besides what is set down in the written Law. And this happens, sometimes though the Lawgivers are unwilling; sometimes by their connivance. Unwillingly, when they were ignorant of the matter; willingly when they cannot determine, but there is a necessity to speak in general terms, not so, but as is most usual; or where they cannot distinguish because of Infinity, as to give rules if a man wounds, with what sort of mettle, and how much of any sort: For it would be tedious to enumerate those particulars: If therefore, when the thing is Indefinite, a Law must be made concerning it, nothing can be said otherwise

wife then simply and barely. Wherefore if a man having a Ring upon his Finger, strikes another, or lifts up his hand, he is guilty according to the written Law, and has done an injury; though in reality he has done none. And this is Equity. If then what we have said be Equity, it is apparent what things are equal, what not, and who are men of Equity. For where pardon is allowable, there is also Equity; nor is it equal to judge offences and injuries, and injuries and misfortunes worthy of equal punishment. Now misfortunes are such things as happen contrary to expectation; and not through improbity: Offences such things as happen, not contrary to expectation, yet not out of a wicked intention: But injuries happen from a wicked inclination, according to expectancy. For what proceeds from desire, proceeds from wickedness. And it is but equal also to pardon human frailties; and not to have a respect to the Law, but the Lawgiver; not to the words but the sense and meaning of the Lawgiver; not to the act, but the pre-election; not to the part, but to the whole; not what a man is now, but what a man was always, or for the most part; and to remember to what good things his inclination leads him, then to what bad things: And the benefits he has receiv'd, then what he has done; and his patience in suffering injuries, and his desire to be judg'd rather by words than deeds; and rather to refer himself to Arbitration, then go to Law and Tryal. For an Arbitrator considers Equity; a Judge looks upon the Law, and therefore an Arbitrator is chosen; that Equity may prevail: And thus much concerning things Equal.

CHAP.

CHAP XIV.

Of the greater or less Injury.

THE greater Injury is that which proceeds from the greater Injustice. Wherefore sometimes the least crimes seem to be the greatest; as when *Callistratus* accused *Melanopus*, for taking three small Vessels of inconsiderable value from the Builders of the Temple, because the Vessels were sacred. But in Justice, 'tis quite contrary. For those other things seem so to be, because they exceed in the virtual consequences; in regard, that he who would steal three sacred Vessels of small price, would do a greater injury. And sometimes it is so indeed the greater, sometimes it is so judged according to the harm that ensues: And where the punishment is not equal, but every way less, and for which there is no remedy; for that is terrible, and almost impossible, and where the sufferer can receive no recompence, in regard no remedy can be found. For judgment and punishment are the remedies: And if the sufferer cannot brook the Ignominie. Moreover if he that did the injury more deserves the punishment; as *Sophocles* pleading for *Eurymachon*, because he that could not brook the indignities kill'd himself, affirmed that he would not have meaner thoughts of the contumely, or think it deserv'd less punishment, because he that had suffer'd had punish'd himself. Or if a man does an injury alone,

alone, or first of all, or engag'd with a few: And to commit the same injuries often, is a great injustice. Great are also those crimes for the prevention of which great punishments and torments, are sought and invented, and Prisons built for their restraint. And among the *Argives* he is fin'd and amerc'd, who occasions the making of a new Law. The most Bestial injury also is the greater, and that which is premeditated: And which they, who when they hear it, are more afraid of, then pity. And where we concern or transgress many just things, as oaths, pledging of Faith, and Conjugal Vows. For it is an exuberancy of many injuries. Also their crimes are not mean, which are committed where the unjust are punished; such are false Witnesses; for who may be counted Offenders, if not they who offend in Courts of Justice: Also those which the greater ignominy attends. Also they that injure their Benefactors. For he multiplies injuries, as well in doing ill, as in not doing well. And they that act against the Laws unwritten; in regard it is better to be just when uncompassed. Now the written Laws were made through necessity, but not the unwritten. For he that aw'd by fear, and liable to punishment, commits an injury, will not scruple to do worse where no punishment hangs o're his head. And thus much concerning the greater and the lesser injury.

CHAP. XV.

Of Unartificial Proofs.

WE are now to speak of proof which is Unartificial; which is proper in judicial causes. Now there are five things that make up this sort of proof; the Law, Witnesses, Compacts, Examinations and Oaths. And first of the Laws, what use is to be made of 'em, as well by him that dissuades, as by him that persuades; by him that accuses, as by him that defends. For it appears, that if the written Law be contrary to the fact, the common Law is to be made use of, and equity, as being more just. For he proceeds according to the best advice, who does not always make use of the written Laws. For Equity always remains and never changes, no more then the common Law, as being according to nature; but the written Law changes often. As it is said in *Sophocles's Antigone*, that she had acted contrary to the Laws of *Creon*, but not contrary to the unwritten Law.

*Which neither now, nor yet of Yesterday,
But still in all mens minds perpetual stay
Has born, and for that reason did deride
Not only this, but all mens Laws beside.*

Seeing then, that just is somewhat which is true and profitable; but that which seems so is not; therefore

therefore that which is written is no Law, because it does not perform the duty of Law. Moreover, the Judge is like him that essays both Silver and Gold, to discern what is truly just from what is adulterate: And besides, it is more becoming the Character of a judicious man, to make use of unwritten then written Laws, and to stick close to them. Whether this unwritten Law be contrary to some approv'd Law, or opposite to its self, as when the one commands all contracts to be firmly observ'd, and the other forbids any contracts to be made contrary to the Laws. Or if it be ambiguous, that he may weigh and consider, to what part to accommodate the just, and to what the profitable; and so to make the best use of it. And if the grounds and reasons upon which the Law was made, are ceas'd, but the Law is still in force; this must be endeavour'd to be explain'd; to shew the repugnancy of the Law to its self. But if the written Law be agreeable to the occasion or the fact, then it is rightly and truly to be said, that the Law was not made for the Judge to act, for the sake of what is contrary to the Law; but least he should perjure himself, being ignorant of the Law; and because no man chooses what is barely good, but all make choice of what is good for themselves; and because there is no difference, whether there be no Laws, or whether no use be made of any; and because that in diseases, it signifies nothing to cavil against the Physitian; although the error of the Physitian is nothing so prejudicial, as to accustom our selves to disobey our Rulers. And because the best Laws forbid any man to shew himself wiser then the Law. And thus much concerning the Laws. The

The Witnesses are sometimes ancient, and sometimes modern, sometimes participant of the danger, sometimes out of all hazard. I call the ancient Testimonies, such as the Poets and other famous men; whose judgments and sentences are approv'd, as the *Athenians* made use of *Homer*, for a witness about *Salamina*; And the *Tenedians* of *Periander* the *Corinthian*, against the *Sigæans*, *Leophron* made use of *Solon's* Elegies against *Critias*, to shew that his Family had been infamous, for so long time, for uncleanness. Otherwise *Solon* had never said,

*Bid Critias vaunting in his Golden Locks,
Obedient to his Parent, shun the Rocks
Of Youth's Intemperance*

These are therefore Testimonies concerning things past; but as to future things, the Interpreters of the Oracles; as *Themistocles* alledging, that wooden Walls signify'd to the *Athenians* to make themselves strong in their naval force. A Proverb also is a kind of Testimony. As if a man deliberating whether to seek the friendship of an Old Man, meets with the Proverb, *Never place a benefit upon an Old Man*. He that deliberates whether to kill the Children with the Parents, meets with another Proverb. *A Foul is he, that once the Children slain, the Father saves*.

Also the Evidence of modern Testimonies being of good credit; are useful in suits at Law. As *Eubulus* urg'd in a Trial, a certain Sentence of *Plato* against *Chareias*, which *Plato* had urg'd against *Charibius*. That it was all long of him that the People confess'd themselves all-wicked in the City.

Some

Some are participant of the danger if they seem to swear false. But these are only Witnesses of things of this Nature, as whether done, or not done, and whether it be or be not; but not at all of the quality, as whether just or unjust; profitable or not profitable. However ancient Testimonies may be us'd to prove the quality; for not being to be corrupted, they are most undeniable Evidence. And therefore they who have no other Evidence, make use of this assistance, which is to be judg'd from Probabilities. For that is an excellent method of judging; that probables cannot be corrupted with money; and are never accus'd of giving false judgment; which Testimonies he that has, will make use of against him that has not, because that probable will delay the sentence: In regard there would be no occasion of Witnesses, could the matter be prov'd by reason.

Now Testimonies, some relate to our selves, some to the adversary; some to the matter, some to the Circumstances. Whence it is apparent, that we never can be in want of profitable Testimony. For it will relate to the matter, either for us or against our adversaries: Or the Circumstances of reputation; what our own, what the repute of our adversary.

In reference to Contracts, there is this use of Oration, to increase or extenuate, to shew their credibility or incredibility. For if the probability and credibility be on our side, 'tis for us; if not 'tis against us. But he that will shew the probability or improbability of things, must consider what we have already said concerning the Witnesses. Now if it be granted there was such,

a contract; then Amplification must be us'd on our side. For a contract is a private Law in reference to the particular part. However the Laws are not confirm'd by contracts, but contracts are confirm'd by the Laws: And the Law is absolutely a certain agreement. And therefore he that will not believe, but overthrows a contract, subverts the Law. Also exchange of Commodities to an again; also whatever we do voluntarily, we do by agreement. Therefore he that endeavours to render contracts invalid, destroys all commerce and conversation among Men. But if these things are on the Adversaries side, all things are first to be urg'd to invalidate the force of the contrary Law. For if the Laws do not appear to be rightly made, but falaciously impos'd by the Law makers, it would be an absurd thing to believe our selves not bound to obedience; but yet that it was of necessity to stand to the contract. Moreover because a judge is a dispenser of Justice, and therefore he is not to consider what is just, but what is most just. For it is not for Justice to be perverted, either by fraud or through necessity: For it is natural. But contracts may be made by persons deceiv'd, or in necessity. Therefore it is to be consider'd whether they are contrary to any written or common Law, or to what is just and honest: Or whether to any former or latter contracts: for either the latter stand good, and the former are cancell'd, or the former stand good and the latter are void: And so we must plead what is most for our turn: then we are to consider, whether they may be any way prejudicial to the Judges; or whatever else may occur of the same nature.

Exami-

Examinations also and Torments are a sort of Testimonies, and they seem to be of some credit, because they are constrain'd. And therefore it is no difficult thing to understand their force, and how far use may be made of 'em. Which if they prove for us, then we are to amplify, as if they were the only true Testimonies against us, and for the Adversary, then to impeach the Evidence, by speaking generally of Torments. For that they who are constrain'd, speak far more untruths than truths. Enduring, on purpose to conceal the truth; and readily lying, to be out of their pain: And for collateral confirmation, examples are to be brought which the Judges know.

Concerning Oaths, the consideration is fourfold. For in this case, there is either giving or taking, or neither, or both. Another way thus, whether the thing be sworn, and whether by this or by that person. The reason is, because men easily forswear themselves; nor does the sweater restore; besides, he believes judgment will pass without any Witness to swear, and because there is less hazard to commit himself to the Judges; for he confides in them, not in the Witnesses.

The other then again will not take, because he detests to be brib'd to swear: because that if he were a Villain he would swear; and better it would be to be a Villain for something than nothing; for by swearing he shall get nothing, and therefore he refuses the money, not to avoid swearing, but out of a virtuous Inclination. Whence that of *Xenophanes*, that the challenge is not equal of an impious person against a man

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of

of Religion and Honesty, but as if a strong lusty person should challenge a weak Impotent Cripple to fight him. If he takes, 'tis because he confides in himself and not the Giver. So that inverting the saying of *Xenophanes*, we may say thus, that it is the same thing whither the wicked offer, or whether the Vertuous person swearer: for it is a hard thing that he should refuse in those things, concerning which they think fit to give sentence upon his Oath. But if he gives as willing to commit his cause to the Gods; or because he has no need of appeal to any other Iudges, he offers to him that he may be his Judge: And because it is absurd that he should refuse to swear to such things, which others are thought worthy to swear, and will be sworn to. And thus as it appears what is to be done in singulars, it is as apparent also what is to be done in Copulatives. As if the same person will give, but not take; or take and not give, or if he be ready to give and take or refuses to do either. For by what has been said of necessity, they must be coupl'd; as must their Reasons and Consequences also be. Hence it is apparent, that if a Man be deceiv'd by his Adversary, 'tis no Perjury. For Injury proceeds from the Will, and Perjury is an Injury; but such things as are done by Violence and fraud are not voluntary. Hence Perjury appears to be in the Mind and not in the Mouth. Wherefore if the Adversary swear that he subverts all things who will not stand to his Oath, the Answer is at hand. For this reason it is that you subvert the Law in Swearing: Cry you, we think it just that you should abide by your Oaths, and submit to

to our Judgment; but we will not abide by our Oaths: Or whatever else may be spoke by way of Amplification. And thus much concerning in artificial Proofs.

OF THE ARTS OF ARGUMENT.

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R H E T O R I C

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Theodectes.

BOOK II.

CHAP. I.

That the Affections of the Auditors are to be mov'd.

NOW because *Rhetoric* is all for the sake of Judgment ; (for Men judg of Deliberations, as Judgment belongs to the Seat of Justice) therefore it will be necessary to shew how it is adapted, not only to accomplish two ends of Demonstration, and gaining Belief ; but also to render himself and the Judg so and so qualified.

For

For chiefly in Deliberations, and then in Judgments it mainly avails to the gaining Belief, that the Speaker may seem to be so qualify'd, and by the Hearers be thought to be some way or other affected toward em, and further that they be in some measure affected toward him. Now that the Person of the Orator should be most regarded, is most proper in matters of Deliberation; but that the Hearer should be affected, is most proper in Courts of Justice. For the same things do not appear to those that love and hate; nor to the hasty and the mild; but another thing altogether, or as it is in sickness. For to a Friend, he that is to give the Judgment seems to none or but very little wrong; but with an Enemy is quite otherwise. Also to him that hopes and desires well, if what is expected be pleasing, it seems both that it will be, and that it will be a happiness if it come to pass. Quite otherwise it will be to him that despises and fears the Issue. There are three things therefore which render an Orator worthy of Credit, besides Demonstration, Prudence, Vertue, Benevolence. Wherefore they who speak or debate, fail either for want of all these, or for want of some one of these. For either through folly they do not rightly think, or if they think aright, for want of Honesty, they do not say as they think; or though they guess right and are virtuous, yet are they easily thought not to give the best advice; though they knew how to do it, because they are not accounted Benevolent. These are the three things, for want of which they only fail. Therefore if they be but thought to be endow'd with all these Vertues, of necessity he must be thought a Person of Cre-

dit by his Hearers. Now how Men may come to be thought Prudent; and Vertuous, is to be gathered out of what has been discours'd concerning the Vertues: for from thence he may learn to make not only himself, but another so. We are now to speak of Benevolence and Love, and in general of the Affections.

The Affections therefore, are those things, wherewith Men being mov'd, make a different judgment of things. Which affections are attended either by Pleasure or Pain; as by Anger, Pity, Fear, and the like, together with their Opposites. To every one of which there belongs three Considerations; as, in reference to Anger, how Men affected with that Passion become Angry, with what things they are accusom'd to be angry, and in what sort of things. For if we aim at one or two, and not all of those things, it will be impossible to move the Hearers to anger. And so of the rest.

CHAPTER II.

Of Anger.

Anger is therefore the desire of apparent Revenge, accrewing from a distaste, by reason of some appearing, tho' undeserv'd contempt of themselves, or their Friends. Which being Anger, of necessity when any one is angry, he must be angry with some one in particular, as with *Cleas* tho' not with the Man; otherwise then because he

he did or would have done something to himself, or some one of his Friends. So that always some Pleasure attends upon all Anger, in hopes of revenge; for it is a pleasure for a Man to think he shall obtain what he desires: since no Man seeks after Impossibilities. Wherefore an angry Man covets Possibilities. Wherefore it is rightly said of Anger,

*That it encreases in the anger'd Breast
More sweet then Honey, that so charms the Taste.*

For it is attended by a certain Pleasure, as well for the reasons alledg'd, as also for that Men dwell upon the Imagination of Revenge, which Imagination is like to the Pleasure we have in Dreaming.

Now in regard Contempt is the operation of Conceit about that which seems to be of no value (for we do not slight either good or bad things, or their Consequences, but we never value those that are none at all, or the least) there are three sorts of Contempt; slighting, vexation, and affront: For he that slights another, contemns him; seeing that what Men have but little value for, that they slight: but they contemn things of no value. And he that vexes another, seems to contemn him. For vexation is when any Man becomes a hindrance to another Man's Will: not to gain any thing himself, but to prevent the other. And therefore not aiming at any Profit to himself, he despises the other. Which is apparent from hence, that it will be no damage to himself; (for if he did he would be afraid and not contemn the Person) nor advantage

to the other in any thing of Moment. Otherwise he would be careful to seek his Friendship. And he that offers an affront to another, despises him. For to affront, is to vex and trouble another in such things, wherein it is an Indignity to him to suffer; not that he aims at any thing more than what he does, but only that he delights in the Act. For they that return the Injury, do not affront but take revenge. But it is a pleasure to him that offers the affront, to think that in doing the Injury he excels the other, and shews himself to be the better Man. Therefore young Men and Rich People are Contumacious, believing it shews their Superiority to give an affront. For it is the nature of Contumely to disgrace, and he that disgraces another, contemns him. For whatsoever is worth nothing, has no esteem or repute either of being good or evil. Therefore says Achilles of his Fury,

*The affront my Honour stains,
While he my Valours Guerdon thus derains.*

And that other,

As if some Despicable Rascal.

Which were the reasons of his Provocation. Now Men think it convenient to be exalted above their Superiours, because of their Birth, their Strength, their Vertue, and briefly in every thing that is an excellency in others: as the wealthy excels in Riches; the Eloquent in the gift of utterance; he that commands him that is commanded, and he that is thought worthy to govern,

vern, excells him that is not thought worthy.
And therefore it is said,

Great is the wrath of Jove descended Kings

And in another Place,

*Deep in his breast his brooding Anger lies,
To perfect what is fury shall devise.*

For they impatiently brook affronts, in regard of their high dignity and superexcellency. Others by reason of the benefits they have done, or do; either by themselves, or their friends, or will or would do for his sake. And thus it is Apparent how men come to be angry with whom and for what causes they are angry. For some are angry when they are aggrieved. For he that is aggrieved desires something, whether it be by any Opposition directly made against him, as to hinder a man from drinking that is thirsty; or not directly, as if a man does not oppose, yet does not lend his Assistance; or if any other greivance happen, all these things raise anger in a man. And therefore, sick People, Poor People, Lovers, thirsty People, and in a word all that desire, without obtaining their desires, are angry and easily provok'd, especially with those that dispise their present Condition. As those that are sick with those that upbraid; or whatever is the cause of their Distemper: The Poor are angry with their Poverty; the Warriour with his ill success; the Lover, for want of his satisfaction; and so of the rest; seeing that every one is prepar'd for his Passion by the disturbance

disturbance that is within him. Moreover if the
 person expected things contrary. For what is
 great and unexpected causes a greater greivance ;
 as it causes greater delight, when a thing hap-
 pens contrary to expectation. Hence it happens
 that seasons, hours, ages, and dispositions make
 it apparent who and which are most Subject to
 anger, and when and where and which overruling
 render the Tempers of men more froppish and
 testy. They also are angry with those that
 laugh, deride and scoff at 'em: for such affront
 'em: and with those that offend 'em in such things
 as are the signs of contumely ; of which number
 are those things which are done to no end, and
 are no way profitable to those that give the Of-
 fence: and therefore they are contumelious.
 People also are angry with those that slight and
 speak ill of those things wherein they chiefly
 delight: as when they speak evil of Philosophy
 before such as study to excel therein: or if
 another dispraise the shape of such a Mans Body,
 which they think handsom: and so in other
 things, more especially if they suspect themselves
 to want those Perfections which are tax'd to be
 wanting in others. But if they are confident of
 their own parts and beauty, they never mind
 what others say. Also men take these things
 more unkindly at their friends hands then at
 the hands of others; as expecting at their hands
 more civility and respect. Also with such as
 were wont to respect and honour 'em, but for-
 bear their former civilitys: for then they think
 themselves contemn'd, otherwise they would
 continue their friendship. Also with those that
 shew themselves ungrateful, and do not return

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Quid for Quis and with such as are quite contrary to what they do, especially if their Inferiours. For all these things are lookt upon as contempts, the one of Inferiours, the other by Inferiours. Most especially if they be contemned by those who are of no esteem themselves. For Anger rises from a contempt that no way becomes the Contemners: now it does not become Inferiours to despise their Superiours. And friends are no friends, if they do not say and do well: much more if they act or say quite contrary to their friends, and if they are not sensible of their wants, as was Antipho's Ptolemy with Melagor, for it is a sign we are not sensible of the disrespect we show: for where we are careful of our behaviour, we consider what we do. People are also angry with those that rejoyce at their Misfortunes, more especially if they sport with their Calamities: for both are signs of contempt or Enmity. Also with them that care not whether they be troublefom or no. Wherefore they are angry with those that tell 'em ill news: and with those that hear of or see their Misfortunes without being concern'd, for they resemble Enemies or Contemners. For friends condole with friends, and all men grieve at their own Misfortunes. People are also angry with five sorts of men: with those with whom they stand in Competition for honour, those whom they admire, with those by whom they would be admir'd, with those whom they reverence, and with those by whom they are reverenc'd. For if they are despis'd by any of these, they are more Passionately angry. And if they are contemned by those whom they are oblig'd to

assist

with, as Parents Children, Wives, Subjects. And with the ungrateful: for such a contempt is unbecoming: and with such as dissemble toward such as are serious. For Dissimulation is affrontive. And with those that are liberal to others, not to them: for it argues contempt to be only thought unworthy. For goodness also causes anger, as of names, tho' it be a small matter; for it proceeds from negligence, and negligence denotes contempt. Thus it is manifest that an Orator ought to frame his Auditors to such a Temper as they use to be in when they are angry, and the Adversary to be guilty of such things which provoke their anger, and to be such with whom they have just cause to be angry.

CHAP. III.

Of Mildness.

NOW in regard that to be Angry is contrary to be Mild, and anger opposite to mildness, we are to consider the temper of mild People, what things render them so, and towards what sort of Persons they so carry themselves. Mildness therefore is a suppression and sedation of anger. Since then men are angry with such as despise, and despise is Spontaneous, it is apparent that they are mild and gentle toward such as do none of those things or unwillingly, or else are seemingly such: or with such as would do contrary to what they have done: and with such

whose

whole behaviour is alike to others as to themselves; for no man despises himself; or toward such as make an acknowledgement, and repent. For looking upon it as a Peice of Justice done to him that the other repents, and is sorry for what he has done, they cease being angry. Which is apparent from the Chastisement of Servants. For men chastise more deservedly the stubborn, and such as deny the fact: but when they confess themselves to be severely punish'd, we forbear. For it is a peice of imprudence to deny those things that are manifest; and imprudence is a contempt; and therefore we despise those we do not reverence.

Therefore also we are mild toward those that carry themselves submissively and do not contradict us in our anger. For they seem to confess themselves our inferiors, but inferiors stand in fear, and therefore not worth anger.

Now the very Dogs are a demonstration that our anger ceases toward those that humble themselves, who never bite those that sit still. We are also kind to those that are serious when we are serious. For then we seem to be observ'd, not contemn'd. Also toward those who have been greatful in a greater matter; and toward those that beg and intreat: for they seem to be the more submissive: also toward such as are neither contumelious, Scoffers, or contemners, either of any Person, or of none but the wicked, or of such as are no way like to themselves. In general those things that pacify and assuage are to be consider'd by their contraries. Also toward such as we fear and reverence.

For men in that temper are never angry.

For

For it is impossible to reverence the same Person and be angry with him at the same time; For sometimes when men have done a thing in passion, we are either not angry at all, or very little mov'd: in regard they did not seem to have done the thing out of contempt: for no man contemns that is angry. For grief never accompanies Contempt, as it does Anger. Men are also mild to those that respect em. Moreover those that carry themselves quite contrary to those that are angry, may be said to be mild; as in Play, in Jestings, at Festivals, in Felicity, in Success, in Plenty, and briefly in all manner of Indolency, in harmless pleasure, and honest hopes. Also toward those by whom they have not been molested for a long time; for Time appeases Wrath. Revenge also taken formerly of another pacifies the fiercer Anger of some men. Wherefore *Philocrates* being ask'd by another why he did not clear himself before the enrag'd People? answer'd it was not yet seasonable. When then, said the other. When I have seen another, Condemned before me; replied *Philocrates*. For they grow tame, when they have spent their Anger upon another. As it happen'd to *Argophilus*; whom the people absolv'd, tho' they were more enrag'd against him then against *Callisthenes*, because they had first condemn'd *Callisthenes* to death. Also when the offenders have suffer'd more damage then they receiv'd from those that were anger'd; for they believe such a one sufficiently punish'd. Or when they believe themselves to have done unjustly, and to suffer justly: For anger never proceeds from what is lawfully done or said. Therefore when Men believe they suffer undeservedly

deservedly, they are to be reprov'd in words; which is Anger. Therefore we are more gentle to Servants that brook their Chastisement patiently. Or if they believe them not sensible of the offence done 'em, or for whose sake they suffer'd. For as it appears by the definition, Anger is against particular and singular Persons. Wherefore *Ulysses* is rightly call'd *A Destroyer of Cities*. As if he would not have taken his Revenge unless he had been sensible both of the *from whom*, and *for what*. Therefore we are not angry with those that are not sensible, as for example never with the dead. Which was the reason that when the Poet would appease *Achilles's* Anger toward *Hector* then dead, he us'd this expression;

*For all this fury is but spent in vain
On the Deaf Earth; therefore thy rage refrain.*

Hence therefore it is apparent that if we design to appease wrath we are to speak from these Topics, so as to render the Auditory qualify'd to our minds; and to shew that they with whom they are displeas'd, are either to be fear'd, or to be reverenc'd or such as have well deserv'd, or such as offended unwillingly, or are sorry for what they have done.

CHAP. IV.

Of Friendship and Love, and their Contrarys.

TO Love is to wish what is truly beneficial to another, for the sake of that Person, and not for his own sake that wishes, and to use his utmost endeavour to bring those things to pass.

A friend is he that Loves and is belov'd again, and they are said to be friends, between whom there is this mutual Correspondency. Which being granted, a friend must be such a one as rejoices at his friends felicity, and condoles with him in his Misfortunes; not for any other reason but because they are such either good or bad, which happen to their friend. For all men are glad if things fall out according to their wishes; if otherwise, they grieve and are sorry. Wherefore Gladness and Sorrow are the signs of good or bad wishes. Moreover they who account the same things good or evil, who have the same friends and the same Enemies. For of necessity these must wish the same things. Now he that wishes the same things to another as to himself, for that very reason seems to be his friend. For they love those that have either done them kindness, or those that are under their care; especially if the kindness were great, if frank and free, if seasonable, and for his own sake: or whoever they believe have a good will do them good.

Also

and those that love whom they love, and those that are beloved by them, who are belov'd by themselves; and their friends; and hate those whom they hate, and Enemies to their Enemies. For they believe the same things to be beneficial to all these as as well as to themselves; so that they wish no other to themselves then what their friend enjoys. Also those that are liberal of their purses, and for their security. Therefore we love the Liberal, the Stout, as also the Just. And such they believe those to be that live by their Labour, Husband men, and good necessary Tradesmen. Also such as are temperate; because they are not unjust: and such as are not given to meddle with other People's business for the same reason. And such whose friendship we would desire, if they would but seem to desire it; such are those that surpass in vertue, and are famous either among all Men, or among the best of Men, or among those whom they admire. Also such as are pleasant and merry in dayly Converse. Such as are facetious and harmless in their Discourse, neither reproving the faults of other Men, nor contentious, nor obstinate. For all such are given to strife. And such as are contentious never seem to wish the same, but contrary things. And such as are quaint in giving and taking Jeasts. For in both these things men strive to be facetious, as well he that gives as he that takes the Jeast. And such as praise the present felicitys, especially those which they are afraid to loose at the same time themselves. And such as are neat in their Dress and Habit, and such as never reproach the Mis-carriages of others, nor the good Turns which

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they

they have don^eem; for both are signs of Contention. And such as never bear injuries in mind, nor observers of other mens faults, but such as are easily reconcil'd. For as we find e^m to be to others, such we believe they will prove to us. And such as are never given to slander, neither understanding their own nor the failings of others, but only their Vertues. Also such as never contradict such as are in Passion or Serious; for these are accounted Contentions. And those who are so affected toward us, that they respect us, believe us vertuous and delight in our Company: and are chiefly so affected with us in those things which we most delight to follow and take pleasure in; and for which we are most esteem'd whether for pleasure or profit. And such as are of the same Calling and Profession, unless they seem to interfere one with another according to that of the Proverb, *The Potter envys the Potter*. And such as desire the same things, if there be a possibility of their partaking: if not, the reason proceeds from the same Proverb of *Hesiod*. Also those who so behave themselves toward all men, as not to be asham'd to discover their Opinion, yet not to the contempt of others: and such as are ashamed to discover their real infirmities and miscarriages committed. And such between whom there is a generous Emulation, yet they desire not their Envy, but either are or would be their friends. And whose good they study, least greater Mischiefs should befall themselves, and such by whom they are belov'd as well present as absent. And such as are firm to their friends and never forsake 'em; for among all blessings, men love chiefly true and good friends

friends. And such as never feign stories of themselves; such are they that proclaim their own Vices. For it is said, among friends, we are never ashamed of our Reputation. If therefore he whom we are ashamed of, does not love us, he of whom we are not ashamed may, be said to be like one that loves.

All such as are not to be feared, and in whom we confide: For no man loves the Person that he fears. Now Society, Familiarity and Kindred are sorts of Friendship. Now that which creates Friendship is favour, and the doing of a kindness not requir'd, and not divulging it when it is done. For so he seems to have done the kindness for his own, and not for his friends sake.

But as for Enmity and hatred, we must look upon 'em as proceeding from contrary Effects. For the Effects of Enmity and Hatred are Anger, Detraction, and Calumny. Now Anger is reckon'd among those things that are in the Person himself; but hatred is distinct from the Person himself: For if we believe a Man to be such a one, we hate him. Anger also has a respect to singular Persons, as to *Callias*, *Socrates*, &c. but hatred to many and in general. For every man hates a Thief, or a *Sycophant*. And the one is curable by time, the other incurable. The one offends by giving trouble, the other by doing mischief. He that is angry desires to make the other sensible of his Anger; the other takes no such care. Now all things troublesome, are of that nature, that men are soon sensible of the inconvenience. And what are the greatest evils are least perceptible, as injustice, imprudence: for the presence of Vice is no offence. The one

is with trouble, the other without. For the Passionate man is troubl'd in his thoughts, he that hates finds no such disturbance. The one compassionates where the effects of his Anger are too great, the other never minds the greatest misfortunes of those he hates. Hence it is apparent, that by these things we may find who are Friends and who are Enemies, when they are so, and what will make 'em either, when they are not so : what will dissolve contracted friendship ; and inforce men either to Friendship or Enmity, when there is any Controversie between 'em.

CHAP. V.

Of Fear and it's Contraries

FEAR is a perturbation of mind out of an apprehension of some future Evils at least such as are capable to produce great mischiefs, or destruction it self ; not such as are seen at a distance, but neer approaching. For mischiefs a far off are not much fear'd : since all men know they shall dye, but because they know not the time, they are not much troubled. If this then be Fear, of necessity those things must be dreadful, which appear to have a great power to destroy or to cause such mischief as bring along the greatest Molestations and disturbances. Therefore the signs of such things are dreadful. For that which is dreadful appears nigh at hand ; and therefore danger is the Approach of a thing dreadful. Such are the Enmity and Wrath of those that are able to Execute : for
it is

is apparent that when they both are resolv'd and are able, they are not far from acting. Therefore is Potent Injustice fear'd. For because a man chooses to be unjust, therefore he is unjust: Also Valour injur'd when it has power: For it is manifest that as it always chooses to act, when it is provok'd. Also the fear of such as are able to execute. For of necessity they must prepare before hand. Nevertheless, because some men are worse than others, and more covetous of gain, and fearful to hazard, it is to be fear'd that he may depend upon other assistance, who intends the mischief. Therefore they who are Associates with another in any banious Villany are to be fear'd, least they should discover or desert the Principal. Also they who are Potent to do injustice, are always dreadful to those that are lyable to suffer the Injustice, as unable to defend themselves. For generally men do an injury, when they find themselves able. And such as are injur'd, or so believe, for they always wait an opportunity. And they who have done an injustice, when it was in their power are to be fear'd, for they are still in fear of Retaliation, as being that which they dreaded at first. And they who are Competitors for the same things, when they cannot both be equally satisfy'd; for that breeds a perpetual Quarrel. And they who are dreaded by their Superiours, are more dreadful to their Inferiours since it lyes in their power to do more mischief to their Inferiours then Superiours: and such whom their Superiours stand in fear of for the same Reason: and such who have slain their Superiours: and such as make attempts upon Inferiours; for either they are to be fear'd

already, or else when they grow into Strength and Power. And among those who have suffered injury, and as among Enemies and Adversaries, not those who are Hasty and Cholerick, and liberal of their Menaces, but the Close, the Soft, the Dissemblers, and the Malicious: for they that are at hand, lye conceal'd. They that are open, seem to be at a distance, and they prevent the Storm by their own Blustering. But of all things formidable, those are most to be dreaded, where the Miscarriages are never to be corrected; but altogether impossible to be recovered, as being not in their own, but in the power of their Enemies. Also such things for which there is no help, or very difficult to be obtain'd. In a word all those things are to be dreaded, which when they do or shall happen to others are lamentable in their Consequences. And these are the chiefest things that are dreadful to men, and of which they stand in fear. Now let us see, how men are affected, when they are afraid.

Seeing then that fear proceeds from the Imagination of some destructive Chance, it is manifest that no man is afraid when he believes he shall suffer nothing; nor of those things which he does not expect; nor of those persons. But therefore those persons have most reason to be afraid, who believe that they shall suffer something, and from such Persons, and in such things, and at such a time. They do not believe they can be afraid of any thing who possess ample Fortunes, and therefore they are apt to contemn, to be injurious, and to be bold in all their violent proceedings. Their props are Riches, Strength, Power and multitude of Friends.

Nor

Nor do they fear who believe they have suffer'd the utmost of Misery, whose hopes are extinct, and they as it were dead and buried in Calamity, like those that have endur'd the torments of the Rack. Only they might have some hopes before, that they might have escaped. Which is demonstrable from hence, that fear induces men to consult. For no man consults when he finds there is no farther hope. Wherefore, when it is requisite to strike a fear into the Minds of the Auditors, we ought to render 'em such and so prepare their Ears, that they may believe they may suffer those things, when greater then they have suffer'd the same; and to produce Examples of such as do or have suffered the same things from such as they never expected; and such things and at such a time, when they least dream't.

Now as confidence is the contrary of Fear; so what we confide in is contrary to what we are afraid of. So that Hope is accompanied with imagination of Safety and Security being athand; and that there is nothing to be dreaded, or else at a very remote distance. That which breeds confidence is the hope of danger being at a distance; and Prosperity at hand; As if there be ways to amend miscarriages, and Assistances at hand, either many or considerable, or both together. Also if they never did, nor receiv'd, any Injury; if they have no Enemies, or such as are no way powerful; or if they have power, yet are equal'd by the other party in friends by them oblig'd, or to whom they are oblig'd. Also it is of great importance whether more are engag'd or better or both. They also are confident who have done many noble acts, and never suffer'd: or that have

run themselves into many dangers, but still escap'd. For men become two ways scornful of danger, either through inexperience, or assurance of aid; as in dangers at Sea; they who are unexperien'd, are confident, because they know not the danger, and the expert know how to help themselves, and are therefore assur'd. Sometimes equality lessens the dangers, sometimes those that are Inferiors scorn it, at other times men think themselves above it. In all which cases surplussage of Money, strength of Body, wealth of the Country, warlike preparations and the like make men confident; Religion also and Piety toward the Gods, and the Answers of the Oracles make men confident. Also heat of anger begets confidence; for to be injur'd, when a man does no injury raises choler. And God is also thought to succour those that are injur'd. And when being the first Aggressors, they believe they have done well, and shall receive no injury thereby.

CHAP. VI.

Of Shame and want of Shame.

SHAME is a perturbation of the mind proceeding from evils either past, present or future which procure disgrace. Want of shame or impudence is a contempt and insensibility of those things.

Shame being therefore what we have said, of necessity we must be asham'd of those evils
which

which are a disgrace either to our selves or those for whom we have a kindness. Of this nature are a Souldiers loosing his Arms, or Flight, as proceeding from fear : the denyal of a trust repos'd, as proceeding from Injustice. To lye with Women with whom he ought not, where and when he ought not, as proceeding from lust. Also Paltry and ignominious Gains, and from the Impotent, as from the Poor and the Dead : because it proceeds from a base and covetous mind. Whence the Proverb, *To rob the dead*. Also not to assist with a man's purse when he is able, or with less then he is able, and to borrow of those that are Poorer then himself. To take up at interest and yet seem to beg; to beg, and yet seem to demand; and to praise a thing in hopes it will be given him; these are the acts of a sordid and covetous Spirit: as also to beg and be refus'd. To praise a man to his face, to set too high a value upon what is good, and to speak against his knowledge when requir'd to give his Judgment of what is bad: to condole beyond measure with him that is in Greif; these are signs of Flattery. Not to endure the labour which his Elders, his Betters, and those that are much weaker endure; These are all signs of Effeminacy. To receive kindness from another, and reproach another with his own favours, These are signs of Pusillanimity. To brag of a mans self, to promise Mountains and never perform, to assume other mens works to himself, These are signs of Arrogancy. Like to these are the Acts and signs in all other vices of human manners. For they are ignominious and procure shame. Also to be ignorant of those things

things both profitable and vertuous, of which all men, or all his equals, or most are well vers'd in. Equals I call those of the same Nation, City, Age, Kindred, and in a word all that are alike in condition and Estate. All which things are the more ignominious, if his ignorance appear to be the Effect of his own negligence and sloth. Also they that suffer, or have suffer'd, or shall suffer any thing to be done or said to their scandal or reproach have reason to be asham'd; whether in reference to their own Bodys, or any other ignominious Acts, whether venereal or otherwise, whether voluntary or by Compulsion. Also in respect of courage, where a man suffers himself to be abus'd and through sloath or Cowardice refuses to defend himself. And those are the things of which men have generally reason to be asham'd.

Now because shame is an imagination proceeding from some injury done to Reputation, for Reputations sake, and not of the Events that happen; and because no man would have any care of his Reputation but because of that esteem which generally men have of it; of necessity a man must esteem that which all men value. Now they who esteem, esteem those whom they esteem, and those by whom they would be admir'd; all those with whom they have an honourable Emulation, and whose good fame they do not contemn.

By these therefore they would be admir'd and respected, and they reverence those who have any thing of Vertue or Honour; or are masters of those perfections which they earnestly covet; as
it

it is the nature of Lovers. But Men contend for honours with their equals; and they reverence the prudent for their Truth: such as are their Seniors and their Masters. Also what they behold in the Countenance, openly. Whence the Proverb; that shame is seated in the sight. Therefore men give grater respect to those that are present, and such as are their Tutors, because they are still in view. And such who are not guilty of the same Offence; for they know themselves to be not in so good a Condition: and such as are not apt to forgive: for where a man is apt to transgress himself, he does not take it amiss to see the same faults punish'd in others.

Also such as are given to tell abroad what they know. For 'tis the same thing not to seem bad, and not to be so reported. Now they that are oppress'd with Injury, tell it abroad, because they have had occasion to observe the particulars: and Backbiters, who being ready to slander the Innocent will never spare the Guilty. And such as make it their business to spy and pry into the faults of others; as your Satyric Poets and Comedians: who are a sort of Backbiters and prone to twattle. As also those from whom they never were deny'd what they ask'd: for they are of the same Nature with their Admirers. Therefore men are asham'd the first time they ask, because they never ask'd a Courtesy before; and therefore could not believe themselves to have the Repute of a Friend. But on the other side those that ask the first time, are respected, because they never beg'd a Courtesie before; such are those that make
their

their first Addresses for Acquaintance and Friendship: as having seen something Extraordinary in the Person. Wherefore the Answer of *Euripides* to the *Syracusans* was well. And old familiar Friends, if t axt of no Trangressions. Therefore men are ashamed not only of things said, but also of their signs: So we are not ashamed only of the Act of Venery, but Venereal Postures, and Lascivious discourse. Nor are they only ashamed of such loose Persons but of their Acquaintance and Friends.

But we are not ashamed of those things, where many misdoubt the Truth of the Reporters: for no man is ashamed of Childrens Report. Nor are we ashamed of the same things among our Acquaintance, and those we know not. For among our Friends we are ashamed of nothing but what is true; among Strangers opinion and prejudice by Report hath some prevalency. But they are thus affected who are ashamed. First if they be such as we have already said we ought to be ashamed of. These were they who make a wonder, or are wondred at, or such as by whom they would be admir'd at, and from whom they want some thing, which they shall obtain, as being infamous, and of no Credit, and these are such as are in sight; as *Cydias*, who at the debate about the Division of the Lands in *Samos*, asked the *Athenians*, to suppose all the *Greeks* to be standing round about, not only as hearers, but such as saw their Decree: Such then may either be at hand, or may be otherwise sensible of the thing. Therefore they who are under a Cloud, are unwilling to be seen by their Emulators, for those that Emulate make a wonder

wonder: Also when they lye under such Circumstances and have done such an Action, as taints their own and the Reputation of their Friends and Relations, and altogether such as of which they themselves are ashamed. To these may be refer'd the Teachers and Advisers of such things, or of whom they were the Teachers and Advisers. Also if others be their equals with whom they contend in Honour. For in those cases People out of shame will do, and refuse to do many things. Also when men must be seen and expos'd abroad, their Consciences strike them with shame. Wherefore *Antipho* the Poet, being sent to Execution, when he saw those that were to be Executed with him, pull their Caps over their Eyes, as they pass'd along; *Why d'ye hide your faces,* said he, *Who will see you to morrow?* And thus much for shame. Impudence will appear by its contraries.

CHAP. VII.

Of Favour and Charity.

Charity is that whereby men are said to do any kindness *Gratis*, to him that desires it, not for any reward, nor for any advantage to him that gives, but to him that is in want. Now these favours are very great, either because of the great wants of him that deserves, or because the favours desir'd, are very great and difficult

to be granted, or else in hard and difficult times, or or else in respect of the Person, being the only, the first, and for whose sake chiefly. But Indigences are desires of those things, the want of which causes sadness and inconvenience: such are the desires of Love, and our desires in pains and dangers of the body. Therefore they that relieve men in beggary and flight, though the relief be but small, yet considering the pressure of the necessity and the reasonableness of the relief, it may be great, as the gift of the poor man, that gave a Matt to the *Lycæum*. And therefore relief is necessary in such Exigencies, or in such as are equal, or in greater. Since then it is apparent from hence, when, and what sort, and to whom Charity is necessary, it is likewise from hence manifest, that we demonstrate that others are, or were, in like distress, and that others supply'd those Persons in those necessities by such and such manner of ways. Hence also it appears where Charity may be disgrac'd, and who may be rendered incapable of it, either because they relieve, or have reliev'd for their own sakes, and then it is no Charity: or, else it was done by Chance or by Compulsion; or else they only restor'd, and did not give, whether they knew it or no: for either way it is but *quid pro quo*: and so neither would this be Charity. Therefore it is to be consider'd through all the predicaments; for Charity is either this, or so much, or such, or when, or where. But if he has done less then at another time; or given to an Enemy, these, or equal or more considerable reliefs; these are signs they were not done for our sakes. Or if he knew the relief to be of no value, for no man confesses

confesses his craving from Indigency it self. And thus much concerning Favour and Charity.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Pity and Compassion.

Pity is a certain Sorrow proceeding from some apparent destructive Mischief, causing sadness in one that deserves not to suffer, or in any of his Relations, and this such as appears to be nearly resembling the sadness of him that suffers. For of necessity, he who would be thought to be Compassionate, must be such a one, as believes he suffers the same evil either himself or some one of his friends, and some evil of the same nature, like to that in the definition. Therefore they that are utterly lost never take Pity; for they have suffer'd as much as they can. Nor they who believe themselves in full Felicity; for they generally laugh at others Miserys. For while they believe they enjoy compleat happiness, 'tis apparent they believe they can suffer no evil. But there are such who believe they may suffer, as having suffer'd and escap'd, and these are of the number of those that Pity. Also Old men by reason of their Prudence and Experience; and the weaker sort, as being more timorous. The Learned also, for they argue from Reason. Also they who have Parents, Wives and Children; And such as are not over Power'd with Anger or Confidence: for they have no Consideration
of

of the future: Also they they that are given to Contumely: for they do not think themselves lyable to suffer. Therefore always they that keep the *Medium*. Nor they who are not extreemly timerous. For they being once terrify'd Pity none but themselves. Also they that believe that there are some good Men; for they who believe there are none think all deserve alike. And in a word such as can call to mind that the same Misfortunes have happen'd to them and theirs, and be Sollicitous for themselves or their friends in reference to the future. These are the qualifications of those that take Pity. What things are miserable appears from the definition. For they are of that sort which procure sadness, are destructive and have Power to destroy. Of the same Nature are all considerable Calamities occasion'd by Fortune. The destructive and efficient causes of Sadness and Grief are Death; Stripes, Afflictions of the Body, old Age, Diseases, Hunger. The Miseries occasion'd by Fortune are want of Friends, and therefore to be torn from Friends and Acquaintance is a Miserable thing. Also Deformity, Weakness, Lameness: and where we expected Good to find Evil, and that frequently: and when Comfort comes too late. Like the relief sent to *Diopithis* by the King, which arriv'd after he was dead. And where no relief comes; or if come, no Power to enjoy it. These are in general what things are lamentable, with several of the same Nature.

Now men Pity their Acquaintance, so they be not too nereely related; for with such we share, as if the Miserys were our own.

Thus

Thus *Amasis* when he saw his Son led to death, never shed a tear; but he wept when he saw his friend beg. The latter is miserable, the first terrible. For terrible is a different thing from miserable, and expels Commiseration, and therefore more useful sometimes to the adversary. Also men take Pity, upon the approach of any thing terrible we pity our Relations also, according to their Ages, Conditions, Endowments, Quality and Birth. For in every one of these things we may be highly damnify'd. For this is a Maxim, That whatever men are afraid should happen to themselves, they are by the same things mov'd to compassion when they befall others. But in regard those Miseries are most prevalent upon our affections, that are most visible to the sight, whereas the stories of what happen'd ten thousand years ago, or Prophecies of what shall happen ten thousand years hence little move us, as being past our remembrance, and out of the fear of expectation; therefore of necessity those things that are represented to us by Postures, by the Voice, by the Habit, and Action, make the Miseries seem the greater, as being by those means expos'd nere at hand to the Eye. And of the same nature are those things lately done, or which shall suddenly happen: as also the Postures, Actions, and Habits of those that lately suffer'd: or the Speeches and behaviour of Men at their Executions; especially, if look'd upon as Men of Vertue and Religion. For all these things approaching the Eye, more effectually move Compassion.

CHAP. IX.

Of Indignation.

OPPOSITE to Compassion lies chiefly that which is call'd Indignation. For to grieve by reason of Adversity undeservedly happening, is in a manner oppos'd to it, and proceeds from the same Inclinations that cause us to be sorry when we see men prosper undeservedly. And both these are perturbations of honest Inclinations. For it becom's us to condole when any one is unjustly vex'd, as also to be offended at their ill usage. For what is contrary to desert, is unjust. And therefore Indignation is attributed to the Gods themselves.

Envy also seems to be oppos'd to Pity in the same manner, as nearest to it, and almost the same thing with Indignation. But it is another thing: for Envy is a troubl'd sorrow and repining at the Prosperity of one that is unworthy of it, but one that is in the same state of Equality and Similitude of parts and conditions. But Indignation arises, not because something of adversity happens to himself, but because it befalls his friend. For, as they say, there ought to be an equal distribution to all men. For if a man be perplex'd, as fearing lest some evil should befall himself from the happiness of another, this is no longer Indignation, nor Envy, but Fear: and it is manifest, that contrary Passions will follow these. For
he

he that is offended at the evils which befall the undeserving, will certainly be glad, or at least not be sorry, when those that deserve ill, are punish'd according to their merits, such as Parricides, or Murderers, whose deserved Executions no good man pities. For it behoves us to rejoyce at the punishment of such, as we do at the rewards of the Vertuous: there being an equal Justice in the two different sorts of Recompences. For of necessity we ought to wish the same good fortune to those that are like our selves, as to our selves. All these things therefore proceed from the same constitution of mind: but the contrary to these, from contrary dispositions. For, to rejoyce at other mens Misfortunes, is the same thing as to be Envious: since that whenever a man is offended at a thing that is or may be, of necessity he must rejoyce at the privation or destruction of that thing. Therefore all these things expel pity, but they differ one from another as has bin said: wherefore they are all alike effectual to render things incapable of pity.

Now then if Indignation be a Vexation of mind to see an undeserving Person do well in the world; first, it is thence manifest, that we ought not to Stomach all good things in the same Person. For we ought not to take it ill if a Person otherwise undeserving, be just or courageous, or be endu'd with any sort of Vertue. Nor does compassion consist in the contraries to these: but men are offended at the Riches, the Power, and such like Advantages of Persons undeserving: as also at those advantages which they have by Nature, Beauty, Birth, and the like. And because Antiquity seems to approach near to na-

tural, they who have been of long continuance in prosperity, disdain those that are newly sprung up; For they who are lately become wealthy, are more troublesome, then Persons of ancient Estates by descent. And the same may be said of men in authority, men powerful, men begirt with friends, full of Children, and the like; and so if any other Advantages happen by means of those already mention'd. For Persons newly enrich'd become more troublesome, as being advanc'd to Power by reason of their Riches, then such as have been long in possession of wealth; and so of the rest. The reason is, because the latter seem to enjoy their own, the other, not. For what seems to have been long in the same condition, seems to be true. Wherefore new upstarts do not seem to enjoy their own: and because every man is not worthy of every good thing; but that there is a consideration of Proportion and what is fitting: as Beautiful Armor is not proper for the Just, but for the Stout; nor Noble Matches for upstarts, but ancient Nobility: Therefore if any Person of vertue happens to enjoy what is not proper, men presently Stomack him, as also the Contentions of Inferiors with their betters. Especially where the subject of the dispute is the same. And therefore said the Poet,

*Therefore did he in single Combat shun
To grapple the bold Son of Telamon:
For his presuming Pride did Jove offend,
That with a better Man he durst contend.*

Or whether he be Vertuous or Noble or no, let
him

him be who he will, if an Inferior: as if a Musician contend with a just man; For Justice is better than Musick.

Now they that are most prone to indignation, are they that are most deserving, and enjoy what they deserve: for it is not just to believe them worthy of the same benefits, who are not alike in deserts: In the next place if they are not only vertuous but serious and considerative. For then they judge aright, and hate what is unjust: or if they are Ambitious of Honour, and desirous to perform such or such atchievements, and seek after those things to which others undeservedly have attain'd. And generally who ever think themselves worthy of certain things of which they believe others unworthy. And therefore servil minds, evil men, and contemnners of honour are void of Indignation; not believing themselves worthy of any thing of that nature. Hence it is apparent what sort of Persons those are, at whose Misfortunes, or Crosses in the world, as not thriving, or missing their Aims, we ought to rejoyce at, or be sorry for. For from what has been said, the Opposities are apparent. So that unless an Orator do so prepare the Judges, that he may be able to demonstrate when they are petition'd to for Compassion, with reasons alleadg'd, who are unworthy, who worthy to obtain it, he shall never obtain his end.

CHAP X.

Of Envy.

ENVY is a trouble of the Mind by reason of those happineſſes ſeemingly enjoy'd by their Equals, not ſo much becauſe they are not enjoy'd by themſelves, as becauſe they are enjoy'd by others. For the Perſons that will envy, are ſuch, as to whom ſome others are equal, or ſeem ſo to be: I mean equal either in Birth, or Kindred, or Age, or Conditions, or Repute, or Riches; and ſuch as want but little of being Poſſeſſors of all together. Therefore they who perform great Actions and are Proſperous in their undertakings are more ſubject to envy others: for they believe every thing their own that is given to others: and ſuch as are particularly honour'd for ſome particular Excellency, as Wiſdom, or Felicity; and thoſe who are ambitious of honour are more envious then they who are not ſo; and ſuch as have an opinion of their wiſdom; for they are ambitious after wiſdom; and in a word, they who ſeek for honour in any profeſſion whatever envy all others that vie with 'em in the ſame. And puſillanimous Perſons for to them all things ſeem to be great. And thus much for the Happineſſes which breed envy in men. For in whatever undertakings, men love glory, and contend for honour, to gain the Applauſe and opinion of Men, and in all the Effects of good fortune. there is envy, eſpecially as to ſuch

such things as men desire, and believe to be but the rewards of their deserts; or of which they either exceed in the enjoyment, or are but a little defective. And it is no less apparent whom they envy, that is to say, those that are their equals in time, in place, in age, in glory, and esteem, Whence it is said,

Far Kindred is to envy prone.—

And those with whom they contend for honour, who are such as are living at the same time. For men never contend with such as liv'd ten thousand years ago, or shall live ten thousand years hence, or with the Dead; or with those that live beyond *Hercules's Pillars*; nor with those whom they believe by many degrees their superiours, or as much their inferiours. But because men chiefly contend with their Rivals and Competitors, and such as aim at the same ends, therefore they chiefly envy these Persons, whence the Proverb of

The Potter envys the Potter.

And such as have speedily, or are within a little of obtaining their desires: and those who tho' they do enjoy, or bring a thing to Perfection it becomes a disgrace to 'em: in regard these are near alike. For it is manifest that they did not gain by their own merits, and that breeds envy. Those also that enjoy or have those conveniences and enjoyments they ought to have or once had. Therefore Old men envy young people. Also they who have lay'd out much money, envy those that have lai'd out but lit-

tle about the same thing. Hence on the contrary it is manifest, what such sort of people rejoyce at, with what sort of people they are affected, and how they themselves are qualify'd. For as they that miss of enjoyment are sorry, so they that gain are pleas'd with the contraries. So that unless they be so prepar'd, and that they who are deem'd worthy of Compassion, or to obtain any other request, be such as these are said to be, they shall never obtain pity from the Judges.

CHAP. XI.

Of Emulation.

EMulation is a certain disturbance of mind, by reason of an appearing enjoyment of honourable happineſſes, which it is not impossible for him also to attain, in things naturally alike; not because they are enjoy'd by another, but because they are not enjoy'd by himself. So that Emulation seems to be a vertue, and about vertuous things: but envy is evil and evil things are the subject of it. For the one through Emulation endeavours to attain to good things; the other endeavours to prevent his neighbour from attaining those good things through Envy: and therefore those that emulate, must believe themselves to be worthy those good things which they have not: For no man deems himself worthy of Impossibilities; therefore are young men and Magnanimous

nimous Persons of this sort. And such as enjoy those accomplishments which are deem'd worthy men of honour, as Riches, Favour, Authority, and the like. For as if it concern'd 'em to be vertuous, because these are felicities belonging to the vertuous, therefore they emulate these virtues in others. Also such as others esteem Persons of worth; or such whose Ancestors, Kindred, Acquaintance, or Country are famous, strive also to emulate their Accomplishments; for they believe those to be their own, and therefore believe themselves worthy of 'em.

Now then if good things which are honourable are the Subject of Emulation, of necessity virtue must be of the same nature, and whatever things are profitable to others and assistant to Liberality. Also those happinesses which men enjoy, as Riches, Beauty, Health, &c. these are such as are proper Objects of Emulation: For they are the Persons that enjoy these felicities and such like, as Fortitude, Prudence, and Dominion. For Princes are able to bestow many favours upon many Persons. Also such whom many desire to be like, such as have many, friends and acquaintance, such whom many admire, and themselves among the rest. Also such whose praises and achievements are set forth by Poets and Historians. These men they Emulate the contrary they contemn. For contempt is contrary to Emulation. And to contemn and to Emulate are contraries. Of necessity therefore they who are so qualify'd as to Emulate some, and to be Emulated by others, must be so temper'd as to contemn those who are noted for those

those imperfections which are contrary to the Objects of Emulation.

Wherefore oft times they condemn the Fortunate, in regard that good fortune is not always attended with those perfections which are of greatest value. Thus how the affections are mov'd, and with what things, and how they are allay'd, also whence Proof and Credit arises, hath been said.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Affections and Habits of Youth.

I Call the Affections Anger, Desire, and the Rest, of which we have already discoursed. The habits are virtues and vices, of which already has been spok'n; as also which every one chooseth, and practiseth. Ages are Youth, Manhood, and Old Age. I call Fortune Nobility, Riches, Power, and their contraries, and in a word, Prosperity or Adversity. Young men are in their natures prone to desire, and strong to act for the obtaining their desires. But chiefly they are led by those desires that are venereal, in which they are incontinent. They are inconstant in their desires, and apt to loath what before they lov'd. They ardently desire, soon grow cold. Their wills are eager, not impetuous, like the hunger and thirst of sick people. Also prone to anger, and vehement, and apt to follow their most eager Appetites. They are over-

come

come with passion, as not brooking contempt through Ambition; and are impatient when they believe they have receiv'd an injury. Ambitious also of honour, but more of victory. Youth covets to exceed; and victory is a certain excess: and therefore they covet both these, rather than money, which is that they least mind. For as yet they have not experimented want; according to the Elogy of *Pittacus* upon *Amphiarais*. Not Malitious, but downright: as not having much us'd themselves to Intrigues of suttler. They are also credulous, as not having been often deceiv'd. They are also naturally hot, like men heated with Wine. Full of hopes also, for hope respects the time to come; Memory relates to what is past. And to Young Men, the future is Long, Past time, short. Therefore easy to be deceiv'd, because they easily hope. The more stout therefore, because they are easily anger'd and hope well. The one makes them fearless, the other confident. For no man fears when he is angry; and because he hopes the best, he is confident. They are also modest, for they look upon things to be honest no otherwise then through the Opticks of nature's Simplicity, and know nothing but what the Law has instructed 'em. They are also Magnanimous, as not having been depress'd by the Misfortunes of life, but altogether unexperienc'd in necessity. Now for a man to deem himself worthy of great things is Magnanimity; which is the effects of good hopes. And they rather choose to practise things honest then Profitable. For they live more by custom, then by reason. Now reason looks at profit, Vertue at honest Actions. They are

are also much more desirous of Friends and Companions than other Ages. For they rejoyce in Society, as judging nothing yet by the Rules of profit, not so much as seeking advantage in Friendship. For they do all to excess, and transgress more violently, contrary to the saying of *Chilo*. For they act to excess, they love to excess, they hate to excess. In other things temper'd equally. They believe also and affirm they know all things; the reason, that they always over-do. They injure others out of Contumely, not out of Malice. They are compassionate, because they believe all men good and honest. For they measure other men by their own Innocency: wherefore they believe such people suffer undeservedly. They love merriment, as being facetious: For jests are polite Contumelies. Thus much for young Men.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the Affections and Habits of Old Men.

THE Dispositions of Men stricken in years and aged Persons are for the most part quite the contrary. For having liv'd a long while, they have been frequently deceiv'd, often err'd; and because most things are evil, they slowly affirm any thing, and put a less value upon things than they ought: for they do nothing, but stuff their discourses with *perhaps's* and *ifs's* and *and's*, and so conclude nothing. Also they are morose and ill-natured for it is a sign of ill nature

ture to interpret every thing in the worst sence. Also they are suspicious, because incredulous, & incredulous, because experienc'd. For the same cause they neither love to excess, nor hate to excess; but according to the Precept of *Bias*, they love as if they would hate, and hate as if they would love. They are Pusillanimous, as having felt the hardships of life: nor do they covet what is great or pompous, but only what is necessary: nor are they over liberal. For one of their necessary things is their Estate: and as they are experienc'd, they know how hard it is to get, how easie to loose an Estate. They are fearful, and affraid of all things; for Old Age opens a way to fear, as being cold: for fear is a kind of Refrigeration. They are desirous to live, especially when nearest their ends; as covetous of what they shall leave behind; and what we think we shall most want, we most covet. They are more querulous then needs; which proceeds from their Pusillanimity. They live according to the rules of profit, not of honesty. For profitable is to themselves advantageous; Honesty but a Good in it self. They are rather Impudent then modest; for having a different esteem of profitable and honest, they little value the semblance of Honesty. They are apt to despond, as having but small and fluid hopes, by reason of their Experience. For which reason, and because they are fearful, they frequently come by the worst. They live more by Memory then by Hope; for the remainder of their days is but small; the longest part is past; which is the reason of their Loquacity, for they love to talk of old Stories, as taking delight in remembrance. In their anger vehement, but feeble.

In

In their desires impotent; only in the desire of gain: and therefore they seem to be temperate: remiss in their lusts, and Servants to their avarice. They live rather by reason than custom: and their Injuries are mischeivous, not contumelious. They are also compassionate, but not for the same reason as young Men; these, out of humanity; they, through Infirmitie: For they think the miseries of others near themselves: whence they become querulous, but not facetious: nor do they mind jollity or mirth. For to whine and moan are contrary to mirth and laughter. These are the several Dispositions of young and old Men. Wherefore, since all approve Orations adapted to their own Dispositions, it is hence apparent how an Orator is to frame his Oration to suite with this variety.

CHAP. XIV.

Of the Dispositions of middle Age.

Between these two lye the Manners of middle Age, pruning off the Excesses of both. For they are neither over confident, which is rashness; nor over timorous; but fairly in a medium between both. Neither confiding in all men, nor mistrusting all Men: but rather judging according to the Truth: neither living altogether according to the Rules of Bravery, nor altogether following profit: but between both: Neither parsimonious, nor luxurious; but according to what is laudable and convenient. Ob-
serving

serving the same measures both as to anger and desire; temperate with courage, and courageous with Temperance. Which things are divided in Youth and old Age. For young Men are strong and Intemperate; old Men temperate and cowardly. So that to speake in a word, whatever Youth and Age divide apart between them, as to what is profitable, that middle age enjoys entire. Where they exceed or are defective, middle Age observes the Medium, and the moderate. Now the Body is in its full vigor from thirty to five and thirty; the Soul from thirty to nine and forty. And thus much for the three Ages of Man.

CHAP. XV.

Of the Humours of Noble Men.

AS to the humors of Noble Men, most certain it is, that he is most covetous of honour who possesses it. For all Men desire to add to the heap which they have. Now Nobility is the honour due to Ancestry. Therefore Noble Men are apt to despise those who are like their Progenitors: For remote Renown is more venerable than honour newly got, and more fit to be boasted of. Now Noble proceeds from the virtue of Lineage: Generous, is that which does not degenerate from Nature: Which does not frequently happen to the Noble; but sometime they become Persons of mean and affected Spirits. For there is a fertility in the Progenies

genies of Men, as in the products of the Earth. Sometimes a fertile Stock bears a race of Illustrions Persons ; but then the Stock being worn out, the Fruit degenerates. And many time the offspring of sublime Ancestry corrupts into cruelty and insaneness ; like those that descended from *Alcibiades* and *Dionysius* : and mild *Genius's* sink into sloth and effeminacy, like the Descendants from *Canon*, *Pericles* and *Socrates*.

CHAP. XVI.

Of the Humours of the Rich.

THE Humors that attend upon the Rich, are easie to be discern'd by all Men. For they are Contumelious, and excessively Proud, as being swell'd up with their Wealth. As if they look'd upon themselves to enjoy all the Happiness in the World. For Wealth is a Price whereby to value other Men. Therefore they believe all things vendible to themselves. They are also voluptuous, and profusely lavish. The first, to shew their Riches, and make an Ostentation of their Felicity. The latter, because men love to gratifie their darling humours, and please themselves with what themselves admire ; believing that all other men admire what they do. And in some respects it does 'em a kindness ; in regard there are many, who want what others have ; and therefore *Simonides* being ask'd by *Hiero's* Queen, whether it were best to be a Rich

Rich or a Wiseman, reply'd, I have seen Wise men wait at Rich mens doors. Another Reason is because they think themselves worthy to govern. For they have that, for the sake of which they believe themselves worthy to govern others. And indeed the humors of the Rich, are the humors of the happy Madman. But there is a great difference between the Customs of Persons newly enrich'd, and such as were born to Wealth. For as they are more wicked, so are they more wickedly wicked. For the Wealth of him that is newly enrich'd is wild and untam'd. Nor do they do injuries through Malice, but either through Contumelie, or Intemperance.

CHAP. XVII.

Of the Manners of the Potent and Fortunate.

IN like manner the Customs of men in Power are plain to be discover'd: For they are partly the same with Rich Men, partly better. For men in power are more Ambitious, and more strenuous; because they covet to execute what their Power authorizes them to act. Also they are more diligent; as being constrain'd to take care of what belongs to their *Authority*. And more Majestic then morose; for their Dignity begets 'em respect. And Majesty is a kind of compos'd and decent Gravity: and if they do an Injury, it is not in slight matters, but in things of Importance. Good Fortune also has a

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great share in the parts of these manners. For the cheifest of Fortunes Prosperity's are referr'd to these things. Good Fortune also is the cause that we are in a better Condition, both in respect of our Offspring and other Corporeal Happineses. Therefore they are more proud and less considerate by reason of their Prosperity. But one excellent custom attends good Fortune, that it makes 'em Religious, beleving those Goods of Fortune, to be the gift of the Deity. And thus much concerning the customs and manners of Ages and Fortune: from whence the contraries may be easily collected.

CHAP. XVIII.

That there are some things common to all kinds.

NOW because the use of perswasive Oratory relates to Judgment (for what we know and have judg'd of needs no farther Explanation of Speeches) and because, though it be but one, alone whom the Orator seeks to perswade or dissuade; as they do who seek to admonish or exhort, yet that one Person is a Judge; therefore of necessity care must be taken to subvert contraries, against which, as against an Adversary the Speech is directed. And so likewise it is in demonstratives. For the Oration is directed to the hearer as to the Judge, and to speak in general Terms, he is a single Person; but to speak simply, he is a Judge, who determines what is controverted in a civil contention. For
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in all things about which disputes or consultations arise, the general Inquiry is how the case stands. Now then to speak of things that are common, all men of necessity must make Use of *Possible* and *impossible* in their Orations. Others must endeavour to shew that the thing will be; Others that it has been. Also the magnitude of a thing is to be enquir'd into in all Orations. For all Men make use of Diminution and Amplification; as well they who consult, as they who dissuade or perswade: as well they who praise as they who dispraise; as well they who sue, as they who defend.

CHAP. XIX.

Of things Possible and impossible.

FIRST then let us see what things are Possible, what Impossible. If therefore the contrary may be, or be done, the contrary may also be possible. For if it be possible that he may be cur'd, it is possible he may be sick: since that is the Power of contraries, *quatenus* contraries. Also if like may be possible, so also may be unlike. Also if what be more difficult be possible, in like manner what is less difficult. For it is more difficult to make a stately House, than a House. Also where the beginning is Possible the end is possible. For never any Impossibility will ever be done, or be begun to be done; thus no man will ever begin to make a diameter Simmetrical. Also where there may be an end there was a beginning. For all things

arise from the beginning. Moreover if what is posterior in substance and original may be Possible, also that which is Prior. Thus if it be possible for a Man to be, it is also possible for a Boy to be, or if it be possible for a Boy to be, in like manner for a Man. As also such things for which we have a natural love or desire. For no man loves, or really desires impossibilities. Also such things of which Arts and Sciences take cognizance; for all such things are possible. Also these things whose Principle of so being, is in those things to which we can either constrain or persuade, as Betters and Superiors, Lords and Masters, or Friends. Also where the whole is possible, there the parts; if the Garment, then the Sleeves; If the kind, then the form; if the form then the kind. For example, if a Ship then a Fly-boat, or Galley; if a Fly-boat, then a Ship. Also if the one of two things mutually agreeing between themselves, then the other; as if the whole, then the half; and if the half, the double. Also if a thing may be done without Art and care, much more by Art and Industry. Wherefore it was said by *Agatho*,

*Some things there are which men by Fortune do;
And some by Art, by need constrain'd thereto.*

And it if be possible for men every way inferior, and more Inconsiderate, certainly their contraries will find it as possible: As *Socrates* said, it would be a strange thing if he could not find out what *Euthymius* learnt. Thus much of Possibility. What is Impossible, is manifest from the contraries to Possible.

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Now from hence we are to consider whether the thing be done or no. For if that was done which was less probable in nature, also that which is more. And if it were wont to be done afterwards, it was done before: as if a man has forgot, that time was when he learnt what he forgot. Also if he had a will and could, he did it. For all men act, if they can, when they have a will: at least there is no impediment but that they may: and if he could and desir'd; and if he could, and it was a pleasure to him. For all men act, if they can, according to their Pleasures. The debauch'd, as being pleas'd with their intemperance. Men of Integrity, as desiring just and honest things. Also if he went about it; for 'tis probable he did what he went about. Or if those things are done which precede the doing of any thing; as if it Thundred, it Lightned: or if he endeavour'd, he did it.

Now of all these things, some are through necessity, others so in themselves. As for what was not done, it appears by the contraries; nor is it less manifest from thence, what will be: for what is in the Power and the Will to be, will be: and what is in the desire, in Passion, and the consideration of profit, where there is a Power. Also if a man be carry'd on with precipitation to do a thing which an opportunity offers to act, 'tis probable that will be done: and sometimes things that will be, happen sooner then things presently design'd. Also if those things were done before which nature orders to precede, as if it be cloudy, 'twill rain. Or if that be done which is done for the sake of a thing, as if the Foundation, then the House. As for Magnitude

and smallness, greater or less, as also great things and little things it is manifest what they are, from what has been already said. Now because every Oration proposes for its end what is good, profitable and honest, Amplifications must therefore be taken from all these Topics. For beside these things, to seek after any thing in reference to Magnitude and excellency simply, would be a vain Dispute. For singulars are more proper for use than Universals.

CHAP. XX.

Of Example.

HAVING thus spoken of Proper Proof, it remains to speak of Common Proof. Which is two-fold, Example and Enthymeme. For a sentence is part of an Enthymeme. But first of example; For example is like Induction, and Induction is a Principle.

Of Examples there are two sorts. The one, that speaks of things past; the Other, that feigns the same thing; and of this the one part is Similitude, the other Fables, like those of *Æsop* and *Lybicus*. Example therefore is, as if any one should say, Forces ought to be rais'd against the King, and not to suffer him to reduce *Egypt* into his Power, because *Darius* did not cross over the Sea before he took *Egypt*, but when he had cross'd the Sea he took *Egypt*; so he that will take *Egypt* must cross over the Sea; and therefore

therefore he is not to be suffer'd to cross the Seas.

A Socratic Similitude is as if a Man should say, that Magistrates chosen by Lot ought not to govern. Also as if a man should choose Wrestlers by Lot, not such as were fit for service; or as if a man should chuse a Pilot to steer a Ship by Lot, and not for his experience. A Fable is like that of *Stesichorus* to *Phalaris*; and *Esopus* concerning the Popular Leader. For when the *I-mereans* had chose *Phalaris* for their Captain with full and absolute Authority, and were about to give him a Guard for his Body, *Stesichorus* among other things told 'em, that there was a horse which held possession of a whole Medow by himself, at what time there coming a Hart and spoyling the Grass, the horse desirous to be reveng'd of the Deer, came to a Man and ask'd whither he might not be able with his Assistance to punish the Hart? The man answer'd him, Yes, upon condition he would submit to be bridl'd and let him get upon his back. But when the horse had accepted the condition, instead of punishing the Hart, he was forc'd to be a Servant to his Rider. Wherefore said he, do you beware, least while you are striving to be reveng'd of your Enemies, you come to suffer like the horse. You have already accepted a Bridle in choosing a general with absolute Power. But if you allow him a Guard, and permit him to get upon your backs, you will certainly be *Phalaris's* slaves.

Esopus also in *Samos*, pleading for one of the Chief Leaders of the people accus'd of High Treason, told the Assembly, That a certain

Fox going to cross a River, fell into a Ditch ; where after he had layn in great Misery, not being able to get out, many great Flies came and fix'd their stings in his Skin ; at what time, a Hedgehog passing by, ask'd him whether he should pull out the Flies : which when the Fox refus'd to let him do, in great admiration he demanded the Reason ; to whom then the Fox, If thou drive away these, there will come others half fanish'd that will suck out all the remainder of my blood. Thus, O men of *Samos*, this man now enrich'd will do you no more harm. But if you put him to death, other Persons poorer then he will step into his room, and suck away all the wealth of your City. Fables therefore of this nature are appositely made use of in Popular Harangues ; and they have this particular Excellency, that when Reall Examples are not to be found, it is an easy thing to feign Parables ; Though the examples of Reall Transactions are more profitable in deliberation and consultation. For for the most part things to come are like those that are past. And therefore when we want Arguments, we are to make use of Examples by way of demonstration ; but where Arguments are not wanting, Examples are profitable after Arguments, by way of Peroration.

For when they are first made use of, they are like to Inductions ; but Induction is very improper for a Rhetorical Harangue, unless it be sometimes. But being last made use of, they serve instead of Testimonies : and then one single Example is sufficient : seeing that one Witness, if credible, is of great use.

CHAP. XXI.

Of a Sentence.

A Sentence is an Enunciation, Apophthegm, or Maxim, not of singulars, as what sort of Person *Iphicrates* was; but of Universals, as that streight is contrary to crooked; or concerning which there are certain actions to be made choice of or avoyded. Wherefore because Enthymemes are Syllogisms concerning those things, as well the Conclusions of Enthymemes, as the beginnings, the Syllogism being set apart, are Sentences; as thus; It behoves a prudent Person not to breed up his Children overmuch in wisdom. This therefore is a Sentence: to which if the Cause and the Wherefore be added, it becomes a perfect Enthymem. For besides that sloth to which men are otherwise inclin'd,

Malevolent Envy on themselves they draw.

And this other,

*In all things there is no man to be found
That doth in perfect Happiness abound.*

And again,

There no man lives who is compleatly free.

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This a Sentence, to which add that which follows, and it becomes an Enthymeme.

*For either to his Wealth that Fortune gives,
Or else to Fortune's self a slave he lives.*

Seeing then a Sentence is what we have describ'd, of necessity there are four sorts of Sentences. For either they are accompanied with a Reason to illustrate 'em, or not. They that have need of Demonstration, are accompanied with an illustrating reason, as being a kind of Paradoxes: otherwise they need no reason for illustration's sake. Of these, such as are known before, need no demonstration. As thus.

To me of blessings Health does seem the best.

For this is apparent to all men. Others there are which being spok'n together are manifest only to them that consider. As thus,

*———No man was ere in Love,
But he will still a Lover prove.*

Of Sentences with illustration, some are parts of an Enthymeme, As,

Ill it befits the Person truly wise.

Others are Enthymematical, but not part of the Enthymem, which are most approv'd. Of this sort are those wherein the Cause is apparent; as thus,

Since

*Since Mortal, in thy Mortal brest
Let not Immortal Anger rest*

Like to which is that other,

*Let Mortals only Mortal matters mind,
And leave Immortal things to Heav'n resign'd.*

Hence it is apparent how many sorts of Sentences there are, and how they are to be accommodated: that is to say, either to things Ambiguous, or new, or paradoxically, or wanting illustration, where the Sentence is to be added to the conclusion by way of illustration. As if a man should say, Because I would not be subject to Envy, nor be accounted Idle, think learning unnecessary. Or else the last may be first affirm'd, and the first afterwards. But such things as do not seem to be Paradoxes, yet are uncertain, are to be utter'd concisely with the Wherefore. To which Laconic Brevity, and Riddles are properly accommodated; as if a man should say, what *Stesichorus* said to the *Locrians*, That they should not be contumelious, lest the Grasshoppers should Sing.

Now Sentences and Apophthegms are most proper for men strick'n in years, concerning things of which they have particular Experience. For where a man cannot pretend to Gravity, Sentences will ill become him. And he that speaks without Experience, is a fool and illiterate. For which this is a very good Testimony, for that your Husband-men are the cheif Proverb-mongers, and have 'em still at their Tongues end.

To speak Universally that which is not Universal,

verbal, is proper chiefly for Lamentation, or Amplification; and then either at the beginning or after Demonstration. But vulgar and common Sentences are to be made choice of, if they be needful. For because they are common, yet granted by all, they seem to be true. As when we would exhort those that have not sacrific'd, to run into danger,

*'Tis the best Omen of Success, that we,
Fight for our Country, and for Liberty.*

And to those that are Inferior in number,

The Chance of War is doubtful——

Or if we would exhort the Souldiers to slaughter our Enemies Children who have done us no harm,

*'Tis but meer folly, once the parent kill'd,
In tender pity then to spare the Child.*

Also some Proverbs are Sentences and brought as testimonies, as that of an *Athenian stranger*. On the other side, we ought to call those Sentences also which are frequent in the Mouths of the Multitude: and I call these such as are frequent in the mouths of the Multitude *Know thy self; Nothing to excess*; when either our dispositions would appear better, or that the thing be spoken Pathetically; and that is spoken pathetically, as when a man in his anger should say, That it is false that a man ought to know him self: for such a one, if he knew himself, would never think himself worthy to govern.

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The manners or disposition appear better in this manner; We ought not, as they say, to love as one that intended to bear malice, but to hate as one that intended to love. And by that saying We ought to make our choice apparent; if not, then to declare the cause: as in saying thus, we ought to love, not as they say commonly, but as one that always intended to love: Otherwise 'tis but the love of a treacherous Person. Or thus, The saying does not please me; For a true Friend, as a Lover ought to love always: nor does that saying please me, of nothing to excess. For we ought to hate the wicked to excess. Now these Sentences bring great assistance to Orations, partly because they take greatly with the Auditors. For they are mightily pleas'd, when any one speaking generally, falls into some particular Opinion of their own. Now what I say will thus be manifest; as also which way to tickle their fancies. For a Sentence, as has been said, is a general Enunciation: and therefore they are pleas'd, when a thing is spok'n generally, of which they have a good opinion in particular. As if any one had bad neighbours or wicked Children, he would be pleas'd with these Sentences.

*Then Neighbours nothing more troublesome.
Nothing a greater sign of Madness then to beget
Children.*

Therefore we are to consider how they stand affected, and what were their former thoughts, and then so to speak in general concerning those things. This is one use of Sentences, and there
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is yet another, which is better : for they fill the Oration with Morality : those Orations being Moral, where the will and pre-election of the speaker is apparent. Which is the property of Sentences to do ; in regard that he who speaks a Sentence utters something in general concerning those things that are to be made choice of. Wherefore if the Sentences be good, they make the speaker to appear vertuous. And thus much concerning Sentences and their use.

CHAP. XXII.

Of an Enthymemes.

NOW let us discourse in general concerning *Enthymemes* ; how we are to find 'em out ; and then the *Places* : for there is a different sort of both of these. Now that an *Enthymeme* is a certain sort of *Syllogism* , has been already said ; how it comes to be a *Syllogism* , and how it differs from a *Logical Syllogism*. For neither must we make a Collection from too great a distance, nor be too nice in taking all things together. For the one creates obscurity by being too prolix : the other meet Trifling, as speaking of things already known. This is the reason that the illiterate are more prooper to perswade among the Multitude, then the learned ; as the Poets say, that the illiterate speake more adaply to the vulgar. For these speak things common and general ; the other what they know, and what
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are near at hand. Wherefore we are not to discourse of all things that are probable, but from things that are certain and fix'd; as either to the Judges, or those whom they approve. And this because they by that means appear perspicuous either to all or the most part: nor are we only to gather from Necessaries, but from things that are most commonly and universally so. First therefore we are to consider concerning what we are to speak, and to conclude either by a Political Syllogism or any other, that it is necessary to retain either all or at least some of those things that are contain'd therein: for having nothing, no collection can be made from nothing. For examples sake, as if we were to advise the *Athenians* whether to enter into a War or not, how could it be done, unless it be known what their strength is by Sea or Land, or both; what their Revenues, who their friends, and who their Enemies. Moreover what Wars they have wag'd, and how they were carry'd on, and the like. How could we commend 'em, unless we knew their victories at *Salamine* and *Marathon*, or their famous Acts for the Offspring of *Hercules*? seeing that all men raise their Applauses either from things that are, or which appear to be noble and brave. In like manner they disprove and discommend from the contraries, considering what there is in them that may be, or seem to be so. As that they reduc'd the *Greeks* into Slavery, and subdu'd the *Egyptians* and *Potidaes*, who assisted them against the *Barbarians*, and behav'd themselves with great Courage; or whatever other errors they committed. In the same manner Complainants and Defendants while they, consider

der what things are contain'd in the Accusation or defence, produce their matter from those things. Neither is it material whether we speak of the *Athenians*, or *Laceemonians*, of Men or of the Gods. Therefore if a Man were to counsel *Achilles*; to praise, to discommend, or defend him; those things are to be taken of either side which are or seem to be, as in praising or dispraising, what is honourable, what unworthy is to be assum'd. In pleading for or against, what is just, or unjust: In counselling, what is profitable, what pernicious. The same rule holds in every thing else: as concerning Justice, whether good or not good, must be discours'd from those things that are inherent in Justice and Goodness. So that seeing all men seem to take this way of demonstration, whether they argue more accurately or more remissly (for they do not take from all things, but from those things that are included in the Subject) it is apparent that demonstration can be made no other way. Whence it is necessary, as in the *Topic's*, to select the most probable and proper out of every one: and as to those things that happen of a sudden, to make the same inquiry, not regarding things Indefinite, but really included in the matter, and comprehending the most and the nearest. For the more things are included; the more easie will the Demonstration be. And the nearer they are, the more proper and less Common. We call those common things, as to praise *Achilles*, because a Man, because of the Race of the Semigods, because he fought at the Siege of *Troy*. For these things belong also to others: and the same Person praises *Achilles* no more then

then *Diomed*. But Proper things are those things that never happen'd to any other then to *Achilles*, as to kill *Hector*, the Stoutest of all the *Trojans*, and *Cycnus*, who being invulnerable, hindred all others from landing; and because that being very young he fought uncompell'd as a volunteer. And therefore there is but one Place of Election and that is topical. Now concerning the Elements of *Enthymemes*.

I take the Place and the Element of an *Enthymem* to be all one: and of *Enthymemes* there are two sorts.

The first is demonstrative, whether the thing is or is not. The next for Confutation. And they differ as in Logic the *Syllogism*, and the *Elenchus* or the *Probation*. The Demonstrative *Enthymeme*, collects together those things that are not conceded. Therefore for the most part there are Places relating to every one of these forms both profitable and necessary; out of every one of which the propositions are Selected.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of the Places of *Enthymemes*.

There is one place of Demonstrative *Enthymemes* from contraries. For we are to consider whether the contrary be in the contrary. For if it be not, it refuses; and confirms if it be. As when we say Temperance is a good thing because Intemperance is evil. Or as in
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the *Messenians*: If War were the occasion of their present Miseries, they are to be recover'd by Peace. Or like that of the Poet,

*If just it be not, Anger should chastise
Those that against their will do inquiries
Nor are they to be prais'd that nere do well
Unless necessity or force compe.*

Or thus,

*If falshood among men such Credit gains
As oft by soft persuasion to deceive;
On th' other side we safely may maintain,
There are more Truths that men will not believe.*

Another *Place* is taken from Similar Cases. For it must be included or not included in the thing, as if we should say, That what is just is not alone good: for then what is justly done would be done well; but to do justly is not always desirable.

Another *Place* from those things that are relative one to another; as if it be in the one to act and do justly, in the other it may be to suffer justly; and if to have Commanded; to have submitted to Command. As *Diomedon the Publican* said concerning the customs. If it be no shame for you to sell, it is no shame for us to purchase. For if he that has suffer'd, has suffer'd justly and well, therefore he that acted; and if he that acted, therefore he that suffer'd. But here may a Cavil arise, for if a man be justly slain, he may have justly suffer'd, but not at your hands. And therefore it must be seperately consider'd whether he were worthy to suffer, who suffer'd, and to act;

act, who acted; and then to proceed as shall seem most convenient. For this sometimes differs, and hinders nothing, as in *Theodectes's Alceon*.

Did never any Mortal hate thy Mother?

To which the Answer is,

Distinctly this must be consider'd.

Alphesiboea also demanding, Wherefore said she, have they doom'd thee to dye, me not to put to death?

Or like the Judgments pronounc'd upon *Demosthenes* and those that slew *Nicanor*. For because they were adjudg'd to have slain him rightfully, he was adjudg'd to be justly slain. Also as to the Person who was slain at *Thebes*, concerning whom judgment was requir'd, whether he were worthy to dye; as if it were contrary to Law, to kill him that deserves to dye by the Law.

Another Place is taken from *More* or *Less*. As thus, If neither all the Gods know, much less men. This shews that where the *more* is not, the *less* cannot be. But this, he beats his neighbours, who beats his Father, proceeds from hence, that if the *Less*, the *Greater* is included, and it is requisite to demonstrate both ways, whether it be or be not.

Again, when neither the *More* nor the *Less* is included: As for example.

*Thy Father is become
Compassion's object for his Children lost.
But no man pities Oenus Loss, a Son
Who made all Hellas ring with his renown*

Also if *Thesus* did no Inquiry, neither *Alexander*. And if neither the *Tyndaride*, neither *Alexander*. And if *Hector* equall'd *Patroclus*, *Alexander* equal'd *Achilles*. And if other Artists are not evil, neither the Philosophers. And if Commanders are not bad because often overcome, neither Sophisters. And if it behoves private Persons to have a care of their honour, you ought to be careful of the Reputation of Greece.

Another Place is taken from Consideration of Time. As *Iphicrates* for *Harmodius*. If before I acted I had desir'd a Statue, and you had granted my request before I acted, will ye deny it me now I have acted: Never promise therefore in expectation of a benefit, and deny when the benefit is receiv'd. And again, as to that whether the *Thebans* shall permit *Philip* a passag into *Attica*, for if he had demanded that Passage before he assisted against the *Phocians*, they would have certainly granted it; and therefore it was absurd to deny him when he had forgiven 'em and believ'd 'em.

Another Place is taken from things said and retorted upon the Speaker, as *Iphicrates* against *Aristophan*, with whom he treated to betray the Ships for money, which he denyng to do; Therefore said He, thou being *Aristophan* wouldst not betray the Ships, and should I being *Iphicrates* have betray'd 'em? For he must be thought to have been more criminal, otherwise it will appear ridiculous, as if any one should have said the same thing against *Aristides* being the Accuser. But to detract from the Credit of the Accuser. For the Accuser would always be better then

then the Person accus'd. Therefore this Place is for absolute evincement, that it is a positive absurdity for any man to object that against others which he does or would do himself; or to persuade another to do that which he neither does or would do himself.

There is another Place from the Definition. As if a man should say *Demonium* is nothing else but God, or the work of God. Now whoever thinks there is a work of God, the same Person must of necessity believe there is a God. And as *Iphicrates*, said that he is the most generous, who is the best: for there was nothing of Generous, that could be attributed either to *Harmodius* or *Aristogiton*, till they had acted generously. And for that he is the nearest. For my Actions are nearer to the Actions of *Harmodius* and *Aristogiton* than thine. And as in *Alexander*, we must certainly confess that the Fruition of one Body does not content the Intemperate. Which was the reason that *Socrates* deny'd to go to *Archelaus*, since he thought it a dishonour, that he who had receiv'd a benefit, could not retaliate it. For all these Persons when they have defin'd and consider'd what the thing is, then they discourse of what they propound. Another Place arises from the multiplicity of manners by which a thing may be.

Another from Division. As if all the rest are injur'd for the sake of thee, or this or that Man, or that thing. And for the sake of two it was impossible: and for the sake of the third, they themselves confess he could not.

Another from Induction; as from *Peparethia*, That women every where make a true distinction

of Children. Thus the Mother declar'd to *Mantias* questioning the Legality of her Son at *Athens*. And at *Thebes* *Ismenia* and *Stilbone* having the same Controversy, *Dodonis* confirm'd the Boy to be the Son of *Ismenia*. And so he was afterwards reputed. Also by the Law of *Theodeetes* men never trust their own Horses to those that have ill us'd other men's; nor to such as have cast away other mens Vessels, does any man commit the charge of his own. Which holding true in every thing else, no man trusts himself with one that neglects his own safety. And as *Alcadas* argu'd, All men honour wise men; the *Parian's* honour *Archilocus* though abusive; The *Chiot's* honour'd *Homer* though none of their Country-man. The *Mityleneans* honour'd *Sappho* though a Woman; and the *Lacedemonians*, though no great admirers of Philosophers, yet admitted *Chilo* into their Senate. The Latins honour'd *Pythagoras*; and the *Lampsacenes* buried *Anaxagoras* magnificently, and honour him to this day. The *Athenians* also, so long as they observ'd *Solon's* Laws were happy; and the *Lacedemonians* so long as they obey'd those of *Lycurgus*. *Thebes* also was govern'd by Philosophers, and then flourish'd.

Another Place, is taken from a Judgment made of the same thing or some thing like, or contrary to it; especially if by all and always; or the most and good men: or if the Judges or their favourites: or Persons against whom there is no Judgment to be given, as Princes: or such against whom it would be a shame to give Judgment, as God, a Parent or a Teacher; as *Autocles* argu'd against *Mixidemides*: If it were law-
ful

ful for the *Furies* to give judgment in the *Areopagus*, why not for *Mixidemides*? Or as *Sappho* argu'd, that Death was an Evil. For unless the Gods had so adjudg'd it, they themselves would dye. Or as *Aristippus* reply'd to *Plato*, whom he look'd upon as too dogmatical; but our Companion, said he, affirms no such thing, meaning *Socrates*. *Egesippus* also having first consulted the Oracle of *Olympus*, came to *Delfos*, and demanded of *Apollo*, whether he were of the same judgment with his Father, deeming it ignominious for the Gods to contradict each other. Or as *Isocrates* wrote, that *Helena* excell'd in virtue, if *Theseus* so adjudg'd it. And *Paris*, whom the Goddesses prefer'd. And that *Euagoras* excell'd in virtue, as says *Isocrates*, because that *Conon* in his Calamity, rejecting all others, went to him.

Another *Place* is taken from the *Parts*; as in the *Topics* what sort of motion the Soul is: either this or that: of which there is an example in *Socrates* of *Theodectes*. What Temple did he violate? What Gods did he not worship among those which the City so esteem'd?

Another *Place* from *Connexion*. Because in most things it so happens that they are attended by good and bad, there it is proper to perswade or dissuade by the Consequences; to praise or dispraise, to accuse or defend by the Consequences: for example Envy attends learning, which is an evil: and wisdom, which is a felicity. Therefore learning is not to be acquir'd: because Envy is not to be contracted: Therefore learning is to be acquir'd, Because wisdom is to be covered. This *Place* was the Invention of *Callippus*, which included

cluded Possibility, and those other things, as has been said.

Another place arises from Opposites, when persuasion or dissuasion lyes concerning two Opposites, and the foregoing *Place* is to be made use of in both. The difference is, that in the one, things that offer themselves by chance are oppos'd; in the other, contraries. As when the Priest forbid his Son to speak on Oration to the People. For if thou utterest things that are just, men will hate thee; if things unjust, the Gods. On the other side it behov'd him to speak to the People. For, said he, if thou utterest things that are just, the Gods will love thee; if what are unjust, Men will admire thee. This is the same with the Proverb of *buying Oyl and Salt*.

Another from the twofold Opinion of men; when we do not openly and privately praise the same things, but openly those things that are just and honest; privately, those things that are more profitable. And this *Place* chiefly prevails in Paradoxes.

Another place arises from Analogy, because it agrees with Porportion. As *Iphicrates* said to the Magistrates that would compel his younger Son to publick Duties, because he was Big of Age, If they thought great Boys to be Men, they were to decree little Men to be Boys. And *Theodectes* in the Law you have made Citizens *Strabaces* and *Charidemus*, tho' Stipendiary and Pensioners, by reason of their honesty, and will ye not exterminate from your City those that behav'd themselves amiss.

Another from Consequences, as *Xenophanes* said, they were equally Impious to affirm the
Gods

Gods to be born, as they who affirm'd 'em to dye. For the Consequence of both is, that the Gods at some times cease to be. And the Consequence from both is always to be taken, as that which always follows. You will judge not by *Socrates*, but by the studies which he professes, whether he be a Philosopher or no. That to *Give* Earth and Water is to serve; and to participate of Common Peace, is to obey commands. But we are to consider which is most advantageous.

Another from this, that the same Persons do not always choose the same things, after or before, but by Turns, as in this *Euthydemus*; If being in Exile we thought that we might return, now we are return'd shall we go into Exile that we may avoid fighting. For one while they chose to fight, that they might stay; another while, not to be at home, lest they should fight.

Another *Place* is to affirm a thing to be, or to be done for the sake of that thing of which it might be the cause, though it be not. As if a Man should give to another, that he might disoblige the same Person, by taking the same gift away again. Whence that saying,

*To many Fortune, not in kindness giving,
On many large Prosperity bestows*

*That their Calamities, at last, their greater woes
May prove* —

And

And that of *Antiphon*, out of *Meleager*,

Not coveting so much the Beast to slay
But that their Testimonies might display
Meleager's courage over wondring *Greece*,

And that of *Ajax* in *Theodectes*, That *Diomedes*
made choice of *Ulysses*, not for the honour which
he bare him, but that his Companion might be
his Inferiour: For it might be, that he might do
it for that Reason.

Another place is common to Pleadors and Coun-
sellors, to consider what is disswasive, what perswa-
sive, and those things for the sake of which men act
or avoyd. As if possible, if profitable, if easie to him-
self or his Friends; if hurtful to his Enemies; and
whether the loss greater then the profit. These
are perswasive, their contraries disswasive. Disswa-
sives are us'd in Defences; Perswasives in Accu-
sations; This place is wholly attributed to *Pam-
philus* and *Callippus*.

Another from those things which we see done,
yet are incredible, because they would not seem
to be, unless they were nigh; for men believe
those things that are, or which are probable. Yet
if credible nor probable, it shall neither be true:
for it does not therefore seem to be true, because
probable, or credible, as when *Androcles* of
Pythia found fault with the Law, and was ex-
clam'd against, when they heard him say, *The
Laws want a Law to correct 'em*; he answer'd, just
as Fish want Salt. And yet it is neither credible
nor true, that because they live in the Salt Sea,
that therefore they want Salt. And Olives may be
said to want Oyl. And yet it is not credible that the
fruit

fruit from which Oyl is press'd should want Oyl.

Another Argumentative, concerning Repugnances either in time, fact or words, as thus, He says he loves ye and yet conspir'd against ye with thirty men. This separately as to the Adversarys. Then again separately as to the Person himself. He calls me litigious, yet cannot prove that ever I suted any man. Then with reference to the Adversary and himself. This man never lent any Money but I have ransom'd many of yours. Another, from men and things of which there is a bad opinion conceiv'd, which seems to speak the cause of the suspicion. For there is something to be said why it ought to seem so. As when a certain Woman was accus'd because she kiss'd her Son, she lay under a Suspicion of lying with the young Man, but the cause being explain'd, the Accusation fell. And as in *Theodectes* *Ajax*, says *Ulysses* against *Ajax* I am Stouter then *Ajax*, yet it does not appear.

Another from the cause which if it be, the thing is, if there be no cause, there is no such thing. As *Leodamas* defending himself against the Accusation of *Trasibulus*, that he was noted with Infamy when plac'd in the castle; but had wip'd it off among the thirty Tyrants; made answer that his Suspicion did not hold, For then the thirty Tyrants would have put a greater Confidence in him in regard of the hatred conceiv'd against him by the People.

Another place arises from a consideration whether it were possible or best, which the Son advises, does, or has done; for if they appear to be such, it is apparent that he either advis'd or acted: since no man willingly and knowingly advises

advises or acts for the worst: only he may be mistaken; for many times it appears that a thing might have been better done.

Another is to consider, something may be done contrary to what has been acted: As *Xenophanes* answer'd the *Tegeates*, who desir'd to know of him whether they should sacrifice to *Eucothen* and put on mourning, If, said he, you think her a Goddess, never mourn; if a mortal, never sacrifice.

Another to accuse or defend from things ill done. As in the *Medea* of *Carcinus*. These accuse *Medea* for killing her Children, because they do not appear. For *Medea* was mistaken about the sending away her Sons: but she defends her self, that she had not kill'd her Sons, but *slain Jason*. For unless she had done that, she had done amiss; since she had done the other.

Another from the Name, as *Sophocles*,

Well mayst thou steel be call'd, thou bear'st the Name

Thus *Comon* calls *Thrasylbulus*, bold Adviser. Thus *Herodicus* speaking of *Thrasymachus*, Thou art always *Thrasymachus*, saith he, or *Bold in fight*. And of *Polos*, thou art a true *Polos* or young Colt. And of *Draco's Laws*, that they were not the Laws of a Man, but a Dragon, in regard of their severity. Or as *Hecuba* in *Euripides* speaking of *Venus*.

*Well does thy Name become thee
Goddess of madness as thou art.*

And

And as *Cheremon* was call'd *Pentheus*, or the Mourner from his future Calamity.

Now Argumentative *Enthymemes* are more approv'd then demonstrative. For a convincing *Enthymeme* is a short Collection of contraries; and those things which are couch'd close together are most apparent to the Auditor. But of all Syllogisms as well for convincement as demonstration, those are most troublesome that do not appear conspicuous at the beginning.

For men are pleas'd to find themselves able to fore-judge what the Orator will say, and that they can understand him as soon as he has spoken.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of the Places of seeming Enthymemes.

NOW because it happens, that this is a Syllogism and that is not, but only in appearance, of necessity, sometimes this must be an *Enthymeme*, and that not, but only seemingly so.

Therefore the first *Place* of seeming *Enthymemes* is in utterance. And of this one part is, when the Person does not conclude in a *Syllogism*, but ends in something like it, as it is not this or that, therefore this or that. For what is spoken in *Enthymemes* collectively, and by way of Opposition, that appears to be an *Enthymeme*. And such an *Enthymeme* seems to proceed from the Figure

Figure of Speech. And therefore it is requisite to speak after a Syllogistical form, to recite the heads of severly Syllogisms. These he has sav'd; others he has offer'd to his revenge, but he has restor'd the *Greeks* to their Liberty. For every one of these require a different demonstration; but being conjoyn'd, something appears to be made out of the whole.

The other part consists in the resemblance of names call'd *Homonyma*. As if we would argue there is something of Excellency in *μῦς*, a *Mous*, from whence is deriv'd the most excellent of all Ceremonies: For Religious Misteries are the most venerable of all Ceremonies. Or if any one speaking in praise of a Dog, should comprehend the *Celestial Dog*; or of *Pan*, because *Pindarus* thus speaks,

Ὁ μᾶλλον ὄντι μεγάλα θεῶ
 Κύνα Πανὸς δακνὸν χελεύουσιν Ολύμπιοι.

Or to aver *Mercury* to be the most sociable of all the Gods, because he is call'd sociable *Mercury*.

Another in speaking things disjunctive, conjunctively; and things conjoyn'd, disjunctively. For because it seems to be the same thing which is not the same thing, therefore which is most profitable that is to be done: And this is the Argument of *Euthydemus*. As, to know that there is a Gally in the *Pyreum*, which every one knows: and he that knows the Elements of Poetry, knows there is verse: and because twice as much is sickly, therefore the single unsound. For it is absurd to think that two things being good

good, one of them should be evil, and this Argument is convincing, but thus demonstrative; For it is impossible there should be two good things of which the one should be evil. But this place is only for those that love Cavilling.

Again, what *Polycrates* said of *Thrasylulus*, that depos'd the thirty Tyrants, which is Conjunctive. But that of *Orestes* in *Theodectes* is disjunctive. It is just that she should dye who kill'd her Mother: but it is as just that the Son should revenge the Fathers death; which being conjunctively spoken, would perhaps be unjust.

Another place, is to confirm or lessen by Aggravation: Which is done, when the Person amplifies, before he has giv'n any demonstration of the matter. For thereby he makes it appear how either he has not done the fact, when he that defends the cause amplifies; or how he has done it, when the Accuser is incens'd. Therefore it is no *Enthymem*. For the hearer falsely collects, that he has, or has not done, the thing being demonstrated.

Another *Place* is from the *Signe*. Yet neither is this a Syllogism. As if a Man should say, lovers are profitable to Cities. For the Friendship of *Harmonius* and *Aristogiton* ruin'd the Tyrant *Hipparchus*. Or as if a man should affirm *Dionysius* to be a Theif, because he was a wicked Person. For neither is this a Syllogism, in regard every wicked Person is no Theif; but every Theif is a wicked Person.

Another from the *Accident*: according to what *Polycrates* said of the *Mice*, that they were assistant, in gnawing the Bowstrings. Or if a man should say, It was a most honourable thing to be invited

invited to supper. For that because *Achilles* was not invited, he was enrag'd against the Greeks in *Tenedos*: but the true reason was, because he was slighted: which happen'd, because he was not call'd.

Another from the consequence: As in *Paris*, that he was Magnanimous; for that contemning the applause of the Multitude, he liv'd by himself in *Idea*: in regard that such being Magnanimous, he was also Magnanimous. And because he spruc'd up himself, and made his visits by night, therefore he was a Whoremaster, in regard the custom of Whoremasters is such. In like manner also because the Poor both sing and dance in the Temples; and because Exiles may live where they please. Now then because these things are signs of being happy, they who enjoy these priviledges are happy. But there is a difference in the manner, which makes the Argument defective.

Another from the *Caus* which is not, but as it were the cause; as when the thing which was done together or afterwards, is taken as if it fell out for that reason: especially by them that manage Affairs of State. As *Demades* averr'd the Management of *Demosthenes* to be the cause of all the Mischiefs, because the War ensu'd.

Another, where there is a deficiency in the *When* and the *How*. For *Paris* did not Ravish *Helena* wrongfully, in regard the choice was given her by her Father: not always perhaps, but at first. For till then, she was in the Power of her Father. Or if a man should say, it was ignominious for Freemen to be strick'n; though not always: but when the one has not pro-
vok'd

vok'd the other. Moreover as among Wranglers, there is a seeming Syllogism, from that which is simply, and that which is not simply; as in Logic, That *non Entitie*, is *Entitie*, for *non Entitie*, is *Entitie* not in *Entitie*; and what cannot be known, may be known; for when a thing cannot be known, we may know that it cannot be known: Thus in Rhetoric, there is a seeming *Emhymeme* from that which is not simply probable, but a certain kind of Probability: And this not universally according to that of *Agatho*

*Perhaps some one may think it probable,
That many things improbable to Mortals Happen-*

For that happens, which is beside Probability. Wherefore that is probable which is beside Probability. So that if that be true, that which is not probable shall be probable, but not simply, but as in brangling, the *Secundum quid*, or the *ad Aliquid*, or the *Haw*, not being added, makes the Fallacy; thus here the *beside* Probability is not simply Probability, but a certain kind of Probability. And from this *Place* was *Corax's* Art. compos'd. For whether the person be not lyable to the Crime; as he that is infirm has an easie plea against a Battery: because it seems unlikely: or whether he be lyable to the Accusation, as being stout and strong, he has the same defence, unless the Probability appear: and so in other things. For of necessity a man must be either obnoxious to the Crime or not: and both appear probable: and that is probable, this not simply probable, but as has been said. And this is

to make the Inferiour Reason Superiour; which was the reason that men ill brook'd the Reason of *Protagoras*, as being false and not true; but seemingly probable

CHAP. XXV.

Of Dissolutions.

E*nthymemes* are dissolv'd by opposing another *Enthymeme*, or bringing an Objection. Therefore when we oppose another *Enthymeme*, it is apparent that we may do it from the same Places. For Syllogisms are made out of Probables, and there are many Probables that are contrary one to another.

Objections, as in the Topics, are brought four ways: either from the *same*, or the *like*, or from the *contrary*, or from things *adjudge'd*. I call *from the same*; as if the *Enthymeme* were concerning Love, as being to be applauded; the objection is twofold. For you shall either say say Universally that all Indigency is evil; or particularly, that the Proverb of *Cainias Amor* had never been brought into Use, if Love were not sometimes Bestial and unlawful in some Persons.

An Objection is brought from the *Contrary*, as if the *Enthymeme* were; that a good man is kind to all his friends, the answer should be; That neither the Wicked do ill to all men. From the *like*, as if the *Enthymeme* were that they
who

who receive an injury, always hate; the answer should be, That neither they who receive kindnesses always love.

Things adjudg'd proceed from men of Fame and Reputation. As if the *Enthymeme* were, That Drunkards are to be pardon'd; for that they sin unwittingly. The objection is, that then *Pit-tatus* is to be discommended, whose Laws are no less severe against the drunken then the sober offender.

Now because *Enthymemes* which are deduc'd from four things; Probable, Example, Demonstration and Sign, and for that those *Enthymemes* which are deduc'd from those things which for the most part either are or seem to be, are deduc'd from probables; And those from Example, which ratiocination collects by Induction from one or more things alike, when any assuming universally, concludes particularly; Those from Argument which are infer'd from one necessary appearance: and those from signs, when we collect from what is Universal or particular, whether it be or not be; and probable is that which not always, but for the most part appears; such *Enthymemes* are to be dissolv'd by bringing an Objection, and the Dissolution will be seeming, but not always true. For the Objector does not always dissolve the Probability by denying it to be, but denying it to be necessary. And there it happens that the Defendant is always in a better Condition then the Accuser by reason of this deception. For because the Accuser fetches his Proofs from Probabilities, and for that the Solution is not the same, either that it is not probable, or that it is not necessary; as al'o

for that he is ready to object that which is for the most part, and that it is not only probable but always and necessary, the Judge being so deceiv'd, believes, that either it is not probable, or not to be by him adjudg'd; for he is not only to judge from Necessaries but from Probabilities, which is to judge most judiciously. Therefore the dissolution is not to be made by proving it not necessary, but by proving it not to be probable, which will be done, if it be objected, that it frequently uses to be so. Which Objection may be twofold, either as to the time, or to the things themselves: but then it is most prevalent, if it hold good in both. For the more and the oftner the more probable. Signs and Enthymemes drawn from signs are dissolv'd as we have already demonstrated in our *Analysis*. Enthymemes from Example are dissolv'd in the same manner, as those from probabilities. For if we produce any thing which has not so happen'd, it is dissolv'd as not being necessary; or because more things have happen'd otherwise and oftner. If then more and oftner, then we are to argue it is not the thing in controversy, that it is not like, or not in like manner, or that there is some difference. But Demonstrations, and Enthymemes drawn from Demonstration cannot be dissolv'd because they do not collect Syllogistically; and therefore we are to prove that it is so as it is said. Which if it appear to be so, and to be a Demonstration it is not to be dissolv'd, since there is nothing more certain then Demonstration.

CHAP. XXVI.

Of Aggravation and Extenuation.

BUT Aggravation and Extenuation are not the Elements of an *Enthymeme*. I call an Element, and a *Place* the same; and an Element or place is that into which many *Enthymemes* happen. But amplification and diminution are *Enthymemes* to demonstrate that the thing is great or little, good or bad, just or unjust and so of the rest. All which things are the Subjects of *Enthymemes* and Syllogisms. So that if none of these be the Place of an *Enthymeme*, then neither Aggravation nor Extenuation. Nor are those things that dissolve *Enthymemes*, any species of an *Enthymeme* that avail to confirmation. For it is manifest that he who demonstrates or brings an objection, dissolves. On the other side there is a contrary demonstration of opposites, while the one proves it was not, the other that it was done; so that here can be no difference, for they use both the same *Enthymemes*, that it is, or is not. But an objection is no *Enthymem*, only a certain opinion, whence it will become perspicuous, that the Person has either not Syllogistically concluded, or assum'd something that is false.

Aristotle's

R H E T O R I C

T O

Theodectes.

BOOK III.

CHAP. I.

Of the Parts of Rhetoric.

WE are now to discourse of Elocution. For it is not enough to have in Stock what we ought to speak, but to speak what we have as we ought; to which it much conduces that the Oration should appear Garbate and Polite. And first we are to enquire according to the order of nature, what those things are that are capable to perswade. In the second place, to dispose these things for utterance, The third thing which is of

of greatest efficacy, yet never hitherto explain'd; concerns Action and delivery: as being but of modern use in Tragedies and Comedies; in regard that formerly the Poets rehears'd their own works themselves. And it is manifestly the same thing in *Rhetoric* as in Poetry, of which things have discours'd especially *Glauco the Teian*.

Now Pronunciation consists in the voice, how to make use of it according to every affection, as when low'd, when Soft, when between both: and what accents to make use of; and what measures are proper. For there are three things to be consider'd, magnitude, Harmony and number. And these are the things which generally carry away the prizes at the publick Tryals of Skill. And as the Actors in the Poetical contests are more valu'd then the Poets themselves, so likewise in the Civil, because of the Corruption of Common Weals. Nor is it yet reduc'd into an Art, in regard that Elocution is but a Novelty and seems to be but a slight thing, if rightly examined.

But in regard the Study and Practise of *Rhetoric* depends upon opinion, we must not neglect it, as being a thing more necessary then useful: since there is nothing to be desir'd in speaking, more then to avoid being troublesome and unpleasant: for that when we consent about things and matters, all things else except demonstrations are needless. And yet they greatly prevail upon deprav'd Auditories. And that which concerns Elocution, has some little kind of necessity to be observ'd in all kind of learning. For it is of use to manifest whither the Person speak for or so? yet not so much; for indeed all these

things depend upon fancy, and are referr'd to the Auditory. And therefore no man Teaches Geometry like an Orator; yet Pronunciation when it comes to be us'd there will prove as Effectual as when it is heard upon the Stage. Some however have attempted to say something concerning it, as *Thrasymachus* in his Treatise entitl'd *Elici*. Besides nature is more prone to action, as less addicted to Art; But Elocution is altogether Artificial and therefore rewards are given to those that prove themselves most excellent at that, as to Orators that excel in gesture and Action. For Orations prevail more, being well spoken, then well written. Therefore the Poets were the first that promoted Action. For names are but Imitations; which was the reason that *Rhapsodes* and Stage treading became Arts. Now because the Poets though speaking frivolous things, have seem'd to gain honour by their manner of Delivery, therefore Poetic Elocution was first receiv'd, as that of *Gorgias*. And now many illiterate Persons believe themselves great Authors upon this Subject. But the Pronunciation of Prose and Verse is quite different, as is manifest from the event. For the Tragedians now no longer use that manner; but as they have left *Tetrameters*, and betaken themselves to the *Iambic* as being the most proper among other measures for speech, so they have lay'd aside all names not agreeable to custom, which formerly and still in *Hexameters* the Poets made use of as Ornaments. And therefore it is ridiculous to imitate 'em, in those things which they have lay'd aside, as disagreeable.

CHAP. II.

Of Elocution.

NOW then the vertue of Elocution is to be plain; which that it is so, this is a sign, that if the Oration do not make plain and apparent, it does not do it's work. Nor must the stile be low, nor exceeding the dignity of the Person, but according to *decorum*. For a Poetic stile may not be low, yet not Proper for a Prose Oration. Names also and words which are Proper render an Oration conspicuous, yet not mean but polite and graceful. Variety of words renders the Oration also more Majestic. For like the converse of men with strangers and Foriegners, such is the pleasure we take in Novelty of words. Therefore words the most unusual are to be made use of: For men admire Novelty, and what we admire is pleasing. Therefore in meeter there are many words made use of to this purpose, and there aptly enough in regard the things and the Persons are there more lofty and great which are discours'd of. But fewer suffice in prose where the Subject is of less concern. For there, if a Servant or a very young Person should speak too politely of little things, it would be an *Indecorum*; though in those meaner things there is a decent contraction and dilation of language. Therefore while we do that, we ought to lye close, that we may not seem to speak ridiculously

ously but naturally. For the one gains credit, the other the contrary. For from one that lyes upon the Watch men Guard themselves as from mix'd Wines. And as the voice of *Theodorus* in respect of the voices of the other Actors; for his seem'd to be the voice of the speaker; theirs the voices of other men. And he is well conceal'd that in his composing, chooles out of the common and customary dialect. Which *Euripides* does, and was the first that shew'd the way. But seeing that an Oration consists of names and words, and that there are as many sorts of words as we have set down in our Art of Poesy, obsolete, reiterated and made words are seldom and in few places to be us'd: for it makes a change in the Oration too misbecoming. But Proper, Domestic and Metaphor only become the Elocution of Prose. Which is Apparent because that all men make use of these only, since all men use Proper, Domestic words and Metaphor. Whence it is manifest that if a man rightly observe these things, the Oration will seem clear and unusual; and yet why unusual, shall not be discover'd. Which is the excellency of Rhetorical Oration. Homonymous words are most useful for Sophisters: for by means thereof, they impose their fallacies. Synonymous are most useful for Poets. I call Proper, and Synonymous, as to go, and to walk, journey and Travel both these words being Proper and Synonymous one with another.

Prosperity, pleasantness and what is unusual more especially appear in Metaphor. Nor is Metaphor other where to be fetch'd. But both Epithites and Metaphors ought to be congruous, which

which will proceed from proportion. If not, the Indecorum will appear, in regard that contraries then most chiefly appear, when put together. Therefore it is to be considered, as Purple becomes a young Man, what becomes an old Man; for the same habit does not agree with both. And he that will commend, must deduce his Metaphors from the best in their kind; he that would dispraise, from the worst. Thus I say because there are contraries in the same kind, that a Beggar, Prays; and he that Prays begs. For because both are *Petitions*, it is expedient to do as we have said. As *Iphicrates* call'd *Callias Metragyrten*, or Collector for the Goddess, not *Daductus* or Torch Bearer, to which the other reply'd, that he was not initiated, and therefore he ought to have call'd him *Daductus*, and not *Metragyrten*: since both related to the same Goddess: only the one was honourable, the other, not. Thus the flatterers of *Dionysius* call'd themselves his *Artists*. Both which are Metaphors, the one from what was forbid, the other from what was honourable. Thus Robbers at this day call themselves *Merchants*. Therefore it is lawful to say, that he who does wrong, commits a crime, and he that commits a crime does wrong: and he that Steals, both takes and Robs. But there is an Indecorum in that which *Telephus* in *Euripides* speaks, *Raigning over the Caras, he landed in Mysia*. For the word to *Raign*, exceeding the Dignity of the matter, render'd the Metaphor vicious.

There is also an Error in Syllables if they are not pleasing. As *Dionysius* of *Chalcis* in his *Elogics* calls Poetic the *Clamour of Calliope*, for both

both are words; but the words not being significant, the *Metaphor* is frivolous.

Moreover a *Metaphor* is not to be far fetch'd, but from words as it were next akin, agreeable; and words anonymous ought to be express'd by *Metaphor*, and that being understood, they may appear to be the next in kind; as in that celebrated Riddle.

*A Man I saw Brass Sodering to a Man
With fire: ———*

The *Ad* it self is *anonymous*: but both together infer a certain addition: So that sodering intimates the application of the Cupping Glass. And indeed in Riddles that are well compos'd we shall find many Proper *Metaphors*. For *Metaphors* make Riddles. So that if the Riddles be true the *Metaphors* must be well chosen. Now the grace of the word consists, as says *Lycimnius*, in the sound and signification; as in like manner the Turpitude of the word. Add to these a third that dissolves *Sophistical Argumentation*. For it is not, as *Bryson* said, That no man speaks lewdly, if the same things signifie as well this as that; which is false when another word is more Proper, more like, and more fit to set the thing before our Eyes.

Therefore that which is alike does not signifie both this and that, so that even in this manner one word is to be esteem'd more graceful, another more despicable then the other. For both signifie *graceful* and *despicable*; but not *quatenus* graceful, nor *quatenus* despicable. Or else they signifie the same, but more or less.

Epithites

Epithites also are to be deriv'd from handsome things. But they differ; and it is better to say the *Rosy Morn*, than the *Purple Morn*, worst of all to say the *Ruddy Morn*. *Epithites* also are to be drawn from things wicked and shameful: therefore *Matricide* is worse than *Parricide*: and then again from the better, as *Revenger of his Parent*. And *Simonides*, when the Victor with Mules had given him a small reward, refus'd to compose a Copy of Verses in his praise, because he did not think it became him to speak in the praise of Imperfect Creatures. But when the Muleman had given him more, he cry'd.

Hail Daughters fair of whirlwind-footed steeds.

The same thing may be done by way of diminution; which extenuates good as well as evil, as *Aristophanes* in his *Babylonic*, by way of *Sarcasm*, plays with the diminutives of Gold, and Garment, and sickness, not to be express by us but by some *Epithite* of contempt. But a man must be wary, and observe a *Mediocrity* in both.

CHAP. III.

Of Frigids.

FRigid happen four ways. In compound words, as in *Lycophron*, the many fac'd Heavens, the Huge-neck'd Earth, the Narrow-haven'd shore. Or as *Gorgias* calls one Poor mus'd Flatterer. Or as *Alcidamas*, his soul was filled with
Fury,

Fury, and his face all fiery Choler: to end-brought Joy: the to end-brought force of his Oration: and the Purple-coloured Pavement of Thessalus. For all these, as being compounded seem Poetical: This is one failing. Another to use obsolete sayings as in Lycophron, Xerxes, a Pelopon man: and Schiron a Vast man. In Alcidas; The Boy's play of Poetry, The Stupidity of Nature; and exasperated with the burning anger of his mind.

A third in Epithites either tedious, or unreasonable, or too frequently us'd. For in Poetry to call Milk *White*, is allowable. But in Prose they are either indecent, or if too frequent they turn the Prose into Verse. But because Epithites are useful sometimes (for they render the stile the more unusual) there is a Mediocrity to be observ'd otherwise the Mischief is worse then if they were spoken in vain: for as the one sort of Elocution is not good, the other is bad. Therefore the Writings of *Alcidas* seem to be rigid. For he does not make use of his Epithites as junkets, but as ordinary viands, frequent, open, and greater then the subject requires. For he does not only say *Sweat*, but *moist sweat*. Not by running, but by the *Curribund violence of the mind*. Not the *Laws*, but *Law the Queen of Citys*. Not *care*, but *sad care*. He hid him not with boughs, but with *the boughs of the Wood*: and *Dispenser of pleasure to the Auditory*: and *Desire, the Anti-Rival of the Soul*. Which is both together as well Compound as an Epithite. Therefore they that thus speak Poetically, together with indecorum are subject to Frigidity and ridiculousness, besides that their Loquacity renders 'em obscure. For he that crouds too much upon the

the understanding of the Hearer, darkens the perspicuity which he designs.

We also use compound words, when the things are anonymous, and the word apart for Composition, as *Time-wasting*; which is if it be done too frequently is altogether Poetical. Therefore compound words are most proper for *Dithyrambs*; as making a great noise: Obsolete words for *Epic Poems*, as being lofty and Majestic. Metaphors for *Iambics*.

There is also a fourth Frigidity in Metaphors. For some are ridiculous, which the Comedians use; others too high flown and Tragical; Also they are obscure if too far fetch'd. As that of *Gorgias*, *Green and Bloodless things, which thou hast shameful sown and ill reap'd*. For it is too Poetical. And as *Alcidamas*, Philosophy, the Bulwark of the Law. And *Ulysses*, the bright Looking-glass of human life. These things little avail to persuasion, for the reasons already alledg'd. But that of *Gorgias*, upon a Swallow which mured as it flew toward him was extremely Tragical, *Impudently done, O Philomela*. For if he spoke to a Bird, it was no Impudence: if to a Virgin, it was a piece of Impudence. Therefore he might have some reason to be angry, remembring some past accident. not the present.

CHAP. IV.

Of Representation.

Representation is a kind of *Metaphor* differing little from it. For when we say, *Achilles rushed in like a Lyon*, it is a Representation; but to say a *Lyon rushed in*, is only a Metaphor. For because they are both strong, he calls *Achilles* a *Lyon* by a Metaphor.

Now Representation is very useful in Oratory; but not frequently as being Poetical. And they are drawn from the same things as Metaphors. Representations therefore are like that which *Anavotto* makes of *Idrieus*, That he was like a Dog let loose from his Chains: For they bite all they meet. Or as *Theodamas* liken'd *Archidamus* to *Euxenus*, who knew nothing of Geometry. And, that of *Plato*, they who rob the Dead are like to Dogs that bite the Stones, but never touch them that throw the Stone: and that of *Demosthenes*, That the People are like a Steersman strong indeed, but very deaf; and speaking against the verses of the Poets, that they were like fair women without Beauty. For neither the one when their Beauty's faded, nor the other when dissolv'd into Prose appear alike: and that of *Pericles* upon the *Samiens*, That they were like Children, that take their Bread, crying; and upon the *Boetians*, That they were like Flints: for as Flints were broket one by another;

to the *Berrians* by fighting among themselves. And *Democrats* likened Orators to Nurses; who swallow'd the Meats and anointed the Children with the Spittle. Or as *Anisthenes* likened *Crepisodorus*, being a Lean man, to *Frankincense*; which delights while it consumes. Which may be said to be both Representations and Metaphors. So that whatever are approv'd as Metaphors, certain it is, they will be Representations; and Representations will be Metaphors without Reason. Note also that the Metaphor must proportionably relate to the other part, and in those things which are of the same kind. For if a Beaker may be call'd the shield of *Bacchus*; a shield may be also call'd the Beaker of *Mars*. And of these things it is that Oration Consists.

CHAP. V.

Of Elegancy of Language.

NOW the Principle of Elocution, is property of Language, which consists in five things. First in the conjunctions; if they be so assign'd, as naturally to precede and follow in their proper places as *Indeed*; and *I indeed*: *but* and *But* *He*. Which are therefore so to be plac'd, that they may be easily retain'd in memory, as to relate one to another not at too great a distance; nor must another conjunction be set before another necessary conjunction: for the conjunction is proper but in such and such places; as thus.

N

But

But I, after it was told me (for Cleo came begging and intreating) went, when I had taken those men along with me. Here are several conjunctions interposed, before the conjunction conclusive. So that if the conjunctions had been at a farther distance between *I went*, the Oration had been obscure. So that one thing is the orderly disposition of the Conjunctions. The next thing is to speak in Proper Terms, and not with circumlocutions. The third thing is not to speak ambiguously unless it be done for the nonce; as they do, who having nothing to say, yet pretend to say something for such men. I speak those things on purpose, like *Empedocles*. For Circumlocution deceives, if it be much; and the Hearers are affected, as many are by the Southsayers; who when they speak ambiguously, please their admirers.

Craesus crossing Halys shall overturn a great Empire.

Therefore because the mistake is the less, the Southsayers speak of the thing in general. For in the play at even or odd, a man shall sooner speak truth, by saying *even or odd*, then *How many*; and that *it will be*, rather than *when*. And therefore the Southsayers never determine the *when*: but all these things are a like: and therefore they are to be avoided unless it be for some such purpose.

The Fourth, as *Pythagoras* divided the several sorts of words into Masculine and Feminine, and Instruments. For these things must be rightly distinguish'd to the understanding. *She coming and discoursing departed.*

The fifth in rightly naming many, few, and one. But they, when they came, strook me. more especially

especially what is written ought to be easily legible, and easy for utterance. The same is that which has not many Conjunctions. Also where the points are not easy to be distinguish'd, like the Writings of *Heraclitus*. For it is a hard matter to guess at his Points. As in the beginning of his Book, where he says, *If Reason existing always Men are Ignorant*. Now it is a hard matter to tell, whether to point *always* to *existing*, or to *Men*. Moreover it causes a Solœcism, not to distinguish, unless there be joyn'd to both that which is agreeable.

As to *Noise* and *Colour*, *Seeing* is not a common word. But *perceiving* is common to both. So that there must be obscurity, from insertion of many things, unless those things be set for most which ought to be for most. As for Example. *My design was, when I had discours'd to him these and these things, to go.* But not thus, I design'd to go, and then to tell how he had these and these things to say.

CHAP. VI.

PROLIXITY.

Prolixity.

TO Prolixity these things conduce. To make use of the Reason of the thing, instead of the Name. As, not to say, a *Circle*, but a *Superficies* equidistant from the Center. The contrary conduces to conciseness, that is, to use the Name instead of the thing. Also to demonstrate

by Metaphors and Epithites, avoyding what is Poetical. Also to multiply one thing into many, like the Poets: Who when they intend but one Port, cry the *Grecian Ports*. Also not to conjoyn, but to joyne one to one, another to another. *This Woman, our Wife.* Which might be more concisely said, *our Wife*. Also to speak with a conjunction; *I went and then discours'd him*, which might be more concise without the conjunction, *Going, I discours'd him*. Also by speaking those things which are not necessary, like *Antimachus* concerning *Teumessus*

There is a windy certain little Hillock.

Thus a man may enlarge *ad infinitum*, and that as well in good as bad things; and it is convenient to distinguish in both how it is, or is not. Whence the Poets deduce those words, stringless and harple's Harmony. Which is prov'd by Metaphors taken from proportion, as if a man should say, The Trumpet is a stringless Instrument.

CHAP. VII.

Of Decorum.

Decorum in Elocution is, if it be moving, if Moral and Sententious, if accommodated and proportionable to the business. For it will not be proportionable, if it either speak *extempore* and slightly of great things; nor loftily of

of mean things, nor bestow too much Trimming upon an ordinary word: for that will appear comical; as *Cleophon* does, who speaks many things, as if a man should say, *Most venerable Collastomre* (in the worst sense.)

Pathetic consists in this, that the Injury be recited in the Language of the angry Person. When things impious or ignominious are to be repeated to speak with a modest detestation; when praise worthy acts are rehears'd, to speak with admiration; when Lamentable accidents, to recite submissively and affectionately: and so in other cases. For this proportionable Language renders the thing Probable, For when the Auditors consider that those are the affections of men in such conditions, they are deceiv'd. So that although it be not as the Orator says, yet they believe it to be so. And the Hearer is affected with him that speaks passionately, tho' he speak nothing to the purpose. So that many confound their Hearers by making a noise. Demonstration from signs is also moral; for it is agreeably applicable to every Kind and Habit. I mean by Kind, Age, Sex and Nation, as Boy, Man, Old Man, Woman, Virgin, *Lacedemonian*, *Thessalian*.

By Habit, according to what every man is in his life and conversation. For all lives are not affected according to all habits. Therefore if a man give proper names to every habit, he will be able express all sorts of manners.

For it is not for a Farmer and a learned man to speak after the same manner. However the Hearers are affected with what Orators frequently make use of. Who knows not this? why, all

men know it. Therefore the Hearer out of meer shame acknowledges, that he may be a partaker of what all others partake. Now when it is seasonable, when not seasonable to make use of these things, is common to all kinds: where the common Proverbe is still a common cure for all *Hyperbole's*. Therefore it is but requisite; that every Orator should correct himself; For by that means it seems to be true, what he says, though the speaker be not ignorant of what he does.

On the other side all things proportionable are not to be made use of at once: for by that means the Auditor is also deceiv'd. I mean, that if the words be harsh, yet must not the voice or Countenance, nor those other things convenient be such as to express that harshness. Otherwise it will manifestly appear what every of these is: but if this be observ'd, the other not, it can never be discover'd, though his Judgment may be the same. For if soft things be spoken harshly, and harsh things gently, they will lose their probability of persuasion. But Epithites and compound words the more, and the more unusual they are, are the fittest to persuade. For we are apt to forgive one that is enrag'd, when he talks of some Heaven-reaching, or *Petorian* mischief; and then especially when he hath already mov'd the Auditors, and put 'em into a fury, either by praising or dispraising, by hatred or by love. Which *Isocrates* does in his *Panegyric* toward the end, making use of Fame, and metonymials of what they suffer'd. For things that are alike they generally bawle out, who are in a heat; which they who are alike dispos'd are willing to hear

hear. Wherefore they are agreeable and Proper for Poetry. For Poetry is a kind of Enthusiasm. Therefore this must be the way, or else with an Irony, as *Gorgias* did, or as we find done in *Phædrus*.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Number.

That figure of speech is most approv'd, which is neither in measure, nor without number. For the one is not apt to persuade, as seeming to be feign'd, and calls off the attention; while we are in expectation that the like will return again.

That which is without measure is boundless. But it ought to be bounded, but not with feet, which is unpleasant; and that which is boundless is difficult to be understood. Yet all things are bounded with Number. And the Number of the Figure of speech is *Dimension*, of which Measures are the *Segments*. Therefore Oratory Prose ought to have *Dimension*, but not Feet; for then it will be a Poem. Nor Number exactly, but after a manner. Now of Numbers, the *Heroic* is majestic, adapted for reading, and void of Harmony. The *Iambic* is for the reading of the Multitude. And therefore *Iambics* are naturally spoken *extempore*. But Oratory Prose ought to be more lofty, and more inciting. The *Trochæic* is more fit for Comical Dances. Which

is manifest from the *Tetrameters*. For *Tetrameters* are a voluble sort of Meter: The *Peanic* remains, which came first in use, beginning from *Thrasymachus*: yet they could not tell what it was. But there is a third sort of *Peanic* which is *three to two*; Whereas of the other two, the one is *one to one*; the other *two to one*: of these proportions consists the *Sesquiterce*; and this is the right *Peanic*, which is to be made choice of, in which alone of all the Numbers are uncertain; and therefore least to be discover'd. Now therefore they make use of one *Peon* at the beginning. But it is requisite that the end should differ from the beginning. Since then there are two sorts of *Peanic* opposite one to another, of which the one is proper for the beginning as they use it; This is *one long and two short*. - u u

Delogena, & Auricome O Hecate nate Jovis.

The other three short, and one long u u u -
And this is proper for the end. For because the short syllables are imperfect, they cause a lameness; from which being separated by the long Syllable, the end appears: yet not by the Writer, nor by the Paragraph, but by the dimension of Feet.

CHAP. IX,

Of Diffus'd Oration and it's contrary.

ELocution of necessity must either be diffus'd, and one in a Link; as the *Dilatations* or extensions of the Dithyrambics, or turn'd, and like the *Anastrophe*s of the ancient Poets.

Diffus'd Oration is very ancient, first made known by *Herodotus* the *Thurian*: Which at first all Writers; now not many make use of. I call it *diffus'd*, because it has no end of it self, until the matter treated of be brought to a conclusion; which is unpleasant, because tedious and boundless. For all men are willing to see a conclusion; as being tir'd out of breath toward the end of the Goal, or Stage, and are willing to turn again. But when they see the end, they are not a weary, before they arrive at it.

Turn'd Oration is discern'd by the Period. I mean by the Period, that Oration which has a beginning and an end of it self, and a magnitude easily discernable: and such a one is delightful and easy to be learnt. Delightful, as being contrary to that which is boundless; and because it is always thought to tickle the Ears of the Reader, when he still comes to a full stop. But where nothing is foreseen, nor any thing illustrated, the hearer becomes tir'd, and displeas'd. It is easie to be learnt, because easily retain'd in memory: and that because there is Number in the

Periods. Which is the reason that Verses are more easily remember'd then Prose. Now the Period must be terminated by the Sentence, and not left broken, as in the *Iambic* of *Sophocles*.

Calidon this is, the land where Pelops reign'd.

The contrary would appear, should it be said, *Calidon* is in *Peloponnesus*.

Now of Periods one consists in the members, the other is simple and pure. In the members there is a perfect and distinct Sentence, easily comprehended in one breath, not divided, but entire, and the member is one part of it.

By *simple* I mean a Sentence but of one member. But neither the Periods nor the members must be curtail'd, nor tedious. For being curtail'd they put the Hearer to the stumble. For of necessity, when the Sentence stretches out in length, and the Measure which is bounded comes to be drawn back, the Hearer must be put to the stumble by the jussling of the Sentence and the Measure together: and they leave the Hearer, as those that get ground leave those that walk'd together before. Whence that jest of *Democritus* the *Chian* upon *Melaniposides*, making excursions instead of *Antistrophs*.

This Man frames mischief for himself, inframing mischief for another.

For long suspense is a mischief to him that causes it; which may be truly apply'd to long member'd, and long winded Sentences. But Sentences that are too short member'd, are
no

no Periods, for they carry the Hearer headlong.

But of Elocution in members, the one sort is distinct, the other opposite. Distinct, as thus; I have often admitt'd those who summon'd assemblies, and instituted the *Gymnic* exercises.

Opposite is that wherein through both members, either contrary is compos'd with contrary, or the same is joyn'd to contraries. As for example, they were profitable to both, as well those that stay'd behind, as those that follow'd. For the one purchas'd more then they had at home; and for the other they left sufficient to support 'em at home. Here *staying* and *following* are contraries, *sufficient* and *more*: and as to those that wanted Money, and were willing to enjoy it, the will to enjoy is oppos'd to fruition. Moreover it often happens that Wise Men are unfortunat and Fools prosper. Presently they obtain'd the rewards of stout men, and soon after they took upon 'em the command of the Sea. Also, *he sail'd upon the Land, and travell'd on foot by Sea*: for he joyn'd the two Shores of the Hellespont, and digg'd through Mount Athos. Also, and they who were by nature Citizens, by Law were depriv'd of their City, for some miserably perish'd, others were shamefully exil'd. Or, *Privately to make use of Barbarians in our families, but publicly to despise many of our Allies that are in service. Either we will have 'em alive, or leave 'em Dead.* Or what one said against Pitolaus, and Lycophron in open Court, *They sold you remaining at home; but coming to us, they were bought.*

For in every one of these is to be observ'd what we have said. But this sort of Elocution is delightfull, because contraries are most notorious,
and

and being parallell'd together, are yet more easie to be taken notice of; as also because they resemble Syllogisms; for an Argument is but a Collection of opposites: such therefore is opposition. But, *Adequation* is when the members are equal: *Assimilation*, if both the members have the same extrems. Which of necessity must be either at the beginning or the end. In the beginning the Assimilation consists in words. At the end, in the last syllables of the word, or cases of the same word, or the word it self. In the beginning thus.

Land it was, but Land untill'd, which he receiv'd from him. Attorn'd with gifts, and mollify'd with good words, they departed. In the end thus, *They did not think he had brought forth a Boy, but they thought him to be the cause of the birth. In great cares, but little hopes.* In the case of the same word, as thus; *Can he be worthy of a brazen statue, who is not worthy of Brass? Thou in his life time, spok'st ill of him, and now writest ill of him being dead.* In the Syllable thus; *How terribly hadst thou suffer'd, hadst thou seen a slothful Man prefer'd,* Sometimes *Opposition, Adequation, Assimilation, and Ending* a like concur in the same. Nevertheless there are also false Oppositions, as in that of *Epicharmus*; *Sometimes I was with 'em, sometimes among 'em.*

CHAP. X.

Of Festivity and Urbanity.

TO learn readily is naturally delightful to all men : seeing then that words signifie something, whatever learning we attain to most easily from words, that is the most pleasing. Therefore obsolete words are unknown, proper words we know. Metaphor also more especially conduces. For when we compare old age to stubble, we are taught learning and knowledge from the kind : For they are both decay'd.

The Representations of the Poets are also useful, which being rightly made use of, will appear Urbane and Polite.

Also those Enthymemes and that Elocution must be urbane that imprint a quick apprehension of things. And therefore Vulgar Enthymemes are to be rejected. I mean by Vulgar, such as are obvious to every one, and have nothing that need inquiry after. Nor such sayings as are altogether unknown, but such as of which, when once pronounc'd, there is a quick knowledge, though not before, yet after a short pause of the understanding. For thus there seems to be a kind of instruction, the other way none. There such Enthymemes are approv'd according to the understanding of the thing said, but according to Elocution, in the Figure, if it be oppositely spoken, *What to others they thought Common*
Peate,

Peace, to their own they look upon to be War. Where War and Peace are opposites. Urbanity also in words consists in Metaphors, neither uncouth, which are difficult to be understood; nor Vulgar, which affect little or nothing. Also if they set things before the Eyes, as if they were acted at the same time. For we more easily discern what is acted before our Eyes, then that which lyes under a future prospect.

Three things are moreover to be consider'd, the Metaphor, the Opposition, and the Beginning. Now because there are four sorts of Metaphors, those are more especially approv'd which are most proportionable. As when *Pericles* said, *That youth slain in War, was so taken from the City, as if we should take the Spring out of the Year.* And as *Leptines* said of the *Lacedæmonians*, *That they would not permit the other Eye of Greece to be putt'd out.* And *Cephisodotus*, when *Chares* labour'd to give an account of the *Olympiac War*, *That while he endeavour'd to give the People an account, he kept em in an Oven.* Or as when *Ephicrates* reprov'd the *Amphibians* for making a League with the *Epeaurians* and the Sea Coast, and told em, *They had depriv'd themselves of the Food of War.* Thus *Pitholans* call'd the *Athenian Galley* *Pirætos* the People's *Herculan Club*: and *Sestos* the *Granary of the Piræum*: And *Pericles* advising the destruction of *Agina*, call'd it the *Eye* sort of the *Piræum*. Thus *Esion*, *They pour'd Greece into Sicily.* Thus *Cephisodotus* calls Men of War, so many *Bridewells*. All these are Metaphors, and as it were in sight. Thus *Isocrates* in his funeral Oration, *It was but just,* said he, *that Greece should be shar'd by the death*
of

of those that were slain at Salamina, because that then together with the Grecian valour their Liberty was also buried. Where Valour and Liberty has a certain kind of opposition. Thus Iphicrates, *The road of my Oration lyes through the midst of Chares's Actions.* Which is a Metaphor from Analogy; and *through the midst* sets the Metaphor before the Eye. And that saying, *To exhort dangers to succour dangers,* is a Metaphor in sight. And as *Leucoleon* said upon *Chabrias*, *Neither reverencing his Suppliant Statue of Brass.* Where Statue being said to supplicate, an inanimate is brought as it were to life, by the remembrance of the famous Acts which the City perform'd in his time.

No less proper, *God kindl'd a sight of understanding in our Souls.*

Thus Urbanity is drawn from Analogous Metaphor, and lively Elocution, that sets the thing smartly before the Eye.

CHAP. XI.

What it is to set before the Eye.

THEY set before the Eyes, who significantly demonstrate the Action of a thing. As to say, that a Good Man is a *Tetragon*; which is a Metaphor; yet true; because both are perfect Bodies. But this Metaphor shews nothing of Action. That which follows demonstrates Action in a flourishing condition. *The Grecians now free,*

free, and shaking their Heels, which is both an action and a Metaphor; And as it is frequent with Homer to enliven inanimate things, and then to shew something done to the life is highly commendable, as in the following Examples.

— Then freight again.

The shameless Stone roll'd back upon the ground.

— Away the Arrow flew

Eager to reach the brest.

With Bodies fix'd upon the Earth they stood,

Eager to gorge themselves with humane blood.

— Thirsty of blood then through his brest

The pointed blade made way.

In every one of these inanimate things seem to act like things living. For *shameless*, and to *make way*, and the rest, are Actions, all which the Poet has apply'd by Analogous Metaphor. For as the stone is to *Sisyphus*, so is imprudent to the stone which imprudently vexes *Sisyphus*. The same does Homer also in approv'd Representations of Inanimates.

Swelling and foaming then the Waves roll'd on.

For he makes all things to move and live. For imitation is Action. For, as already has been said, Metaphors must be taken from things familiar, yet not too open. As in Philosophy it is easie to discern similitude at a distance. As *Archytas* said, that the Court of Justice and the Altar were the same thing, for that they who suffer'd Injuries fled to both for sanctuary.

There are also many Urbanities, by way of Metaphor through Prior deception. For it appears

pears the more that he has learnt, because he once thought otherwise, while the mind seems to confess, *Tis so, and I was in a Error.*

Apophthegms also are urbane, because they do not mean what the words sound, as in that of *Stesichorus*,

*The very Grasshopper's your shame
Will singing in the Grass Proclaim.*

And such sayings as are fram'd in the nature of Riddles are pleasing. For it is an instruction, and is call'd a Metaphor; and as *Theodorus* calls it, a producing of Novelty, especially when it happens Paradox-like, and not according to the common Opinion, but slightly transfigur'd. Which is also done by Jest, that are made by playing with words: for it is a deception, even in Meter; For the Speaker does not intend what the Hearer expects,

*He walk'd along, and on his Feet he wore
Chilblains—*

not Shoes, as the other expected he would have said. Yet as soon as the word is out, 'tis apparent what is meant by it.

Representations also set things most lively before the Eyes, if rightly chosen, as *Philamon* contesting with *Corycus*,

Like Parsley stalks his twisted shanks appear.

Proverbs also which conduce to the same purpose, are Translations from *Species* to *Species*. As when a man seeking to do himself good, does
O himself

himself a mischief: Like the *Carpathian's* who not having any Hares in their Island, sent for some: which afterwards multiply'd so fast that they eat up their Corn, whence the Proverb, *As the Carpathian the Hare.*

Hyperboles also conduce to the same effect. You would have thought it had been a Basket of Mulberrys; spoken of a great fiery Boyl upon a man's Groyne. And again, Though he would give more pieces of Gold then there are Sands in the Sea,

*I would not Agamemnions daughter wed;
Fairer then fairest Venus though she were,
Or then Minerva wiser——*

But these things are most in use amongst *Attic* Rhetoricians; and therefore not becoming the Gravity of old men.

CHAP. XII.

Of the several sorts of Elocution.

IN the next place it is requisite to know, that there are various ways of Elocution which belong to every kind.

For neither ought the Language of the Historian, and the Dramatist to be the same, nor of the Pleader at the Barr and the Popular Orator.

The Language of History is that which is most proper and Elaborate.

Of

Of the Dramatical there are two sorts. The one regarding Manners, the other the Affections. Therefore Actors choose one sort of Subject, the Poets another. Such therefore as are fit to be read, are ever to be had, as *Chærenon*; for he is an accurate Writer, and much like an Orator; and *Lycimnius* among the *Dythyrambic's*. And being compar'd together, the Historical Writers are very little addicted to Contention. The Rhetoritians well read, seem so many Clownish Squablers. The reason is, because wrangling is requisite in contests. Wherefore those Writers which consist of Action, not performing their Office, the Action being taken away, appear insipid. As loose Sentences and frequent Repetitions are rejected in History: but much us'd by the Rhetoritians, who are a kind of Actors; and therefore it is necessary for them to make frequent Repetitions, though in the change of words. *This is he that robb'd ye; this is he that deceiv'd ye; this is he who endeavour'd to betray ye.* As *Philemon* the Actor did, in *Anaxandrides's Gerontomania*, where *Rhadamanthus* and *Palamedes* spake. And in the Prologue of the *Religious*, *I* and *I* several times repeated. Which things if they be not help'd out by Action, the person becomes as ridiculous as he that carries the Truncheon before the Actors.

Next Disjunctives in like manner: when many things seem to be spoken in equal time: for Conjunction makes many things one. Which if it be taken away, manifestly on the other side; One will be many. Wherefore it enlarges. *I came, I declar'd, I supplicated*, are many things. But he seem'd to neglect *whatever I could say,*
O 2
whatever

whatever I could urge. This is that which *Homer* intends

Nireus *from* Simus,
Nireus *the son of* Aglaia,
Nireus *the most fair.*

For of whom many things are said, of necessity many things must be repeated; which being often done, they seem many things. Wherefore he enlarg'd, that he might once call him to mind, to avoid deception, never afterwards making any farther mention of him, believing the first remembrance enough.

Deliberative Elocution, is like to Picture and Shadowing in Painting. For the more numerous the People are, at so much the greater distance is the Prospect. Wherefore exquisiteness is superfluous, and appears worst in both.

But judicial Elocution is more Exquisite, especially if before one Judge. But that is the least thing among Rhetoricians; For what is pertinent to the Matter is short, and the Judge separates what is Forreign and contentious, that his judgment may be right. For which reason the same Orators are not approv'd in all these things: One observes this, that where there is most Action, there, there is the least of Eloquent Elocution: and that is where a voice is requir'd, and a loud one, too.

Demonstrative Elocution is most proper for writing: and the Duty of it is, to make fit for reading: and the next is Judicial Pleading.

Now it will be needless to divide Elocution into delightful, and lofty; for why not as well
into

into liberal, and Temperate, or any other of the moral virtues. For what has been already said will make it delightful, if the virtue of Elocution be rightly defin'd. For why ought it to be perspicuous and not mean, but decent? Because if it be loquacious, it cannot be clear; nor if it be too concise. And therefore Mediocrity is convenient. What has been said will also render it delightful; if Vulgar and unusual are well blended, and Number and Probability, as they ought to be.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the Parts of Oration.

HERE are two parts of Oration. For it is requisite to tell what the matter is which is discours'd of, and then to demonstrate it. Wherefore it is impossible not to demonstrate where the Subject is propounded, or to demonstrate before the thing is propounded. For he that demonstrates, demonstrates something; and he that propounds, propounds that he may demonstrate.

Of these then, the one is the proposition, the other the Proof; as if one should distinguish and say, the one is the problem, the other the demonstration. Now adays they distinguish ridiculously; For Commemoration belongs only to Juridical Oratory. But how can such a Narration be proper for demonstrative and delibera-

tive Oratory? Or what is to be pleaded against a Plaintiff, or the Enumeration of demonstration? But the Proem, the comparing part, and the Repetition in Orations to the People, then are in force, when there is a contradiction.

And many times there is Accusation and defence in such an Oration, but not as it is deliberative. Nor does *Peroration* belong altogether to Judicial Oratory, as when the Oration is short, or the matter easie to be rememb'r'd. And therefore the proposition and the Proof are the necessary parts: for these are proper. The common parts, are Proem, Proposition, Proof, and Epilogue. What is alleadg'd against the Adversary, is for Proofs sake. The Comparative part, the amplification of his own, so that it is a part of the Probation. For he that compares, demonstrates something; which neither the *Proem* nor the *Peroration* do, but only recollect for the memories sake. Wherefore if a man should divide these things like the Scholars of *Theodotus*, Narration will be one thing, Prenarration another, and Supernarration another, Refutation, and Superrefutation. But he that gives form and difference to a thing, must also give it a name; otherwise 'tis vain and Ridiculous.

CHAP. XIV.

Of the Proem.

THE *Proem* is the Exordium of the Oration, as in Poësie the Prologue, and the *Overture* in Music. For all these things are beginnings, and as it were preparations of the way to what follows. And the demonstrative Exordium is like the *Overture* in Music. For as Musicians come in with their most delectable and charming composition, next after the *Overture*; Thus in demonstrative Oration, after a short account given, the Orator presently produces and annexes what he has to say. As in the *Proem* to *Isocrates's* Oration upon *Helena*. For *Helena* has nothing to do with disputes and Controversies. Or if he make a digression at the same time, it is requisite that the Oration should not be all of one sort.

Now the Proems of demonstrative Orations derive themselves from Commendation, or Dispraise: As *Gorgias* in his *Olympiac* Oration, It is worthy Admiration, among many, O *Greeks*. For he praises those who first instituted the so much celebrated Solemnities. On the other side, *Isocrates* discommends 'em, because they thought strength of Body worth Prises and Gift, but set no reward for prudence.

In the next place from Counsel and advise; as if we should be advis'd to honour vertuous

men. And therefore *Isocrates* commends *Aristides*, or such, who are neither approv'd, nor yet accounted bad, but such as being vertuous, lye conceal'd; as *Paris* the Son of *Priam*: for he is one that gives Counsel.

There are also judicial Proems, when the Oration is concerning any new difficult thing, or concerning the common report of the People, to beg Pardon, as *Charilus* says, *But now that all things are publickly divided by lot.*

Proems of demonstrative Orations are deriv'd from praise and dispraise, from perswasion and dissuasion of those things which are referr'd to the Auditory: and of necessity they must be either foreign or proper which make way for an Oration. As for judicial Proems, they have the same force as the Prologues of Dramatic, and the Proems of Epic Poems; and as for Dithyrambic Proems, they are like the Demonstrative.

For thy sake, and the sake of thy Gifts or Spoys.

But in Orations and Poetry, the Proems are demonstrations of what is coming, that the Auditors may not be held in suspence, but know the subject before hand. For what is unlimited leads to Error. He therefore that *bands* his subject to the Auditory, detains the hearer to follow the Oration with his attention

The Fury sing, O Goddess.

Tell me the Man, beloved Muse.

*Teach me in other Language, how from the
Asiatic shoare, a bloody war infested Eu-
ropean fields.*

The

The Tragedians declare the Subject, though not presently; as *Euripides*. But *Sophocles* immediately in his prologue;

Polybius was my father.

After the same manner Comic Poets. And indeed the most necessary and proper Office of the Proem, is to clear the end for which the Oration was made. Wherefore if the Matter be short and known, there needs no Prologue.

Those other Forms which they use are for the removing of Calumny, and are Common; being deriv'd either from him that speaks, from the Hearer, from the Matter, or the Adversary. From him that speaks, and from the adversary, are deriv'd whatever avails to the removal of a Calumny, and to make Objections. Yet not all in the same manner. For he who makes his defence, answers to the Calumny at the beginning; he who accuses, inveighs in the *Peroration*. And the reason is plain. For there is a necessity that the Defendant remove all Impediments at the beginning: but for the Accuser to aggravate, in the Epilogue: that the Hearers may the better remember. Now things are referr'd to the Hearer on purpose to render him either kind or angry: to make him attentive or negligent. For it is not always expedient to render him attentive, since the Orator sometimes endeavours to excite him to laughter. Now they are render'd attentive by great things, by proper things, by wonderful and pleasant things. But to celerity of Apprehension, if the Orator design Integrity. For to Integrity they attend most of all. Yet if we would not have the hearer to be Attentive, then

we must tell the Auditory, that the Matter is of little concernment, that it is nothing to them, or that it is a troublesome business. Nor must we be ignorant that all these things are foreign to the Oration. For we speake to a partial Auditory, that gladly hears those things which are foreign to the Matter. For if it be not such, there is no need of Prologue, but only to sum up the heads of the Matter, that the Oration may not be like a Body without a Head. Tho to make the Hearers attentive, is common to all the parts, if there be occasion. Now if the Orator be any where smart, 'tis at the beginning; so that it would be ridiculous to flag at the beginning at what time all men are most attentive. But when People grow drowsie, there is a necessity of raising 'em, with a *Mark I beseech ye, This business concerns your selves as well as me: I am now about to tell ye a thing that is wonderful, a strange and unheard of Crime.* Which *Prodicus* said, was like scattering Money among the People.

The *Exordiums* of Popular Haranguing flow from the Prologues of judicial Oratory, as not having any proper to it self: for they know the subject before hand, and therefore the Matter needs no Prolouge, but either in behalf of himself, or in reference to the Adversary; or else if they do not apprehend what he desires, but either more or less. In such cases *Exordiums* in Popular Harangues are necessary: or else for ornaments sake, otherwise they will appear to be huddled up extempore.

CHAP. XV.

Of Narration.

NARRATION is taken from demonstratives, not in a continu'd series, but in parts. For it is expedient to repeat the Transactions of which the Oration consists. Now the Oration is partly without art; (for the Orator is not the cause of the Transactions) partly Artificial. This is to demonstrate, whether credible, or how much, or of what sort, or altogether. Therefore it is expedient not to relate sometimes in a continu'd series, in regard the memory may not suffice to declare in that manner. For by the relation of some things a Man shall appear to be stout; of other things, to be wise or just. And the one Relation will be plain, the other more full of Variety. It is also expedient to call to mind things and Persons notoriously eminent. Nor is it needful to make use of many things in Narration. As if we would commend *Achilles*: since all men know his most famous deeds, the most notorious are to be made use of. But if we were to applaud *Critias*, whose Actions are not many; there all are to be recited. Now praise is an Oration declaring the Magnitude of Vertue: and therefore the Actions are to be set forth in their full Magnitude: for an Encomium belongs to Deeds. But things Extraneous, as Nobility and Education serve for Proof. For it is probable that a Person descended of honest Parents and well Educated

ted will prove an honest Man. Therefore we praise those that do well, and look upon the Actions as signs of the habit: and sometimes we praise the Person that has not acted, if we believe him to be a deserving Person. But now adays they say a Narration ought to be short, though ridiculously. As when the Baker, was ask'd, whether he bak'd hard or soft: what said he, is it so impossible to bake well. For a man must not be prolix either in his Relations, nor Prologues, nor Proofs. Neither does the well-relating consist in swiftness or conciseness, but in the Mediocrity. Which is done by relating the thing significantly, so as to create a belief of the thing, or the injustice to be done.

Somethings are also to be annex'd to the Narration, as thy own vertues, and the Vices of the Adversary, or what else will please the Auditory: as thus, *But I, for my part, still advis'd what was just and Religious, that he should not forsake his Children; but he cry'd out, that whereever he was he could have more Children;* and other things of the same nature, which *Herodotus* tells ye, the revolting *Egyptians* apologiz'd for themselves. The shorter Narration also suffices the defendant: For the controversy lyes only in this, whether not done, whether not hurtful, whether not unjust, whether not so much. Wherefore we must not insist upon a thing confess'd, farther then is pertinent to the business; as confessing the thing to be done, but then we are to make out that it was not done unjustly. Also we are to relate as acted, those things, which not being acted beget pity or common indignation. As in the Apology of *Alcinous* which he makes

makes to *Penelope* in sixty verses : and the Prologue to *Olneus*.

A Narration also must be well manner'd. Which is brought to pass, by knowing what makes a moraliz'd Oration. One thing is, so to speak that the will and Inclination of the Person may appear. For as the manners are, so is the will, and the will appears in the end. The Mathematicians therefore never make use of Sentences, because they have nothing to do with the will. But the *Socratic* discourse of these things. There are other Narrations which are Ethical, because they belong to every particular *Manner* or *Inclination*. As when we say, *He made a great Noise as he went* : which sets forth the confidence, and Rusticity of the Person's manners. Also when a man speaks not according to the agitations of his thoughts, but from pre-election. As, *I would*, and *I would choose this* : but if I forego my profit, it would be better. For a prudent man pursues his profit ; but a Good Man, Honesty.

If the Narration want Proof, a reason is to be given. As *Antigone* in *Sophocles*, when she prefers her Brother before her Husband or her Children ; *A Husband or Children being lost, others, perhaps may be had ; but a Brother or Parents dying, can never be born again*.

In the next place the Narration must be such as moves the Affections and begets the Consequences, especially of things which the People know ; or of such signs, by which they cannot but know. As, *After he had mock'd me, he went his ways*. Or as *Æschines* speaks concerning *Cratylus*, that he hiss'd, and shook his fist at him.

Many

Many speeches of this nature we meet with in *Homer*.

Upon her Face the Old Woman clapt her hands.

For they that begin to weep, clap their hands to their Eyes.

In deliberative Oratory there is no need of Relation, for no Body makes a Relation of things to come. But if there be any Narration belongs to it, it must be of things already Transacted, and call'd to mind to serve as examples of what is to be done for the future, whether in praise or discommendation.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Confirmation.

Whatever things are fit to prove, are also proper to demonstrate. For it is necessary to demonstrate by bringing a demonstration concerning the thing in Controversie, according to the four Questions, whether he did the thing, whether he did any harme thereby; or whether so much, or whether deservedly? Nor must we be ignorant that in this one Controversie, one of the Persons must be bad. Wherefore if men quarrel about *just* or *unjust*, ignorance is no crime: so that we must insist upon That, not upon other things. But in *Demonstratives* Multitude will be an *Amplification*, because honest and profitable. For Actions must

must be believed; therefore they seldom bring Demonstrations of those things, if they be past relief, or if another has the cause.

In Popular Harangues some will question either how it will be, or how it will not be, whatever he advises, but that they are either not just, or not profitable, or so and so; and care must be taken, least he speak erroneously beside the matter.

Examples therefore are most proper for Popular Harangues; *Enthymemes* for judicial Oratory: for the one concerns the future; the other disputes of things whether in being, or not in being; where Demonstration is most useful.

However *Enthymemes* are not to be spoken continually, but intermix'd with other things, lest they injure one another. For there is a certain limit of quantity, as *Homer* shews us.

O Friend-----

Since thou hast spoken as much, as the wisest man could do

Nor must we seek for *Enthymemes* for all things; otherwise we should do like some of the Philosophers, who Syllogistically conclude things known and certain from things unknown and uncertain.

Sentences may be also us'd as well in Proof as in Narration. For they move the Affection and render the Oration well moraliz'd; as thus, I committed this to him, though I knew he were not to be entrusted. And, though I receiv'd this injury, it does not repent me, especially when I find that the Gain is his, but the right is mine.

Now of *Enthymemes*, those that are most proper to refute, are more to be approv'd, than those which are proper to demonstrate: in regard

gard that whatever inforce to convincement, are concluded more Syllogistically: for the contraries parallell'd soonest appear. But *Enthymemes* urg'd against an Adversary, are no more then Proofs, which dissolve the Accusation either by Objection, or convincement. But as well in Consultations as in Judicial Proceedings, he that begins must bring his own proofs first, and then meet his Adversary, loading and aspersing him before hand. But if the Contradictions of the adversary be manifold, the best way is to begin with the Contradictions; like *Callistratus* in the *Messenian* Assembly, where he first refuted what his Adversaries could say, and then spoke his own.

But he that is to speak last, must first encounter his Adversaries reason, by opposing Objections and Arguments; especially if his Adversary seem to have spoken well. For as the mind does not fore-judge any man till condemn'd, no more do they fore-judge an Oration if the Adversary have seem'd well to maintain his cause. And therefore it behoves a man to make way in the Ears of the Hearers, for the speech which is to come; which he must do by removing the Adversaries Arguments. And therefore he must oppose himself against all, or the chiefest, or the most approv'd, or the most convincing; and then prove his own.

*But first the Goddesses I will assist ———
For Juno, &c.*

Where he touches first upon what was most approv'd for honest. And thus much for Confirmation.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVII.

Of the season for Interrogation.

IT is then seasonable to interrogate, when of two things, the Adversary affirms the one, and seeks for an Absurdity to follow from a Question demanded upon the other. As when *Pericles* ask'd *Lampo* concerning the Ceremonies of the Goddess *Sospita*, who answer'd, *That it was not for him that was not initiated, to hear*; then *Pericles* ask'd *Lampo* again, *Whether he knew himself*? To whom *Lampo*, *How can I, not being initiated?*

Secondly, When one thing is apparent, and it is manifest that the Adversary will grant him the other upon his demand. As *Socrates*, when *Melitus* affirm'd, that he did not believe there were any Gods. But said he, I acknowledge there are certain *Demons*. Which *Socrates* having granted, the other ask'd him whether *Demons* were the Sons of the Gods, or at least any thing of divine Nature. Which being granted, *Melitus* infer'd that there was one who believ'd that there were no Gods, but only Sons of the Gods.

Moreover, when the Opponent would shew a Person speaking things contrary to Reason, or at least Paradoxically:

Fourthly, When there is no way to answer the Question, but by Sophistical evasion. As, *that it is not so, but so; that it is partly, partly not*; by
P which

which means, they that put the Question are puzzl'd, for should the other refuse to Answer, he would seem to be overcome, Nor must many Questions be put at once ; by reason of the infirmity of the Hearer. If the Questions be Ambiguous, we are not to answer presently, but to distinguish by *Ratiocination*. When we answer to Contraries, we must bring the Solution together with the Answer, before he ask the rest, or conclude Syllogistically. And to him that concludes, if the Question makes a Conclusion, by telling the cause. As when *Pisander* ask'd *Sophocles*, whether he agreed with the rest of the Senators to set up the *Forty*, He answer'd, *Didst not thou act these evil things?* To whom the other, *There were no better to be done.* In both which Answers there was an acknowledgment before any Conclusion could be made. Or as the *Lacedemonian*, giving an Account of an Act of the *Ephori*; being ask'd, *Whether it seem'd just to him, that another should perish?* Made answer, *And didst not thou decree the same as they did?* To whom the other, *Therefore wilt thou deservedly perish.* 'No' reply'd the former, *For they were brib'd to make the Decree, but what I did was according to my judgment.* Therefore it is not proper to ask after the Conclusion, nor to demand the Conclusion, unless the greatest part of the Truth remain behind.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Peroration.

Peroration is compos'd of four things; First, of those things that prepare the Hearer to have a good Opinion of us, an ill Opinion of our Adversary; of that which amplifies or extenuates; of that which stirs up the Affections of the Hearer, and of that which rubs up the Memory. For it is natural after demonstration, to shew that we are in the right, the Adversary in the wrong, and accordingly to praise the one, and discommend the other, and despoil him of all good opinion in the Court. For these two things are to be aim'd at, to render the one either honest as to the things of which he is accus'd, or simply so; the other guilty as to the things prov'd against him, or entirely bad. Now how to aggravate, how to extenuate, and how to gain upon the Affections, has been already discours'd.

As to refreshing the memory, it is to be done as others improperly teach us to do in Prologues, by often repeating the same thing. For in Prologues, things are only briefly to be summ'd up, that the Hearers may not be ignorant of the subject. But in Epilogues, all the Heads of the Proofs and Demonstrations are to be repeated. And the beginning must be, that he has perform'd what he promis'd: as for what

reason, and what things were spoken. And with this Repetition is also joyn'd a Comparison of those things which were alledg'd by the adversary. *Thus he concerning these things, but I thus,* and for these reasons. Or by way of Irony. *What would he have done, if he had made out these things.* Or by way of demonstration, *What have we not made clear ? Or on the other side, What has he made appear ?* And at last disjunctives are most proper ; that it may look like a Peroration, and not like a set Speech ; as thus ; *I have said, you have heard me, you have it, and so I leave it to your Judgment.*

The End of the Rhetoric to THEODECTES.

ARISTOTLE'S

Aristotle's R H E T O R I C T O K I N G Alexander.

BOOK IV.

CHAP. I.

Aristotle to Alexander wishes Health and happiness.

UNderstanding by thy Letters, thy great desire that we should send thee the Precepts and Method of Political Arguments, it was not slothfulness that made me thus long delay; but that I might make such enquiries, before I set Pen to Paper, for my own Information, that I might write to thee more accurately then ever any Person has yet done, who has labour'd upon this Subject. And I did well in so doing. For as it is thy

study to excel others in sumptuousness of Royal Habit, and Magnificence, so is it our endeavour to furnish thee with the most noble Efficacy and force both of Reason and Argument. Seeing it is much more noble and King-like, to have a Soul endu'd with Vertue, then to behold a habit of Body adorn'd with pompous Vestments. But it is absurd, that he, who excels all others in renown for his great Atcheivements, should give place in Eloquence to Persons of the meanest rank; especially not being ignorant, that they who live under *Democracies*, refer all things to the People; but they who live under the Dominion of a single Monarch, refer all things to Reason and Judgment. For as the Common Law in free Cities always aims at the Noblest end; so may thy Eloquence direct those that are subjected under thy Command, to what is good and profitable. For the Law, as I may so say, is but a certain Speech, limited by the consent of the City, commanding how every thing ought to be done. Add to this, that it is not unknown to thee, how we have alway made it our business to excel those who make a right use of Reason, choosing to act according to the Rules of it; but that we have always had in detestation those who act without Reason, which produces nothing but Cruelty and Bestiality. For which reason we have chastised the wicked glorying in their Vices, and have commended the generous, making their Vertues known, to Bliss, to admiration and Imitation. Thus we have found out a way to divert future Calamities, and to enjoy present felicity. By which means we have avoided imminent Distresses,

and

and acquir'd absent profit. For as a life not subject to pain is to be prefer'd, so is right and sound Reason to be advanc'd above all things. Nor art thou to be ignorant, that Examples govern most men, some the Law, others thy Life, and Rational conduct. Therefore as thou surpasses all, both *Greeks* and Barbarians, it is to be thy chief endeavour, that they who study these Examples may take from thee the Fair Impression, and strive to be partakers of thy virtues.

Moreover, there is nothing in Man more approaching to Divinity, then to advise and Consult. Therefore it behoves thee not to spend thy time in trivial and superfluous things, but with all diligence to learn the Celestial Art of Consultation. For what man in his Wits will deny, that to act unadvisedly is a sign of Madness; but that to act according to Reason, is a mark of Prudence. And therefore we see all the best Governments among the *Greeks* consulting first, and long debating, before they fall to Action. Nay even they of most esteem among the Barbarians observe the same Method, knowing that the Consideration of useful and advantageous, arising from Reason, is the Bulwark and preservation of Honorable Undertakings. But I fear being too prolix in these matters, lest I should seem too much to boast my self, especially in things that need no proof, but are so apparent to all Men.

Wherefore setting all these things aside, I shall only insist upon such as it behoves us to discourse of as long as we live, as being that which makes the grand difference between us and all other li-

ving Creatures; to which if we attain, we shall also differ in Excellency from all other Mortals, as receiving from Heaven the greatest Honour which the Gods bestow on Men. For if other Creatures have the use of Desire, Anger, and other Affections, yet there is no other Creature has the use of Reason except Man. Wherefore it would be the absurdest thing in the World, if in this alone being the most happy of all Creatures, we should through negligence forsake such a Guide to well-living. Therefore I admonish thee, again and again, though of thy self sufficiently thereto inclin'd, diligently to embrace the Philosophy of Eloquence. For as the Body is preserv'd by Health, so is the Mind preserv'd by Discipline and sound Learning. For so guided and conducted, thou canst not err in the management of thy grand Affairs, but shalt be able to defend and preserve what thou has purchas'd by thy vertue. Again, if it be so delightful to see with the Eye, certainly it must be much more pleasing to discern with the sight of the Mind. For as a General is the preserver of his Army, so Eloquence, being joyn'd to Wisdom, is the Pilot of humane Life.

I have receiv'd thy farther Commands, That no man living beside, shall take this Book in hand: well knowing, that as Parents bear a greater Affection to Children begot upon their own bodys, then to such as are supposititious; in like manner, they who apprehend some more then ordinary invention in themselves, are carry'd on with a greater fervency, to perfect what they have once begun. For some men will hazard death for their Inventions, as soon as for their Children. Tho
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the *Parian* Sophisters, so call'd; because they do not bring forth, through slothful negligence despise their low Inventions, and sell 'em for money. For which reason I earnestly exhort thee, so to observe and defend these Precepts of Eloquence, that as they grow in years they may not be ravish'd from thee by any mans wealth, but may live with thee Vertuously and Honourably; and when they come to full maturity, may obtain Immortal Honour.

CHAP. II.

Of Ratiocinations.

There are three sorts of Political Ratiocinations, Deliberative, Demonstrative, and Judicial. Of these there are seven Species, Perswasion, Disswasion, Praise, Dispraise, Accusation, Defence, and Question, either as to its self, or to something else. And we make use of these in Popular Harangues, in Pleadings concerning Contracts, and in private discourse. Of all which we may speak that which is most adapt and proper, if we enumerate their Efficacy, their Use, and Practicability. First therefore let us discourse of Perswasion and Disswasion (of which there is most use in Popular Harangues, and private converse.)

Generally therefore, Perswasion, is an exhortation to elect, to speak, or act. Disswasion is the Impeding from election, from speaking, or acting.

acting. Which being thus defin'd, he that persuades must shew those things, to which he exhorts, to be either just, or legal, profitable, honest, delightful or easily practicable. If not, he must make 'em appear to be possible, if he exhorts to difficult things, and make it out that they are necessary. He that dissuades must make the contrary appear; as that they are unjust, illegal, useless, unpleasing, dishonest, and impossible to be accomplish'd: if not, that they are difficult, troublesome, and not necessary. For all actions participate of these things, so that he who has neither of these Propositions, wants Arguments.

Now I shall endeavour to define every one of these, and to shew, how we may be sufficiently furnish'd with all these for Arguments. Therefore the unwritten custom of All, or Most, is but just in the definition of what is honest, what infamous, as to honour our Parents, to love our friends, and be grateful to our Benefactors. For such precepts as these are not Commanded by the written Laws, but by unwritten Custom and the Common Law of nature. These therefore are just things.

The Law is the Common consent of a City, commanding in Writing, how we ought to act in such and such particulars.

Profitable, is the Conservation of present Benefits, the acquiring of absent benefits, or the warding off present evils, or the prohibition of threatening Inconveniences. This must be divided, as to present Persons, into Body and Soul, and things external. To the Body are profitable Strength, Beauty, Health. To the Soul, Fortitude, Wisdom, Justice. External things are Friends, Money, Lands. The contrary to which are unprofitable

profitable. Profitable to a Commonwealth are such things as these, Concord, War-like force, Money, Revenues, many and stout Allies, and such like; the contrary to which are unprofitable. Honest things are such, as from which some splendour or illustrious honour flows upon those who have acted honourably. Delightful things are those which affect us with gladness; easie things are those which are accomplished in a short time, with little labour and expence; possible things are those, which are to be done in nature. Necessary things are those which are not at our disposal to do or let alone; but are acted as it were by a certain divine or humane necessity. Of all which we might draw Arguments in abundance, from what has been already said, or from their like, or contraries, and from those things already adjudg'd either by the Immortal Gods, or by famous and celebrated men, or by the Judges, or by our Adversaries.

Thus we have shewn what is just: and like to just is much the same. For as we esteem it just, to obey our Parents, it is also expedient, that Children should imitate the noble acts of their Predecessors: and as it is but just to be grateful to our benefactors, so it is like to just, not to injure those from whom we have receiv'd no harm. Now it is requisite that we make the Example perspicuous from the contraries. For as it is just to punish those who have highly offended, so it is but just to be grateful to our benefactors. Now what has been adjudg'd just by celebrated Persons, is to be deem'd. For not only we our selves prosecute our Enemies, and seek their mischief, but the *Athenians* and *Lacedæmonians*

nomians adjudge it to be just. In this manner frequent use makes a thing just. For where it is profitable, the Sentence a giver ought to recite the Law, Then what is like the written Law: which may be much of the same nature. For as the Law-giver desires that Robbers should be severely punish'd, for the same reason Impostors and Deceivers are also to be punish'd, for they likewise rob the Understanding. And as the Law-giver appoints the next of kin to be Heirs to those that dye without Children, in like manner ought I to be Master of the goods of the freed Servants. For being next of kin to the deceased that set the Servant free, it is but just that I should be Master likewise of all his goods. In this manner therefore is like to legal taken; but the contrary thus. For if the Law forbids that what belongs to the Law should be privately distributed, it is apparent that all they that make such a partition do unjustly to all in whose behalf the Law-giver made the Law. For if the Law Commands us to honour those that faithfully and justly preserve and manage the Common Treasury, the same Law deems worthy of punishment those that waste and dissipate the publick stock. Thus it is apparent what is legal from Contraries: but from things adjudg'd in this manner. For I do not only say this present Law was made upon these grounds by the Law-giver; but former Judges, by the report of *Lyschidas*, decree'd several things like to those by me already related.

What profitable is, we have already defin'd: but there is also like to profitable; for as it is advantageous in War that the Stoutest and most
Magnanimous

Magnanimous should be plac'd in the Front of the Battel, so is it of great advantage to a Commonwealth, that the most prudent and most just should govern the Multitude; and as men that are in health ought to be wary to preserve themselves from sickness, so is it requisite for Cities that are in Peace and concord, to beware of Sedition.

From Contraries Profitable will be thus made manifest. For if it be profitable to honour good and vertuous Citizens, it may be as much to advantage, to punish bad Citizens. And if it be to our disadvantage to fight singly against the *Thebans*, it may be for our advantage to associate our selves with the *Lacedæmonians*, and so to make War upon the *Thebans*.

Profitable also may be thus taken from the judgment of celebrated Men. For the *Lacedæmonians*, when they had vanquish'd the *Athenians*, thought it would be for their advantage not to enslave their City. And the *Athenians*, when they could have raz'd *Lacedæmon* to the ground, thought it would be more to their advantage to let it stand.

CHAP. III.

What things are are to be consulted.

VVE shall once more define how many, of what nature, and what things are to be consulted, as well at Council-Board, as in public

Public Assemblies. For if we distinctly understand every one of these things, the things themselves will afford us words for every Consultation. Briefly then, Consultation is to be had concerning seven things, either about Religion, or Laws, or Political Preparations, or of Leagues against other Cities, or of War or Peace, or of the Public Revenue.

Now let us divide every one of these, and let us consider in what manner we are to make use of Oration concerning any of these things. Of Ceremonies there is not much to be said; for we either say they are to be continu'd as they are, or that they ought to be more sumptuous, or else that some of the Pomp is superfluous. If we say they are to be continu'd as they are, we are to find out reasons from what is just, and then to alledge how unjust it is to alter any thing from the ancient and Establish'd Customs of the Country. How all the Prophecies command men to perform the Sacred Ceremonies according to ancient Customs and Use. That that worship is chiefly to be observ'd which was establish'd by those that first built Citys, and erected Temples to the Gods.

From Profit we may argue, That it will be more for the distribution of Money, both privately and publicly, that the ancient Sacrifices be continu'd; That it creates a confidence in the Citizens one of another, and consequently makes 'em more bold and daring. For the Citizens seeing the Souldiers feasting and performing their Military Sacrifices, shake off their former fears, as being Ambitious to be of the Number.

From honest, by alledging those Ceremonies.

to be the occasion of several Friendly Meetings among vertuous Society.

From delightful, if there be any Variety in the Ceremonies. From possible, if there be neither want nor excess.

Therefore when we consult about things that have been long establish'd, we must take into consideration what things have been already said and their Resemblances, and then as the nature of the things will bear, to discourse upon the several recited Subjects.

But when we advise to make the Sacrifices more pompous, then we bring proper Arguments to prove that it may be lawful to change the Customs of our Country; alleading, that to add to what is already, is not to abrogate, but to adorn the settl'd constitution. Then, that it is probable the Gods will be the more Propitious to us, when they see that we give 'em greater honour: then, that our Fathers did not always observe the same Ceremonies, but varied according as times and Seasons and their Prosperity admitted; and thereupon made particular changes both in public and private worship. And again, that it is requisite so to do, if any profit, splendor or pleasure will thence arive to the Commonwealth; in regard we order our Cities as we do our private Houses.

If the debate be about reducing the Sacrifices to a meaner Condition, then our Oration must be adapted to the Season, by urging that the Condition of the City is Lower then formerly: Then, that the Gods are better pleas'd with devotion then Gaudy Pomp. Then, that both Gods and Men will condemn the Stupidity of the

those that do any thing beyond their power. Then, that the public Expences are not at the disposal of men, but according to their Prosperity or Adversity. Now then, that we may know how to propose and Establish those things that appertain to the best way of Sacrificing, we are to consider, that that is the best Sacrifice, which is made to the Gods piously and holily: Moderate, as to Expences; profitable, as to War; but splendid for shew. Now thou shalt behave thy self piously toward the Gods, if the Customs and Constitutions of thy Country be not infrin'd; moderately as to expences, if all the presents that are made be not consum'd at once. Profitably for the War, if Infantry and Cavalry feast and maintain their pastimes together in their Arms: splendidly for shew, if there be a magnificent use made of Gold and other precious Ornaments which are not consum'd and wasted. And thus from these things shall we agree about the chiefest Ornaments that concern the Gods: and out of what we have already said, we may plainly understand after what manner we are to discourse concerning the several sorts Sacrifices.

In the same manner we may frame Arguments in reference to the Laws and civil Constitutions. For the Laws, as we have already briefly hinted, are the public consent of the Commonweal, which determines in writing, and commands how every one is to act in such and such particulars. Now for making of Laws in *Democracies*, the meaner Magistrates are many, and chosen by Lot, which prevents Sedition: But the Superiour Magistrates by the suffrages of the People. For thus the People having in their Power to confer Honours

nours upon they please, will never envy those that accept it : and they who are most eminent, will be most diligent to exercise Probity and Sincerity, knowing they shall gain by being in esteem with the People. And thus much concerning the Election of Magistrates in *Democracies*.

As to what concerns the other part of Popular Administration, to speak briefly, This must be observ'd, That the Laws prohibit the Multitude from gaping after the substance of the Wealthy ; and the rich to a willing Munificence in public Office's. Which may be done, by decreeing to the Rich certain peculiar honours in lieu of their Expences bestow'd upon the Public : as by preferring Husbandmen before poor Artiss, and Masters of Ships before Ordinary Water-men. Also there ought to be a severity in the Laws to prevent neglect of Tillage, and the publishing the Estates of the deceas'd, with great Penalties upon the Contemners of these Statutes. Also there ought to be allow'd some public place of Sepulture for those that are slain in the Wars, and their Children ought to be brought up at the public charge, till they come of Age. Such Laws as these become a Popular Government. In Oligarchies ; the Laws ought to distribute the Power equally to all that participate in the Government. Of these Magistrates the most are chosen by lots, the cheifest privately by Suffrage, with Oaths and a very great exactness. And in an Oligarchy there ought to be the greatest punishments ordain'd upon those that go about to offer injury to any of their fellow Citizens. For the Multitude is not so much concern'd for being depriv'd of the Magistracy

as they are offended when abus'd and injur'd. It is requisite also to be very diligent in composing the differences of one Citizen with another, and never to suffer the Multitude to meet together in any noted place; for such Assemblies cement the Multitude, and dissolve the Oligarchy. And thus much as to what is to be observ'd and desir'd in all Civil Constitutions.

Now he that would defend his cause by the Law, must shew that it is equal among the Citizens, that it is agreeable to the rest of the Laws, that it is for the Peace of the City, for the advance of the Public Tributes, for the honour of the City, and that it will encrease the Power of the City; and whatever else to this effect. And then the Opponent must consider first whether the Law be common to all, whether agreeable or contrary to the rest of the Laws, whether profitable as the other alledg'd, or hurtful. Now as concerning Allies and Leagues against other Cities, Leagues must be made according to public contracts. Allies are to be sought for, according to the Condition of the times, when they that seek Assistance are weak of themselves, or that they are threaten'd with some War, and therefore a League must be made with others who they think will forsake their side in time of War. And these are the cheif reasons that induce men to make Leagues. Now he that would perswade the making of a League uses these Arguments; That it is Seasonable, that the People are a just and generous People, that they are already well affected toward us, that they are our Neighbours and Powerful. But if all these things cannot be alledg'd, then to urge as many as can be.

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He that would dissuade the entering into a League, must shew that it is needless at this time, that the People are not to be trusted, and that they have ever born us a grudge, that they live at a distance, and that they are in no capacity to assist us in time.

If the Question be whether to make War or Peace, Arguments are deduc'd from the Causes. Now the Causes of War are, For that now is the time to take our Revenge upon those that injur'd us before; or being now provok'd either in reference to our selves or our Kindred, or our Benefactors; or to assist our Allies unjustly invaded, or for the common benefit, for honour, or to enrich our selves, or for any other cause of the same nature. Therefore when we would exhort our Hearers to War, we ought to comprehend as many of these causes as we can, and to shew that the most of those things that render War successful, auspiciously appear to favour the exhorted. For all men become Victorious by the favour of the Gods, which we call *Good Fortune*, or through Multitude or strength of Bodies, through Riches, prudence of the General, stout Associates, and opportunity of strong holds. Therefore from these or Arguments like to these, which are most congruous to the matter, we may exhort the undertaking a War, extenuating the strength of our Adversaries, and extolling our own.

On the other side if we desire to prevent a War, first those reasons are to be found out, by which we may demonstrate, that the injuries are very slight, or none at all that induce us to War, that the War cannot be advantageous,

and then the Calamities attending War are slightly to be run over. Then we are to shew, that all the Advantages which procure Victory are on the Enemies side.

If we would exhort the Surceasing a present War, then the first thing to be urg'd is, That they who are in their wits, will never stay till a misfortune happen, but will endeavour to make Peace while they are Victorious, and may procure it upon the best Terms. Then, because it is the chance of War, that they who win at first loose at last: but that it is the nature of Peace to preserve the vanquish'd, and that thereby the Victor enjoys the fruits of the War. Then repeat the many and various changes that are wont to happen in War. Thus are they to be exhorted who have the better. But they who have miscarry'd in the War are to be perswaded to give over another way: that is, by reasons drawn from the chances themselves that have befallen 'em; and the miseries they endur'd before, when they refus'd Peace: and then, that it is better to part with a small Portion, then to hazard the whole at one throw. Breifly we ought to understand this, that men are wont then to give over War, when they believe their Enemies desire what is just, or that any Quarrel happens between them and their Allies, or that they are weary of the War, or that they are afraid of their Adversaries, or that they begin to fall out among themselves.

As for what concerns the public Revenue, First we are to consider whether any of the public Lands be neglected; which neither yeilds any Revenue, nor yet is consecrated to the Gods. As
there

there are some public Lands neglected which would yield good profit, were they either sold or set out to private Persons. But if there be no such thing, of necessity Taxes must be lay'd; and the Poor must pay the Tribute of their Bodys, the Rich must find Money, the Tradesmen Armes. And thus much for Propositions in deliberative Arguments.

CHAP. IV.

Of Arguments in the Encomiastic kind.

THE Encomiastic kind (to speak breifly) is an amplification of the Pre-elections, Deeds, and Speeches of illustrious men, and a conciliation of things absent. Dispraise on the other side is the obscuring of Men illustrious; and the extolling men of no worth. Now those things deserve praise which are just, which are legal, which are profitable, which are honest, which are delightful, and which are not easily accomplish'd. Now he that applauds must make out by reason, that there is something in that man, or in his Actions which was done by him, or which proceeded from him; or which happen'd from this, or was done for the sake of this, or was not perform'd without this. And he that would dispraise any Person must make out the contraries to be in that Person.

Which happen'd from thence, as thus. Through diligent exercise of the Body Victories happen;

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though

through sloth men fall into distempers. Again; by the study of Philosophy men become more smart in prudence. But negligence brings 'em to want necessities.

Or was done for the sake of this; as thus. Mortals endure many hard labours, run through many dangers, that they may be immortaliz'd by their fellow Citizens; and others strive for nothing more, then to gratifie those they love. *Or was not perform'd without this*, as thus. Victories at Sea cannot be won without Seamen; nor can men be drunk without drink.

If we go about to amplifie or extenuate, we must shew that many good or bad things were acted by such a Person. In the next place something is to be brought in by way of Metaphor, that has been so adjudg'd; if by way of Praise, that which is good and laudable: if in discommendation, that which is bad. Then produce what has been said by thy self, and compare together the best that has been spok'n by thy self, with the worst that has been said by the Opponent, by which means thou mayst shew the thing adjudg'd to be great.

The third way is to counter-compare the greatest thing said by thy self, with the least of those things that fall under the same *Idea*; for so shall the greatest thing said by thy self appear. As men of middle Stature appear to be taller, when measur'd together with those that are lower.

Or Amplification may be made in this manner. If this be adjudg'd a great good, the contrary to it must be a great Evil. In like manner, if it be adjudg'd a great Evil, the contrary
to

to it must be a great good. We may also magnifie good or bad things in this manner, if we shew by ratiocination, and riveting several things together, as how he premeditated many things, how he design'd to act many things; how he acted a long time; how never any one undertook the like before; how afterwards he acted with those that never any did; how, willingly; how of set purpose and by foresight; how if we should all do like this man, we should be happy or miserable. And he that makes Similes must collect together, and appropriating the one to the other must amplify in this manner. As if a man be mindful of his friends, 'tis very probable that he honours his Parents. And he that honours his Parents, 'tis as probable, that he is a lover of his Country. In a word if we shew the Person to be the Author of many things, either good or bad; many things will appear to be great. Moreover the thing will appear what it is, being either divided into parts, or spok'n generally; and which way it will appear greatest, that way it is to be spok'n. Extenuations are handl'd the quite contrary way, as when we demonstrate the Person to be the Author of nothing at all, or at least of things very mean and Paltry.

Amplifications are useful also upon other Occasions; but especially in Applauses and *Encomiums*, and discommending and vilifying.

CHAP. V.

Of Accusation and defence.

Accusation is the displaying of Injuries and Crimes.

Defence is the freeing a Mans self from Injuries and Crimes of which he stands either accus'd or suspected.

Now in regard both kinds have the same force and efficacy, of necessity the accuser when he declaims against wickedness, must lay open the Actions of the Defendant to be unjust and vile, and pernicious to the whole Body of his fellow Citizens. But when he accuses of folly; then he must shew the Actions of the Criminal to be unprofitable even to himself, infamous, unpleasant, and which were impossible to be accomplish'd. These and such like are the Arguments against vain and wicked People. The Accuser is also to observe this, what punishments are set upon every Crime, and what Acts of Injustice are finable by the Judges. When the Law then has determin'd the punishment, this is first to be consider'd by the Accuser, that he make out the fact to be perpetrated. And when the Judges understand the Accusation, the Injuries and Crimes of the Adversaries are to be aggravated, and it is chiefly to be made out, that he Committed the Fact, willing, of malice fore thought, and not by chance, but with great and premeditated

dictated Preparation. But if this be not possible to be done, or that you rather think that the Adversary will acknowledge, that he was in some fault, or that he did it by chance, or that he did it with a good intent, then to incense the Auditory you must alledg, that it did not become the guilty, after they had committed a Crime to Plead that they mistook through Imprudence, but to have consider'd before he acted. Or that if he acted Imprudently, or did it by chance, he ought to be fin'd so much the more, because of his Chance and his Imprudence, then he who never pleaded any such Plea. Besides that the Law does not acquit those who have acted Imprudently, but leaves 'em to punishment, least they should do an Injury to others by mistake. And he may farther urge that if such a Plea should be admitted, it would prove an encouragement for others to play the Villains; for that then they might take their opportunity to do any mischief in regard they may escape punishment by pleading mistake, or imprudence. And this is the way to prevent compassion and forgiveness in the Hearers. And these are the formes of Accusation according to it's several parts. Defence consists of three Methods. For either he must deny the doing what he is accus'd of; or if he be compell'd to make his defence he must endeavour to prove the Fact lawful, honest and profitable; or if he cannot do that; that it was done unadvisedly, or by accident, or that the Injury was inconsiderable. Then distinguish between reall Injustice, Imprudence and Miscarriage. For to act premeditatedly is to do Injustice; to act through ignorance is only a bare offence; what is committed not willingly

willingly but by the Instigation of others, or by miscarriage, in regard such things are not acted upon due consideration, they are only to be attributed to misfortune: in regard that none act wickedly and advisedly, but wicked men; but to offend and miscarry in Actions, was not only particular to himself but common even to the Judges themselves and all other men.

The Defendant must also consider what crimes are punish'd by the Law, and what Trespases are finable. And when the Law determin'd the Punishment, he is to shew, that either he has committed no fact at all, or that he has done justly and according to Law. And where the Trespas is only finable, he is to extenuate the offence, as of little consequence, that the injury was small, and unwillingly done.

CHAP. VI.

Of Questions.

A Question is the Exhibiting of *Pre-election*, Deeds, or Actions contrary one to another, or to another manner of life. He then that asks a Question must demand, whether the words or the actions, or the pre-elections differ one from another. Now the method is this. To look back into the time past, and consider, whether any one being formerly a Friend, afterwards became his Enemy, and then whether a friend again to the very same person; or has done any other unfriendly act
out

out of malice; or would do, if he had an Opportunity, contrary to what were formerly done by him. Then observe, if speaking now, he speak contrary to what he spoke before by himself, or contrary to what was reported before, and now said: also, whether he speak contrary to what he had spoken before, or would not, if he had an opportunity. Also we are to add to the other honest Studies and diligences of the Querent, the contrarieties in the Life of the Person to whom the Question is put. And whoever thus manages the questioning part, shall not omit any manner of putting a Question. And thus all the parts of questioning being divided, they are to be made use of severally as occasion requires, or intermixing their force and abilities together, for they contain great variety. Nevertheless they communicate one with another, as they are made use of, and are of the same nature with the different forms of Men. For they are partly alike, and partly unlike, as well in their Aspects as in their Senses. Therefore having thus determin'd the several *Species's*, and what they want, let us now enumerate how many ways they are to be made use of.

CHAP. VII.

First therefore, Just and Legal, Profitable and Honest, as we divided 'em before, are agreeable to all the Species. But in persuasion we chiefly make use of these.

In the second place Extenuation and Aggravation are of necessity profitable beyond all the rest: but their chiefest use is in *Encomiums* and vilifying Orations. In the third Place Probations, which we are constrain'd to use in all Parts of Orations; but chiefly in accusations and defenses. For such things as those are most controverted.

There are also Anticipations, Petitions, Repetitions and Tautologies, Prolivity of Oration, Mediocrity of length, Brevity of speaking, and Interpretation.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Probation.

TO begin therefore from Probations; of these there are two sorts. For some are produc'd from the words themselves, some from these matter and some from the men: others are fix'd to the things said and done. For
probables,

probables, Examples, Conjectures, *Enthymemes*, Sentences, Signs, Arguments and Proofs are gather'd from the men themselves, from the words and from the matter. Additional Proofs are Witnesses, Oaths and Questions.

Probable, which we call a Probable Proposition, is that which when we have declar'd to the Hearers, they retain the Examples of the thing spok'n in their minds: as if one should say, he wishes his Country may Flourish, his Friends may prosper, and misfortune to his Enemies, they might collectively seem Probable. For every one of the Hearers has the same Sentiments probably with the Person that utters these wishes. And therefore we are to observe this diligently always in our Orations, whether we have left the Auditors conscious of the thing of which we discours'd to 'em. For it is most likely that they give greatest credit to those things.

Probable is divided into three sorts. The one is when in our Orations we comprehend the Passions or Affections generally incident to all men, as well when we accuse as when we defend. As when any Person despises, or fears such a one, or does the very same thing several times, or is again affected with pleasure, grief or desire; or is void of desire; or is wealthy, or affected with any other Passion to which our Souls or Bodies, or Senses are Subject. For these and such like perturbations of the mind, are known to the Hearers. And these are those things which being naturally Incident to men, must be comprehended in our Oration.

The Second Part is the custom of Probabilities;
which

which every one frames according to the general Uses.

The third sort is Gain. For many times for the sake of Gain, forcing nature, we bid adieu to our own Inclinations.

Which things being thus determin'd, both in perswading and dissuading, we are to demonstrate upon the things required, that the thing to which we exhort, or to which we are averse, is according to what we have said. Or else that the things which are like to this matter, were done as we said, either the most or all. In reference to Things therefore, Probable is thus to be taken ; in reference to men especially in Accusations, if it may be done, you are to shew that the adverse Party has committed this Fact formerly or at least, such as were like it. Endeavour also to shew that it was for his advantage to do these things. For most men adoring profit, imagin that other men do all things for the sake of profit. If therefore you can wrest any Probabilities from the adversaries themselves, make your Collection in that manner ; which if it cannot be done, then infer from things like to those which men are accusom'd to do. For Example, 'tis a young man whom you accuse, and therefore prove him to have done those things which men of his Age are accusom'd to do. For Similitude of Actions will cause what you said against him to be credited. For by reason of his familiarity with those young men of his own Age, he will be thought to allow himself the same Indulgences with his friends, especially if any man shall make his Comrades appear to be such as you say he is.

As

As for them that are upon the defensive part, it behoves them to shew that neither he, nor any of his friends ever acted formerly any of those things of which they are accus'd, and that they could be no advantage to him. Or if it be apparent, that he has done the same before, then let him lay the offence upon his Age, or bring some other Arguments to lessen his miscarriage. Let him say that it neither could be advantageous to him, nor now.

But if nothing of this nature were committed by him, but that some of his friends did some such things, let him plead the Injustice of being accus'd for the Facts of others; and then let him shew that the rest of his Companians are sober and moderate young men. For so the Accusation will become dubious.

If it shall be said, that some others like Him have committed the same Facts, let him urge, that because certain others appear to have done the same thing, 'tis no Argument he has committed those things of which he stands accus'd. And thus he that denies himself to have done any of those things of which he is accus'd must defend himself by Probabilities. For so shall he weaken the Probability of the Accusation.

But if he is compell'd to confess, let him then compare his own with the customary practises of many, alledging that most or many, do as he happen'd to do, but if that be not possible to do, let him fly to unfortunate miscarriage or Imprudence for Refuge and beg for Pardon, making use for advocates of all the Common perturbations of the mind, which put us beside our Reason, as Love, Anger, Wine, Ambition and
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the like. And this is the most artful Method of Probability.

CHAP IX.

Of Examples.

EXamples are like Actions other where done, and contrary to those of which we now speak. And they are to be made use of when he that affirms a thing, promises to make it out when it seems not to be very probable, at what time reciting another Action, like to that recited by himself, so done as he affirms it, that so the more credit may be given to his words.

Of Examples there are two sorts. Some are according to Reason, others beside Reason. Examples according to Reason are easily believ'd; but such as are not according to reason seldom or never gain credit. As if a man should say the Rich are juster then the Poor, and brings for Example certain just Actions of Rich men. These and such like Examples seem to be according to Reason, in regard most men believe the Wealthy to be juster then the Poor. But if on the other side, another Person brings Examples of Rich men doing Injury for love of Money, bringing an Example that it is not so agreeable to Probability, he shall lessen the Argument against the Rich. In like manner another Person brings Example of a thing that seems according
to

ing to Reason; That the *Lacedæmonians* or *Athenians* being reinforced with a great Multitude of Allies, vanquish'd their Enemies, and thence will perswade the Auditors to court many Allies; These Examples are according to Reason. For all men believe that Multitude very much conduces to Victory. But if any one will undertake to shew that Multitude is not the cause of Victory, he must make use of such Examples as are beside Reason, as when the *Athenian* Fugitives with fifty men and one Tribe, encountering a much greater Multitude, assisted by the *Lacedæmonians* their Allies, regain'd their own City. And again, But the *Thebans*, when the *Lacedæmonians* assisted by the whole force of the *Peloponnesians*, invaded *Beotia*, withstood their Enemies alone, and utterly defeated the *Lacedæmonians*. - Again, But *Dio* Sayling to *Syracuse* with three thousand men, vanquish'd *Dionysius* that had five times his Number. Also the *Corinthians*, when they Sayl'd with nine Gallies to ay'd the *Syracensians*, drove the *Carthaginians* out of the City, though they had possession of the Town and the Haven with a hundred and fifty ships. Breifly, such Examples as these, that seem contrary to Reason, are often objected in Consultation to those Examples that seem much more rational.

This is therefore the nature of Examples, and they are to be us'd both ways. When we speak of things that are done according to Reason, we shew how such and such things were accomplish'd in such a manner. But when we offer Examples that seem contradictory to Reason, we shew how such and such things, though rashly undertaken

had a prosperous Issue. But they that speak against these Examples, ought to shew how these successes happen'd, and then to urge, that they rarely fall out, but the other Examples frequently. And this is the use which is to be made of Examples. But when we offer Examples contrary to reason, we are to collect the most we can, and then to affirm, that the one as well as the other frequently happen.

Now we may produce Examples not only from these things, but from their Contraries; as if we were to shew, that some through their covetousness toward their Allies have lost their Friendship, and then proceeding, say, But we would have been more equal and more liberal to our Allies, and so have preserv'd their friendship a longer time. And again, as if after we had shewn, that others because they undertook the War, before they were well provided for it, were vanquish'd, we should they say, But let us go well provided to War, for then we may have more certain hopes of success. We may also take many Examples as well from things past, as from the present affairs. For most things are partly like, partly unlike one to another. Wherefore we need not fear to have store of Examples to refute those that are offer'd by others.

CHAP. X.

Of Conjectures.

Conjectures are whatever are done contrary to those things concerning which the Discourse is, and wherein the Discourse it self contradicts it self. For the most Auditors, by those contrarieties which happen contrary to reason or the Common course of Action, conjecture, that there is nothing of sound and solid in those things which are said or done. And a man may make several Conjectures, by observing whether the Opponents Oration contradict it self, or whether the thing it self be contrary to the Discourse of the Speaker.

CHAP. XI.

Of Enthymemes.

Enthymemes are those things which are not only contrary to Reason and Practice, but to all other things beside. And a man may make use of many, handling them as in the *Questioning Kind*, observing whether the Discourse contradict it self, or whether the things transacted be contrary to Justice, to the Law, to what is profitable, to Probability, to the *Genius* of the
R 2 Speaker,

Speaker, or to the nature of the Transactions. Therefore such *Enthymemes* are to be chosen according to the contraries. Now the contraries to these are such as we ought to assume for our selves, shewing that our Actions and our Words are contrary to what is unjust, illegal, unprofitable, to the manners of wicked men, and in a word to every thing that is evil. All which ought to be spoken breifly and in few words. And in this manner we may frame many *Enthymemes*, and make the best use of 'em.

CHAP. XII.

Of a Sentence.

A Sentence (to speak breifly) is the declaration of a man's proper opinion in all things.

Of Sentences there are two sorts. The one Credible, the other Paradoxical. When we speak a thing that deserves to be credited, there is no reason to be given. For neither is what is said unknown, neither does any Person contradict it. But when a Paradox is spoken, the reasons are in few words to be given, to avoid Loquacity and the misfortune of not being believ'd. Now those Sentences are always to be spoken that are most consentaneous to the present affairs, lest what is utter'd should seem forc'd and improper. And we may deduce many Sentences, either naturally, or from *Hyperboles*, or by way of *Paromoiosis*.

Natural

Natural Sentences are these, No man, in my opinion, who is unskill'd in Affairs, can be a shrewd Commander. And again, It is the duty of Prudent men, to study the Examples of things past, that they may avoid inconsiderate Errors.

Sentences from Hyberboles are these. It is much more dangerous to admit of Thieves than Robbers, for the one take our money from us privately, the other openly.

By way of *Paranymiasis* or Similitude, these; They that steal our Money, in my opinion, do the same, as they who betray Cities. For both being trusted, they enjure those that entrust. And again, They that are unjust, to me seem to be like Tyrants. For they never think they deserve punishment for the Injuries they do to others; but where they believe others to be offenders, they spare for no Torments. And these, if they owe me any thing, never repay it; but if I owe them any thing, they exact both the Principal and Interest.

CHAP. XIII.

Of Signs.

A Sign is the other of the other, not every thing of every thing, nor all of all, but what uses to be before the thing, or with the thing or after the thing. And the sign is not only of the thing being, but not in being. In like manner, that which never was done is the sign not only of the thing done, but of that which was never done.

Now of these Signs some cause us to think, others to know, and in the next place those that beget the most probable opinion. Nor can we want plenty of these Signs, to speak summarily, taken singly and separately from every thing said, done or seen, from the greatness or smallness of those things which happen to us, either good or evil; Also from the Testimonies, from the favourers of us or our adversaries, from them themselves, from the Prosecutions, from the times and seasons, and from many other things.

CHAP. XIV.

Of an Elenchus.

AN *Elenchus* or convincing Argument is that which cannot be otherwise then as we say. And it is taken from things naturally necessary to be as we say; or what the Opponent says, and from such things as are naturally possible or impossible; which of therefore naturally of necessity must be. As that living Creatures stand in need of Victuals, and the like. As we say, Of necessity those that are whipp'd must confess what those that lay on command 'em. Also naturally we say, 'tis impossible such a little Child should steal so much Money: as not being able to bear it, and go away with so much weight. Or if the adversary should aver it to be impossible, if he should but tell us at what time we sign'd the contract at *Athens*: For we
are

are able to prove; that at that time we were absent in some other City. In a word, we have already discours'd of all manner of Proofs, and how they are to be taken from Speech, from business, and from men themselves. Now let us consider how they differ one from another.

CHAP. XV.

Of the difference between Probable and Example, &c.

PROBABLE differs from Example in this, that the Hearers themselves have a notion of Probability; but Examples are brought from things as well contrary as similar. Conjectures are compos'd of contraries both in Speech and Practice. And *Enthymemes* differ from conjecture in a certain Repugnancy between the word and the deed. But *Enthymemes* remove the contradictions concerning other Ideas. Or else because it is not for us to comprehend a Conjecture unless there be some repugnancy between things and words: but an *Enthymeme* offers it self every where and upon every thing.

Sentences differ from *Enthymemes*; for that *Enthymemes* consist of Repugnancies only; but Sentences may be utter'd as well with Repugnancies, as simply themselves by themselves.

Signs differ from Sentences and all other things before mention'd in this, for that all the other

things create an opinion in the Hearers; but some Signs will cause the Judges rightly to apprehend. Besides; it never happens to the rest, that we can abound in many; But we may produce many Signs. An *Elenchus* differs from a *Sign* in this, that some Signs only create an opinion in the Hearers; but an *Elenchus* teaches and confirms 'em in the Truth.

Now let us see what may be oppos'd to these. The opinion of the speaker is the declaration of his Sentiments touching such or such matters. And it is requisite that he shew himself experienc'd in those things concerning which he discourses; and that he should demonstrate how much it concerns him to speak the Truth concerning such matters. And then let him make out that the Opponent knows nothing of the matters which he undertakes to discourse of, and that his opinion is as frivolous. Which if it may not be said, then let him urge, that sometimes the most experienc'd may be in an Error; or that it is not for his interest to speak the Truth concerning these matters.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Testimony.

A Testimony is a voluntary Confession of a known Thing. Now of necessity it must be either probable or improbable or doubtful to be believ'd: and in like manner the witness must be either

either credible, or not to be believed or of doubtful Credit. Now when the Testimony seems probable and the Witness true, the Testimonies need no Epilogues, unless for *Decorum's* sake you would make use of any Sentence or *Emphymeme*.

But if the Witness be suspected, then it must be urg'd that he has given his Testimony neither out of Affection, for fear of Torment, nor for hopes of Gain, and that it is no way advantageous to him to testify an untruth: For the utmost he can expect can be but a small profit: but to be convicted of a Perjury is a dangerous thing, considering the Punishments which the Law inflicts upon Bribery and Perjury: and thus we shall render the Witnesses Credible.

They that contradict the Witnesses are to detract from their Lives and Conversations, and to enquire into the Testimony, whether it be credible, or to contradict both at once, and to detect at once all the Vices and Enormities of the Witness and his Procurers. It is also to be enquir'd into, whether the Witness be a friend to him for whom he gives his Testimony, or if he have any dealings with him; or whether he be an Enemy to him against whom he gives his Testimony, or whether he be a poor man. For such as these may be suspected to swear false either for favour or fear, or in hopes of a Reward, for all which the Law has provided punishment. And therefore we may add at the same time, that it would be an absurd thing for the Judges who are bound to judge according the Law, to believe such men as the Law will not believe.

Now there is a way of stealing a Testimony,
which

which is this. *Bear witness for me, O Calliches: By the Immortal Gods not I: for do what I could, he would needs do these Things.* And therefore giving a false Testimony upon the sentence, he shall not be lyable to the Punishment inflicted upon a false Witness. But if the Adversary do any such thing, we presently lay open his foul Play, and order him to attest the Writings.

CHAP. XVII.

Of the Rack.

THE Rack is the unwilling Confession of a guilty Person. And therefore when we desire an ample and strong Confession, we may urge, that private Persons about most serious matters, Cities in case of greatest Discoveries, draw and make out proofs by the Torture of the Rack, and therefore the Torture of witnesses procures the best Evidence. For sometimes it may be advantageous for a Witness to tell an untruth, but it is less for the Advantage of those that are tortur'd to tell the truth. For then their pain will be the sooner over. But when we would make proofs by Torture invalid, we must first alledge, how they that are Rack'd are Enemies to those by whom they are delivered up, and therefore many speak false against their Masters: and then because many times they confess to their Tormentors whatever comes uppermost, and any thing but the Truth, to be out of their pain. Then it is
their

to be made out, that some freemen, to be rid of their Torments, have confess'd, untruths against themselves: and therefore it is more likely that Servants should confess lyes against their Masters, to avoid the torture both of the Body and Mind, which they are never put to suffer that can frame a cunning peice of falshood.

CHAP. XVIII.

Of Oaths.

AN Oath is an Asseveration utter'd with divine Reverence, that wants proof. And therefore when we would enlarge upon it, we are to say, That certainly no man would forswear himself, either for fear of divine Vengeance, or of loosing his Reputation among men.

But when the Adversary flies for Sanctuary to an Oath, we are to urge, that they who will not stick to do as he has done, will not scruple a false Oath. For he that impiously thinks he can deceive the Gods, believes he may easily escape the punishment of Perjury among Men.

CHAP. XIX.

Of Anticipation.

Anticipation is that, by which, while we Anticipate the ill opinions of the Hearers, and the Reasons of those that would Contradict us, we remove the Difficulties that lye in our way. And thus we are to prevent the ill opinions of the Hearers.

But you may perhaps admire, that a Person so young in years as my self should undertake to speak concerning things of this High Nature. Or thus, Let no man meet me with a Sorrowful and Morose Countenance, because I undertake to advise ye in those things, concerning which some others have been so free with ye in their discourses.

And thus having prevented the ill will of the Hearers, we are then to bring our Reasons to shew, that we do well in speaking or advising; alleadging the want of Orators, the greatness of the Dangers, or the Public benefit, or any other Seasonable Reason.

If Nevertheless the Hearers are uneasy, it behoves us to speak briefly, either by way of Sentence or Enthymeme, That it is the absurdest thing in the world to come here to debate what is best to be done; and now when you are unwilling to heare the speaker; to think we can ever debate right. Again, That there can be no better way, then either to stand up and consult together, or else giving

giving ear to those that advise, to put it afterwards to the vote, when every man has given his opinion.

This is the way to make use of Anticipation in Popular Harangues. And the same Method must be us'd in Pleadings at the Bar : as for Example, to prevent the Disgust and Mutiny of the Auditors, we may begin our Oration thus. *Is it not absurd, that when the Law-giver has ordain'd every one of the adversaries to have two Orations in his behalf, that you the Judges of the Law and by the Law, should not be willing to hear so much as one Oration, and that such a one as with all foresight has well study'd so well for your Information, that hearing it you cannot Judge amiss? And yet you to be so remiss, as not deigning to hear the beginning, you believe you know the whole merits of the Cause already.* Or thus.

The Law-giver ordaines the Victory to him that has by an equal Number of Voices; how is it that you are so contrary in your Judgements, that you will not hear the defences of the accus'd? The Law-giver, because those that fly are in most danger, allows 'em this Prerogative of most Voices; but you cherish those that accuse in Security, and astonish those that come from the Jaws of fear and danger to make their defences.

Thus if the Disturbance be at the beginning : if afterwards in the middle of the Oration, or if but few, they may be thus check'd; That it is but just they should be now a little attentive, lest they should hinder others from judging truly, but when they have heard him out, then to do what they thought fit. But

But if the whole Multitude seem discontented, then not to check the Judges, but to find fault with himself, by confessing himself in an Errour and begging Pardon. Also we may beseech the Judges to hear us with a favourable Ear. In a word, we are to reconcile our selves to the Auditory, by speaking briefly; with short Sentences, and pithy *Enthymemes*; and by shewing that their Disturbance is Repugnant to Law, to Justice, and the Public benefit.

Now to Anticipate what may be said by the adversary, these expressions may be convenient according to the Information we have. As thus, *And perhaps he will bewail his own Penury, of which not I, but his own manner of Living is the Occasion.* And again, *I know he had urg'd this or that, But, &c.* And thus we are to Anticipate what has been spok'n strenuously; for though the Reasons in his preceding Oration were never so vailid, they will not so seem, when thus lessen'd by him that comes after.

If we are to reply, and the adversary has already anticipated us, then are we thus to counter-anticipate. *But this man has not only utter'd many falsehoods of me before ye, but knowing he should by me be certainly refuted, he has scandaliz'd my Oration by Anticipation; to prevent your giving me that attention which he so humbly beg'd of you: Or, Least I should have the Liberty by speaking before ye, to wipe off those Aspersions which he has lay'd upon my Oration. But I am apt believe, that it rather behoves ye to hear my Oration from my self, then from my adversary. Or if the Accuser has hinted this before, Which I say are shrew'd Signs that he has spoken nothing*
of

of Truth or Solidity. Thus Euripides of Philoctetes.

*But I must tell ye, though you think that I
Have lost the Cause, by his suggesting still
That I have done the wrong; it is your part
To let me make my own Concerns appear,
And let him his own business only mind.*

CHAP. XX.

Of Petitions.

A Petition, is when the speaker begs something in his Orations from the Hearers. And these Petitions are either just or unjust. Just, as when we beg attention, or a favourable construction of our words. It is also just to beg to be assisted according to the Law, or not to decree any thing against us contrary to the Law, or to beg Pardon for any thing that is amiss. But if we desire any thing that is contrary to the Law, then it is unjust: and we have thus distinguish'd 'em, that when we understand which desires are just, and which unjust, we may make a right use of 'em; and know when the adversary desires any thing of the Judges that is unlawful.

CHAP. XXI.

Of Repetition.

Repetition is a Concise Commemoration of what has been said. And this is to be made use of either at the end of the Parts, or at the Conclusion of the whole Oration. Now we sum up the matter in Heads either by way of Ratiocination, or by way of Election, or by way of Question, or Enumeration. By way of Ratiocination thus; *I should doubt what they did, were it not manifest that they left us first. But it was prov'd that they came with an Army toward our City, not doing any thing that they promis'd.*

By way of Apology thus. *I have shew'd how they were the first that brake the League, and first set upon us, when we war'd with the Lacedemonians, designing chiefly to enslave our City.*

By way of profection, thus, *But we are to remember, that we never suffer'd any harm since we made a League with these People: for frequently assisting us, they hinder'd the Lacedemonians from wasting our Territories, and now they continue to bring us much Blame.*

By way of Question, thus. *I would willingly ask 'em why they do not pay us our Tributes? For they cannot say, they want Money; who are known to receive so much Money every year out*

of the Place. Nor can they say, they have spent much Money upon the Administration of the Government; for manifestly they have expended less than any of the Islanders.

CHAP. XXII.

Of Irony.

AN Irony is, when we know one thing and dissemble another. *We must not say, that these men, who boast they have done us so much good, have been the People that have done us all this mischief.* But when we call things by contrary names, then thus. *These good men were, they that did the mischief to our Confederates; but we wicked People, they that did 'em all the kindness.* And thus by way of Commemoration we use these Repetitions either at the Conclusion of the parts, or of the whole Oration.

CHAP. XXIII.

Of Speaking Quaintly.

TO speak Quaintly, this is one Place: as when we speak *Enthymemes* either entire or by halves; so that the Auditors may comprehend the half; to which purpose we ought to include Sentences. And these pithy sayings

we are to disperse into all the parts of the Oration, never altering the words, and never uttering the same in the same Sentence.

But he that would be prolix in his Orations, must divide the matter into parts, and then teach the nature and use of every thing contain'd in each part, both in private and in Common, and to declare at large his Colours and Pretences.

If yet we would spin out the Oration more in length, we must make use of many words to express every particular, and make Repetitions in every part of the Oration, only let every Repetition be Concise. But at the end of the Oration rammass all the Particulars of which before you had discours'd particularly and distinctly together into one heap: and thus may we prolong our Orations. But if we study Conciseness we must comprehend the whole matter in one word: some few Copulatives may be us'd, but most things are to be joyn'd into one: all Repetitions taken out of the parts, and only repeated in the Conclusion.

If we study Mediocrity, then to cull out the chiefest of the Parts, and discourse only upon that. We are also to make use of the middle sort of words, neither the longest nor the shortest; not of many about one thing; but in the middle between both. Nor must we wholly take away our Epilogues out of the middle parts, nor use 'em in all the parts: but where we desire the Hearers to take most notice, there to use 'em in the end.

But if we would write a facetious Oration, take care to observe and assimilate the nature of
the

the words to the nature of men. Which may be done, if we consider which are the greatest, which the most accurate, which the intermediate both of Natures and Customs.

CHAP. XXIV.

Of the Disposition of Words.

THE Figures of words are three, Simple, Compound, and Metaphorical. The one terminates in a Vowel, and ends in a Vowel by Syllables. The second begins from a Mute, and ends in a Mute. The third binds Mutes and Vowels together.

There are also four orders of words; the one places parallel, or else separates like words: the second makes use of the same words, or changes 'em into others: the other calls the thing by one or more words: the other names Transactions in order, or else passes 'em by.

CHAP. XXV.

Of Interpretation.

Interpretation is first to be divided into two parts, and then to be made perspicuous. We divide Interpretation into two parts thus. First, *That he is able to do both this and that other.* Secondly, *That this man can, the other*

cannot. Thirdly, *That this man can do both this and that.* Fourthly, *That neither he nor the other can.* Fifthly, *That he can, but the other cannot.* Sixthly, *That one is able to do the other thing, but that the other is not able to do the other thing.*

First, *He can do both this and the other thing too; Thus: But I was not only the Author of these things in your behalf, but hinder'd Timotheus, who was ready to march against ye.*

Secondly, *This man cannot, the other can; as thus. Your Embassadors cannot, but this man, who is a friend to the Spartans, is able to do your business.*

Thirdly, *This man can do both this and that too: He has not only shew'd himself most stout and valiant in War, but for Counsel and Advice he gives way to none.*

Fourthly, *Neither he nor another can. Thus; Neither he nor any other of his fellow Citizens with a small force can dislodge the Enemy.*

Fifthly, *But he can, the other cannot; As thus. He is vigorous in his strength, but I am weak in body.*

Sixthly, *He himself can do that other thing, but the other cannot do the other thing; as thus. I that stand at the Helm am able, but he that has the Oar in his hand will never be able.*

CHAP. XXVI.

Of Dilucidation.

IN the first place, give to all things their own Proper Names, avoiding Ambiguities. Beware of placing the Articles in their right and Proper Places; least the Composition be confus'd, nor disorderly, To the Conjunctions spoken before, add the following Copulatives: as thus. *I was present, where I appointed; but he who said he would come, came not.* Again, as when the same Copulative follows, *For thou wert the cause of those things, and of these thou also.*

Confusion of words is thus. *'Tis a hard case for this man to strike this man;* for it is not clear which was the Person that strook.

How the Articles are to be properly plac'd from hence observe. This man this man injures. This is clear in the *Greek*, where there is a distinction of Nominative and accusative; but not in *English*, where the Verb must come between.

Sometimes one word has two significations; but that signification is to be apply'd, which is most Proper to the sense, and which the series of the discourse requires.

CHAP. XXVII.

Of Antitheta, Æquates.

ANtitheta are those things which both in name and Efficacie, are contrary to their Opposites, or either the one or the other.

Contrary both in name and words, thus ;
For it is not just, that this man enjoying my Estate should grow Rich ; but that I being depriv'd of my own, should be thus miserably Poor.

Contrary in name only, as thus, *Let the Rich and Happy give to the Poor and Miserable :*
 Contrary in Efficacy thus. *I cur'd this man when he lay sick, but he has done me the greatest injuries Imaginable.* Here is a contrariety in the deed, not in the words. So that the nearest *Antithesis* is both in name and thing.

CHAP. XXVIII.

Of Equation.

Equation is when two even clauses are pronounced : and thus many small clauses may be equal to a few great ones, and equal in Bigness to equal in Number. And this is the form of Equation, *Either for want Money,* or through the greatness of the War. For these Clauses are neither like nor contrary, yet are they equal one among another.

CHAP. XXIX,

Of Paromiosis, or like Cadencies.

Paromiosis is that which is bigger then Equation : For it does not only make Clauses even, but a like, and of like words ; as thus
Bring.

Bring a desire equal to that Imitation of Oration which becomes thee: But chiefly the Conclusions of the words are to be alike. Now those are like words, that consist of like Syllables, wherein most Letters are the same as in *ἐνδεῖς* & *ἐντελεῖς*; or as in the English *Warm, Harm, Charm, Arm*. Or as if we should say, This clink the Close is now left off by us in Prose, And so we pass again to *Exordiums*.

CHAP. XXX:

Of Exordiums.

THE *Exordium*, is a Preparation of the Auditors, and a Summary Declaration of the Subject to those that know it not, that they may understand the subject of the Discourse, and give Attention to it; and as far as we are able, to desire their favourable Construction of our words.

In making our first proposition to the hearers, thus; *I stood up, to advise, how we should carry on the War against the Syracusans*. Or, *I stood up to shew, that it did not behove us to assist the Syracusans*. And this a brief summing up of the Matter.

Now how to perswade to attention, we shall best know from hence, if we understand, what words and subjects most provoke our attention. Now we are generally most attentive when we consult either about great things, or terrible things,

things, or things familiar to us. Or when the Orator tell us they will demonstrate to us, how just, how honest, how useful, how easie to be accomplish'd those things are to which they exhort us: or request the Auditory to hear 'em with Attention. Therefore as they themselves use to deal by others, so likewise we choosing out of the premises, the most proper to the business in hand, and making 'em clear to the Hearers, shall gain their Attention.

Then we shall acquire their favour and good Will, observing first how they stand affected to our selves in particular, whether kindly or morosely, whether well or ill. If they are benevolent, it will be needless to speak of benevolence, but if we must needs take notice of their kindness, we ought to speak briefly with an *Ironie* in this manner. *How great has been my affection to this City; and how often, by my perswasion, you have acted with great profit and advantage; and how just I have shewn my self to the Public, rather choosing to expend of my own, then to be a Debtor to the Commonwealth, I deem it needless to put ye in mind, who know it so well already; now therefore if you will be rul'd by me, I shall endeavour to shew ye, how ye may do well.*

But if the Hearers are neither opposite, nor well dispos'd, we may tell 'em, That it is but just and useful, that they should be kind to such and such Citizens, and discourage those who have as yet given no experiment of themselves. Then we may stroke the Auditory with an *Encomium*, That they have always been accusom'd to pass their judgments gravely and justly.

Allo Extenuations may be us'd; as thus: *I stood*
up

up, not confiding so much in my Eloquence, but believing I should offer that which would be for the benefit of the Public.

But as for those that are obnoxious to Accusations, of necessity either themselves, or the matter of which they discourse, or the Oration it self must contain the Accusations. Now these Scandals are drawn either from the time past or present. If any suspicion be had of any, from the time past, then make use of *Anticipation* towards the Auditors. *Nor am I ignorant, that I lye under some kind of Scandal among ye: But I shall make all those appear to be false.* Then make a short Apology in the *Exordium* (if thou hast any thing to say for thy self, or in repeal of the Judgments) for if a man lie under any Scandal privately or publickly, judgment will surely follow, or else has been already, or else the Accusers will not take judgment; and we must then say that the thing was unjustly adjudg'd; or that we were injur'd by our Enemies: or if this be not so probable; that it ought to suffice for us, who had then the worst of it, and that it is unjust, since the Matters are already decreed, to bring the Accusations upon the Stage again.

But if the Sentence be likely to prove notorious, then alleadge thy self prepar'd to answer all Accusations in this most honourable Assembly, and that if thou hast done the Commonwealth any injury knowingly and of set purpose, thou art ready to suffer. If the Enemies do not insist violently, then bring the Argument of conjecture, That because they believe they have accus'd us falsely, therefore they desist from their Prosecution. For it is not probable that they should refuse to have

have Judgment given, had they brought a real Accusation. Also we ought at the same time to inveigh against Calumny, letting the world know how venomous, how pernicious, and of how many mischiefs it is the common Cause: and how many men have been ruin'd by false Accusations. We may also declare how idle a thing it is for those that consult the common safety not to hear what is said by all, and then to consider what they hear, but to lye festring the Accusations of particular persons. And therefore for thy part, thou art to declare and promise, that thou wilt offer nothing but what is just, honourable, and profitable.

Accusations from the present time are brought against Orators, first for their Age. For if they be either too young or too old, the Auditory is offended. Or if the Orator speak without intermission, for then he seems to take too much business upon him, though he never spake before, and he seems to speak for some private end, that harangues contrary to the common custom.

For these things, excuses and pretences must be alledged by the younger person, from want of Advisers, or that he has not chosen any Subject, but what may become his Age, as the *Gymnasium*, Horſes, Armes, Warlike preparations, all which Subjects are proper for Youth to handle.

He may also insist, that if his years do not permit to be as yet so wise, howe're, that he may have acquir'd it by study and diligence: and he may do well to intimate, that by his failing no man suffers but himself, but if it be profitable what he says, the whole Nation will receive the Benefit.

A

A Person superannuated, brings his excuses likewise from the want of Advisers, and his own sufficiency; from the greatness and novelty of the dangers that threaten. Or if he be one that has frequently advis'd, from his Experience; and from the shame it would be, that he who had so often advis'd, should not now be permitted to speak.

These are reproaches as to the Person; but there are other as to the Matter. When the Orator perswades quiet to those who have done no injury, or those that are Superiour in Power, or to make an ignominious Peace, or perswades a niggardly Parcimony as to the Sacrifices to the Gods.

Here Anticipation must be made use of towards the Auditors, and the Causes of these things must be refer'd either to Necessity or Fortune, or the Times, or some particular Advantage; and alledge, that not the Advisers, but the things themselves are the occasion of the Accidents.

Now the Oration accuses in Popular Harangues, when it is either long, or too Antique, or not over probable. If prolix, the reason must be ascrib'd to prolixity of the Subjects. If ancient, yet that it is at this time seasonable; if not probable, promise to make it appear true in the progress of the Oration.

And thus we are to constitute our Popular Harangues; but how shall we order 'em? If there be no exception against the Matter nor the Orations, expose the Proposition presently at the beginning: then request attention and benevolent Audience. But if there be any Exceptions, we
are

are to anticipate the Auditory, bringing first our Apologies, and Excuses as briefly as we can, and requesting the favour of the Hearers.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of Narration.

AFTER all this, there is a necessity that either we relate or call to mind past Transactions, or that we declare present Actions, or that we foretell such as are to come to pass hereafter. If then we were to repeat the Transactions of an Embassie, it would behove us to relate all things that were said perspicuously, that first the Grandeur of the Oration might appear. For this would be only a bare Narrative, where no other Figure of speech would interfere. So that if any miscarriage happen'd, the Hearers may believe that it did not fall out through any negligence of ours, but for some other Cause. But if it fell out according to our expectation, they may not believe it happen'd by Chance, but by means of Industry and Sedulity. And this they will the more easily believe, seeing that if they were not present at the Transaction of Affairs, they may observe by our Alacrity in the delivery of our Relation, that we have not left out any thing, but that we accurately give an accompt of every thing. But in a Popular Harangue, when we either call to mind things past, or make a relation of the present Affair, or foretell what is to come, we are to do these things, briefly, perspicuously,

spicuously, and not with probability. Perspicuously, that the Hearers may understand what is said; Briefly, that they may remember what is spoken; faithfully, lest before we have confirm'd our Oration by proofs and legality of Proceedings, the Hearers should reject our Relation. We shall perspicuously make appear either from words, or from the business it self. From the business it self, if we do not relate the Matters confusedly and out of order, but such as were first done or to be done, in the first Place: and the rest afterwards in their Order; and not forsaking the Order which we have propos'd to our selves, to fall upon another thing.

In Words we shall be perspicuous, when we relate the Transactions in words proper to the Matter; and if we place our words according to the common custom, and not confusedly or prefunctorily; but always observing a Coherency.

In Brevity we shall be perspicuous, if both from things and words we cut off those things which are not necessary to be spoken; leaving only those things, which if they should be taken away, the Oration would be obscure and difficult to be understood. We shall be thought faithful, and to be credited, if we bring Reasons, by which the things that are said to be done may seem to be probable. And as for those things that are like to fall under too great a Censure of Improbability, to lay 'em quite aside. But if of necessity they must be spoken, the Orator must relate the things upon his own knowledge, and reserving 'em to the Proper place of refutation, where he intends to handle other

other things that are intermix'd, must promise in the Progress of his Oration to make 'em out to be true, pretending first to make out other things more difficult ; which being, done, there is no Question but they will believe the rest. Which is the way to cure the Incredulity of the Hearers.

CHAP. XXXII.

Of Manifestations and Predictions:

AND now we shall order these Narrations, Manifestations and Predictions after a threefold manner. For if the Actions of which we discourse be few, and notorious to the Hearers, we must joyn the Relation to the *Exordium*, least that part being plac'd separately should seem too short.

But when the affairs are very many and unknown, it is requisite that Relations be join'd to every one, and that we make 'em out to be just, profitable and honest, by which means we may not only make a bare Relation without any Variety, but take the Ears of the Hearers. But if they be Actions but of a middle concernment, then the Relation, or the Manifestation, or the Prediction must be plac'd in the *Exordium*, as part of the Body of it ; which may be done, if we Prosecute the Relation from the beginning of it without intermission, not taking in any thing, but barely and nakedly relating the things themselves.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Of Confirmation.

OF necessity, Confirmation must follow next, to confirm the Relations foregoing by just and profitable Proofs, as we promis'd before to do. Seeing then we are to make our Relations closely connex'd together, the most proper Proof for Popular Harangues are to be drawn from the Custom of things, from Example, from Commemoration, and from the Opinion which all men conceive of the Orator. And if we happen upon any other Proofs, they are to be made use of.

Now these Proofs are thus to be rank'd. First, the opinion concerning the Speaker. Which if it cannot be done, then first the usual Custom of things; where we must shew, That the things by us related, and the like to them, usually were wont to be done in this manner; and then we must bring Examples: and if there be any thing of Similitude with those things which we have spok'n, we must not omit it. Those Examples also are to be made choice of, which are both agreeable to the matter and to the Auditory; and next in place or time. But if there be none such, then from such other things as are of greatest importance and most notoriously known. After this, we must make use of Sentences. For we are to terminate these parts where Probabilities and Examples were handl'd, with *Enthymemes* and Sentences. And this is to be done for the confirmation of matters.

But

But if credit be immediately given to the Relation, we may omit the Proofs themselves, and deduce the Confirmation of the Actions before rehears'd from assertions of just, legal, useful, pleasant, easie, possible and necessary. And if it be so, just is to be plac'd in Front; proceeding with what is like to just, what contrary to just, and what has been adjudg'd to be just.

Examples are also to be brought like to those things by thee averr'd to be just. And you will have many things to say from those things by every one in particular suppos'd to be just, and from those things so deem'd in the same City where the Oration is deliver'd, as also in several other Cities, concluding in the end with Sentences, and midling *Enthymemes*, differing one among another, if the part be prolix; and if we, design to recollect, making use of a concise Repetition. But if it be of a moderate length, with a Recapitulation, putting an end to that part, we may begin another. As for Example;

That it is just for us to assist the Siracusans, I believe to be sufficiently made out by what we have said. Now that it will be also for our advantage, I shall endeavour to shew ye. And then again, as to Profit and Advantage, the same Method is to be observ'd, as has been taught in reference to *Just*, adding to the end of the part either a Repetition or a Conclusion, and then beginning again with what remains behind: And this is the way to joyn one part to another, and so finish the whole contexture of the Oration. At last having by Proofs sufficiently confirm'd the thing which thou wouldst perswade, then Summarily with *Enthymemes*, Sentences, and Flourishes,

it

it behoves thee to shew, that it is unjust, disadvantageous, infamous, and unpleasant to act otherwise; adding a brief *Antithesis*, that it is both just, profitable, honourable and delightful to follow thy Counsel and Advice, closing up the whole with certain grave and pithy Sentences.

CHAP. XXXIV.

Of Anticipation.

A *Anticipation* is when we endeavour to vilifie the objections that have been made against what has been said by us. Therefore it behoves us to lessen the objections of the adversary, and extol our own Assertions; to which purpose it will be requisite to compare one with one, if thine be the greater, or more with more, or one with many, or many with one: and when we have done this, we must conclude with Repetitions, and the fore mention'd Colours and Flourishes of Ratioeination, Enumeration, Election, Interrogation and Irony.

CHAP. XXXV.

Several manners of Persuasion.

BUT now, if we were to perswade the giving assistance either to private Persons or to Cities; Brevity will be most convenient: and if any acts of Friendship, Favour, or Pity have
T formerly

formerly past between them and the Auditors, it will be well remember'd. For men are apt to assist those who have been formerly so affected toward 'em: and have a kindness for those from whom, or from whose friends, either themselves or their Relations have receiv'd any kindness, or so believe. Now if we find that any thing of this has been done, it is to be urg'd to excite Compassion. It is also to be made out, that they either do or may or are like to suffer unjustly, unless they are assisted by the Auditory.

If these *Places* are wanting, we are to prove 'em destitute of all those Felicities that other men enjoy, and that they never can be able to arrive at any thing of a happy Condition, unless the Auditory take pity upon 'em. And thus we incite to Compassion.

But we divert from pity by alledging the contraries, laying open the whole business, and by Proofs demonstrating to the Auditory, that what they go about to do is unjust, illegal, pernicious, infamous, &c.

But he that would contradict the Persuasions of others, must lay down in his *Exordium* the Assertions of his adversary, which he designs to oppose; what else he has to say must be done in several Prologues by themselves. After the Prologues, he is to prove every one of the said Assertions to be either false, or unjust, or illegal, or pernicious, nor consentaneous to what the adversary exhorts. Which he must do by proving his Allegations of Falshood, Injustice, Illegality, Perniciousness, &c. And this is the cheifest way of Dissuasion.

But if this be not to be done, then make use
of

of what remains : as if the adversary Demonstrate the thing to be just, endeavour thou to prove it infamous, or unprofitable , or irksome , or impossible, or whatever else may be proper to thy purpose.

If the adversary demonstrates the thing to be profitable, do thou prove it to be unjust, or bring whatever other objection may stand thee in stead : magnifying thy own, and clouding the Arguments of thy adversary. Nor will it be amiss to make use of *Enthymemes* and Sentences, and at length to sum up all in a Recapitulation, having first refuted the Anticipations of the Adversary.

CHAP. XXXIV.

Of Praise and Dispraise.

IN praising and dispraising we are to order our Proems after the same manner as in the *Deliberative* kind. After the Proem we are to divide the benefits external to vertue, and the benefits internal in vertue. The benefits external to vertue are Health, Strength, Beauty, Wealth. Internal vertues are Wisdom, Justice, Fortitude, and the more noble Sciences. Now we praise those things that are seated and inherent in vertue. But as for the Strong, the Healthy, the Rich, the Beautiful and the High born, we do not applaud them, but we say that they are happy. Which things being diligently consider'd, we order the Genealogy in the first place : for that, both as to men, and all other Creatures

is in the first place either noble or ignoble. And therefore we rightly begin the praises either of men or of any other Creature from their descent. But when we design to extol any affection, or thing, any Oration, or Estate, we praise what is most worthy Commendation in them.

From the Stock we derive our *Encomiums* thus. If his Progenitors were famous, we are to enumerate every one from the first of the race to the Person living, and of every one make some remarkable Observation. If the first were persons of Industry, and men of Repown, and that the rest were Persons never noted for any worthy Acts, we are to extol the first, and pass by the rest, pretending that by reason of the great number of his Ancestors, thou wilt not be tedious in enumerating the whole Line: besides that it cannot be unknown to all men, that they who are born of generous Parents, generally tread the footsteps of their Fore-fathers. But if the first Progenitors were men of ill Fame, and the Father and Grandfather Persons of Renown, the first are to be omitted under pretence of Prolixity: and the last are to be applauded, not doubting but the Progenitors of such Persons were equal in value to them. But if there were nothing of Splendid Ancestry, praise the Person himself for his own Generosity and Bravery, adding, that all men are well born who are born to Vertue; and that they are to be prefer'd before all others, who are born to be the Ornaments of their own Parentage, and give lustre to their Ancestry; for that many times Persons born of Noble Parentage, degenerate.

The same Method is to be used in vilifying the Parentage of any Person. When

When we come to the Actions of the Person whom we applaud, we are first to begin with his Justice, then commend him for his Prudence, next for his Fortitude; and in every *Encomium*, it will not be amiss to use many words, to render the Oration Splendid and Magnificent.

In vilifying, Ironies are of great use, and to deride the Adversary in those things for which he chiefly magnifies himself.

CHAP. XXXVII.

Of the sorts of Questions.

Interrogation is chiefly useful against Contradictions. And they that Interrogate must begin in the same manner with those that are accused. Where when we have brought proper pretences at the beginning for so doing, we are then to proceed to Interrogate. Now the Proper pretences in Civil Assemblies are, that we do not do it for contentions sake, but to make the matter plain to the Auditory; and because the Adversary first began with us. Now in private Disputes we are to alledge the Enmities, or the ill manners of the Persons interrogated, or their Affection to the Adverse party. In public Disputes we must alledge Legality, Justice and Public profit.

The Proem thus fram'd out of these, and things like these, after we have propounded in order every one of the things done, said, or thought,

thought, we must make our Interrogations, and shew how they are contrary to Justice, to Law, to publick and private Profit; and then we must consider all together, whether they are contrary to themselves, to the Manners of good men, or such as seem to be so.

But to avoid prolixity in enumerating every one particularly one by one, how much the more we prove the Persons interrogated to be averse to ingenious Studies, to good Actions, or good Manners, by so much the more shall we render 'em obnoxious to the Auditors. Nor must we interrogate with a severe and morose Countenance; but a mild and winning Aspect. By which means the Orators will avoid all pretence of Scandal, and their Orations will be the more acceptable to the People.

When we have diligently interrogated as much as is needful, and enlarg'd upon the Questions, then it will be requisite to sum up all at the conclusion, for the satisfaction of the Auditory.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

The Peroration.

NOW then it behoves those that speak and write, to deliver their Orations according to the Actions, and to accustom our selves to make use of all these things promptly and readily. How then to speak Artificially both in private and public Disputes, and in Converse with others, we have here the most, and the most Artificial

cial assistances. But an Orator must not only be careful of his Words, but of his Life, to adorn it with the *Idea's* afore mention'd. For the care of a mans Life and Conversation avails as well to perswasion, as to the gaining of Esteem and Reputation. First then, we are to divide things according to the division of true Discipline, what is to be handl'd in the first, and what in the second, what in the third, and what in the fourth place. Then we are to make those preparations which are necessary for the Auditors, as in the Chapter of *Exordiums*. For we may win favour to our Persons if we keep constant to our Professions, and preserve the same friends while we live; not wavering in our Studies, but still following the same course. We shall render the Auditors attentive, if our Subjects be always Important, Honourable and Profitable. Now having made the Auditory both kind and attentive, when we come to propose our Matter, whatever contains the disswasion from Evil, and the perswasion to Good, they will readily and easily admit, as being for their advantage, or else reject the contrary. Now to render thy Oration brief, perspicuous and profitable, this is to be done. Thou shalt quickly conclude if thou doest not design to act all together, but the first, first of all, and the next in order. Thou wilt be perspicuous, if thou makest an end of one thing before thou passest to another.

Thy Oration will be probable, if thou doest not act any thing contrary to thy own Genius, and the good opinion had of thee; and if thou dost not pretend the same Persons to be both thy Friends and Enemies:

Of Proofs, we are to make choice of these
which

which we know to be so proper to accomplish our business, that we are able to explain 'em to others: but as for such as we have not real knowledge of, to take those as they most frequently happen. For thou shalt act most securely in things of this nature, if thou art guided by custom.

In Disputes with the Adversary, if we contend by way Oration, we must make out our Proofs out of those things that are spoken.

But if the Dispute be about Contracts, we are to proceed according to the Laws both written and unwritten, with the choicest witnesses, and at a time perfix'd.

And in the Conclusion we shall the better imprint into the Memory of the Auditors, what has been spoken, if we make a brief and summary Repetition.

Of our Actions we shall put 'em in mind, when we handle the same again, or like the former.

We shall win the good will of the Auditory, if we act those things by which they have receiv'd, or do or are like to receive any Benefit. And we shall act great things if we undertake Actions that are the Causes of many and honorable events. And these are the Preparations we must make toward a vertuous Life: the former Treatises concern'd the Exercises of Eloquence.

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